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This PhD thesis asks how ‘neo-liberal’ was the Thatcher government? Existing 
accounts tend to characterise neo-liberalism as a homogeneous, and often ill-defined, 
group of thinkers that exerted a broad influence over the Thatcher government. This 
thesis - through a combination of archival research, interviews and examination of 
ideological texts - defines the dominant strains of neo-liberalism more clearly and 
explores their relationship with Thatcherism. In particular, the schools of liberal 
economic thought founded in Vienna and Chicago are examined and juxtaposed with 
the initial neo-liberals originating from Freiburg in 1930s and 1940s Germany. 
Economic policy and deregulation were the areas that most clearly linked neo-liberal 
thinking with Thatcherism, but this thesis looks at a broad cross section of the wider 
programme of the Thatcher government. This includes other domestic policies such as 
education and housing, as well as the Thatcher government’s success in reducing or 
altering the pressures exerted by vested interests such as the trade unions and 
monopolies. Lastly, while less associated with neo-liberal theory, foreign policy, in 
the area of overseas aid, is examined to show how ideas filtered into the international 
arena during the 1980s. Although clearly a political project, the policies of 
Thatcherism, in so far as they were ideological, resonate most with the more 
expedient, or practical, Friedmanite strain of neo-liberalism. This encapsulated a 
willingness to utilize the state, often in contradictory ways, to pursue more market-
orientated policies. As such, it sat somewhere between the more rules-based 
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The policies associated with Margaret Thatcher’s government, as well as the 
contested and often opaque term Thatcherism, have been closely linked with liberal 
economic ideology. Many books on the subject simply state this as a fact while others 
question either the assumption itself or at the very least wonder to what extent it is 
true.1 The events of 1979 to 1990 have proved fascinating and controversial with 
much literature being generated about the formation of the policies that came to 
define Thatcherism, the government’s time in power and, of course, its legacy. 
 
Why, then, revisit the subject? Mainly because the link between ideas and the 
Thatcher government has frequently been over-generalised and under-specified. The 
connection between individual thinkers and schools of thought has been to present 
them as a bloc, in some ways encouraged by economic liberals, in particular ‘the 
Mont Pelerin collective’.2 The result has been often to blur significant distinctions. 
For instance Eric J. Evans, in Thatcher and Thatcherism (2004), describes Keith 
Joseph’s conversion to monetarism in the 1970s.  
 
Above all, following the theories of the so-called Chicago school of anti-
Keynesian economists, F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, Joseph called for 





2 Margaret Thatcher Foundation (hereafter MTF), MTF 117203, ‘Friedrich Hayek letter to Arthur 





Lastly, the application of liberal ideas to specific policies has not been explored as 
extensively as the overall picture of Thatcherism, political events like the Cold War 
and Falklands conflict or individual personalities. The intricacy of policy formulation 
and ideology has informed later events and trends. These points, and an attempt to 
differentiate the components and impact of free market ideas, form the core of this 
thesis. The strands of modern liberal economic thought, sometimes dubbed ‘neo-
liberalism’, will be brought into sharper focus and compared with the policies of the 
Thatcher government. The question of how and to what extent these ideas were 
implemented in particular policies is the second objective of this project. 
 
‘The Thatcher government was influenced by Hayek and Friedman’ or internationally 
‘Thatcher and Reagan brought about free-market revolutions in the 1980s’ typifies the 
kind of statements found in many texts.4 The Thatcher government has also been seen 
as being at the vanguard of a neo-liberal project or a shift toward ‘market 
fundamentalism’.5 In the very broadest sense all these assumptions are true but it is 
rather like saying the Soviet Union was influenced by Karl Marx or, to use a more 
obscure example, that New Labour was influenced by Anthony Giddens. The reality 
is far more complex. This thesis adds to the growing interest in how neo-liberalism 
has developed since the early to mid-twentieth century and its different positions. 
Apart from the analysis of ideological models and actual policy, this project attempts 
to link ideas with policy makers and politicians, if indeed any existed.  
 
                                                        
4 Joseph Stiglitz, Freefall. Free markets and the sinking of the global economy, (London: Penguin, 
2010), pp. 17-18. 
5 Taylor Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse, ‘Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal 




The eleven and a half years that the Thatcher government was in power is clearly of 
great historical significance. Contentious, polarising and controversial, these years did 
much to change the political landscape of Britain. Lower taxes, for the most part low 
inflation, mass consumerism, home ownership, ‘choice’ in public services, trade 
unions as an ‘outsider’ group and privately owned utilities are all now the norm. This 
list would have seemed unlikely to mainstream public and establishment opinion from 
the Second World War until the late 1970s but to reverse the new orthodoxy now 
would require huge upheaval. Two unique aspects of the government between 1979 
and 1990 mark it out. Firstly, the personality, character and leadership style of 
Margaret Thatcher. Secondly, the ideas, dogma or philosophy that the government’s 
policies embodied. The former has been the subject of reams of material, biographies, 
films - and clichés. With over thirty years since Margaret Thatcher came to power, 
and with an increasing number of government and personal papers now being 
declassified, there is space for further investigation of the relationship between liberal 




• To what extent was the Thatcher government influenced by liberal economic 
thought? Which strands of thought and which thinkers exerted most influence 
and in which areas? 
• How closely did the policies implemented by the Thatcher government match 
neo-liberal models? Why were there differences? 





• To what extent did the Thatcher government actually reduce the power of 
vested interests? 
• What impact did liberal economic thought have on the foreign as well as on 
the domestic policy of the Thatcher government?  




This study uses a variety of qualitative research methods. Primary sources were 
obtained from archives, such as the Thatcher Papers at the Churchill Library in 
Cambridge, the Prime Minister and Cabinet files at the National Archives in Kew, the 
Margaret Thatcher Foundation and papers of other politicians and government 
advisors. Interviews were conducted with some of the key political figures as well as 
thinkers and civil servants. Memoirs were a key source as well as Hansard and 
witness seminars. Lastly, ideological texts were studied in an attempt to frame New 
Right policy models. These were then compared with the actual policies formulated 
by the Thatcher government, some of them traced through secondary literature. Ideas 
are transmitted in a number of different ways, from the ‘primary’ thinkers themselves, 
for instance Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, through the work of think-tanks 
such as the IEA, as well as periodicals and journalists. All of these have been used to 
frame ideological viewpoints. The mechanisms by which ideas eventually manifest 
themselves in policies are also explored in this thesis.  
 
A caveat regarding the primary source material is in order, however: up until the time 




between 1979 and 1984 due to the 30 year rule. Therefore evidence of this type is 
skewed towards the first government. Secondly, many other protagonists of the period 
were invited for interview but declined. Thirdly, not all the key players have left 
papers or written memoirs. Keith Joseph was the most important example. 
 
Parameters of this project 
 
This is a study that examines the influence of liberal economic thought on British 
government policy makers. Therefore other strands of thinking will not be examined 
in detail. This is not a character study. There are already several books on the various 
facets of Margaret Thatcher’s personality, and it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
explore this any further. The emphasis is on how closely neo-liberal models were 
applied empirically, how the government was influenced, why they departed from 
‘pure’ ideology and what economic liberals thought of the reforms once they were put 
in place. Other intrigues of the period, such as the ERM, Poll Tax and the downfall of 
the Thatcher government, are not discussed. Lastly, the breadth of this study is large 
because of the amount of time the Thatcher government was in power. Therefore only 
select case studies have been chosen, albeit those which represent a cross section of 
the government’s programme. Each of these has some association with liberal ideas. 
This unsurprisingly includes economic policy, deregulation and liberalization. It also 
takes into account social policies such as education, on which neo-liberals produced 
much work, and health, which represented the limit of ideology on Thatcherism. One 
privatization, electricity, is focused on as it conveniently allows comparison with the 
others that preceded it such as British Gas and British Telecom. Finally, although 




examined. This is because contemporary themes of globalization and the Washington 
Consensus allude to the effect of neo-liberalism. As a result the emphasis of the 




There is a wealth of literature that looks at Margaret Thatcher, her government and 
the wider politics of the time. There are also several books that examine New Right 
ideology and some that integrate these ideas with the politics of Thatcherism. The 
best of these, perhaps, is now nearly twenty years old - Thinking the Unthinkable by 
Richard Cockett (1995), which identifies the work and development of the Mont 
Pelerin Society and IEA with their inspiration, the Fabian Society. The book puts a 
particular emphasis on the think-tanks that proliferated in the post-war period. 
Cockett does compare New Right ideas with the direction of the first Thatcher 
government, ending on a note of disappointment. Andrew Gamble has written on 
Thatcherism from the left, for instance in Marxism Today in the 1970s and later in 
works like Thatcher’s Law (1989, with Celia Wells) and Britain in Decline (1994). 
Gamble was the first to characterise the government’s programme as ‘the free 
economy and the strong state’ and later wrote a book of the same title. Martin Holmes 
wrote an early and authoritative account of Thatcherism in his 1985 book The First 
Thatcher Government, 1979-1983. Holmes identified what he thought was the major 
success of that government, the defeat of inflation, but suggested that other policies 
were too cautious. A subsequent book, Thatcherism: Scope and Limits (1989) drew a 





Think-tanks have been considered a major part of the battle of ideas, particularly in 
the years before the Conservatives came to power in 1979. Andrew Denham covered 
four of these (the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Centre for Policy Studies 
(CPS), Adam Smith Institute (ASI) and Social Affairs Unit (SAU)) as well as their 
impact on policies like health and education in Think-tanks of the New Right (1996). 
Michael Kandiah and Anthony Seldon’s collection Ideas and Think Tanks in 
Contemporary Britain (1996) again concentrates on think-tanks but across the 
political spectrum. An organisation on which less writing exists, the Bow Group, is 
catalogued in James Barr’s Bow Group: A  History (2001). The book revealed how the 
Group sought to have a similar effect to the Fabians but quickly became part of the 
Conservative Party apparatus, before aligning more explicitly with the New Right in 
the 1970s. Finally, Norman Barry has written several excellent works, including The 
New Right (1987) and On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism (1986), which act 





A much-maligned term, there has been a growing body of literature that sets neo-
liberalism in both its historical context and its different strains. Several recent books 
explore the origin of neo-liberalism and its variants. Rachel S.Turner’s Neo-Liberal 
Ideology. History, Concepts and Policies (2008) defines the three broad schools of 
neo-liberalism: German ordoliberalism, the Austrian School associated with Friedrich 




Stigler and Gary Becker.6 This differentiation provides the emphasis for this thesis. 
Mark Skousen, in Vienna & Chicago. Friends or Foes? A  Tale of Two Schools of 
Free-Market Economics (2005), explores the key differences between two of these 
approaches to neo-liberalism. This includes how Austrians and Chicagoans have held 
separate views on monopoly, competition, monetary control and the business cycle.7 
Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe’s collection The Road From Mont Pelerin. The 
Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (2009) examines these separate 
positions in more detail, from the German thinkers of the 1930s to the more familiar 
Chicago School. There is a particular focus on how neo-liberals view state power and 
democratic processes, as well as a focus on the deliberately collective nature of the 
Mont Pelerin Society.8 Masters of the Universe. Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of 
Neoliberal Politics (2012) by Daniel Stedman-Jones again dissects the early variant of 
neo-liberalism in Europe and its transformation once it had crossed the Atlantic. 
Stedman-Jones identifies two Chicago Schools, an earlier one led by Henry Simons 
more in the ‘social’ ordoliberal tradition, and the increasingly radical and economics-
driven Friedmanite School from 1946.9 There is some analysis of how ideology was 
applied in housing policy and enterprise zones in the UK and US in the 1980s. The 
book also examines Hayek’s relationship with the ordoliberals, and provides some 
emphasis on the welfare sentiments contained in The Road to Serfdom, which slowly 
eroded within the neo-liberal collective as the Chicago School gained in influence.10 
                                                        




8 Hayek admitted he would prefer to temporarily lose democracy rather than freedom. Philip Mirowski, 
‘Postface: Defining Neoliberalism’, The Road From Mont Pelerin. The Making of the Neoliberal 
Thought Collective. P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe, eds. (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 
446, Dieter Plehwe, ‘Introduction’, The Road From Mont Pelerin, p. 8. 
9 Daniel Stedman‐Jones, Masters of the Universe. Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal 
Politics, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 122. 




This thesis will modify this last point by arguing that Austrian thinking has remained 
closest to classical liberalism by focusing on microeconomics and maintaining even 
more of a distaste for the state than its austere Chicagoan counterparts.   
 
Taylor Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse’s 2009 article ‘Neoliberalism: From New 
Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan’ illustrates how the term has become 
increasingly opaque, and achieved negative connotations, over the past twenty 
years.11 They also explore the development from German neo-liberalism to the catch-
all term of the 2000s. There are many examples that prove these points. For instance, 
Richard Falk, in The Iraq War and Democratic Politics (2005), wrote ‘globally, neo-
conservatism amounts to the adoption of a more militarist version of neo-liberalism, 
which includes a renewed avowal of the security role of the United States as global 
hegemon.’12 Similarly in Anthony Held and David McGrew’s Globalization/Anti-
Globalization (2002) they use neo-liberalism interchangeably with neoconservatism.13 
The term is sometimes even used in the mainstream British press, for example when 
Guardian journalist Polly Toynbee described Conservative politician Chris Grayling 
in 2012 as having found inspiration ‘from all the neoliberal small statism wafting 
across the Atlantic, imbued with the Ayn Rand and Fox News meanness of spirit.’14 A 
much more detailed and better argued critique of neo-liberalism from the left is David 
Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005). Harvey expands the ‘free 
economy-strong state’ argument to include Deng Xiaoping’s China.15 The book also 
                                                        
11 Boas and Gans-Morse, ‘Neoliberalism’, p. 137. 
12 Richard Falk, ‘The global setting’, The Iraq War and Democratic Politics, edited by Alex Danchev 
and John MacMillan, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 27. 
13 David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003), p. 100. 
14 Polly Toynbee, ‘To condemn those who pay so little is not job snobbery’, The Guardian, 20 April 
2012, p. 35. 




identifies the contradictions between neo-liberal theory and practice, setting out that 
the reality has not necessarily been a smaller state.16 Nevertheless, Harvey sees neo-
liberalism in conspiratorial tones, as the ‘new imperialism’. Jamie Peck, in 
Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (2010) follows several of these arguments but 
highlights the manner in which neo-liberalism has adapted or tried to ‘fix markets’ 
since its inception.17 Peck sees neo-liberalism as ‘regulation-in-denial’.18 Along with 
Harvey he views neo-liberals as trying to ‘retask’ the state, and similarly to Boas and 
Gans-Morse and Stedman-Jones, that ordoliberalism was a moderate version of the 
movement compared to its successors.19 
 
The Austrian School 
 
There are several key ideological texts that stand as the cornerstone of New Right 
thought. The most noted one is Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944), 
which set out his all-important critique of the state. Hayek’s analysis, based on the 
totalitarian regimes of the period warned of the insidious and incremental nature of 
the state apparatus. This inspired the politics of the Chicago School, the work of 
Public Choice theory and the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. This 
line of thinking would also inform Keith Joseph’s analysis of post-war Britain as 
moving like a ‘ratchet-effect’ to the left. Hayek’s tome The Constitution of Liberty 
(1960) was more broad ranging and libertarian while the content of his speeches, 
pamphlets and letters suggest his thinking became more radical in his later years. 
Choice in Currency A  Way to Stop Inflation (1977) advocated the end of the state’s 
                                                        
16 Harvey, Brief History, p. 21. 
17 Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. xiii, 
8. 
18 Peck, Constructions, p. xiii. 




monopoly on issuing currency while Social Justice, Socialism & Democracy (1979) 
sets out his well-known antipathy towards socialism as well as scepticism towards 
concepts of social justice and ‘unlimited’ democracy. Hayek’s early work 
concentrated more on economics rather than his better-known philosophical work. 
During his intellectual battles with Keynes in the 1930s Hayek challenged views on 
attempting to control the business cycle in ‘Prices and Production’ (1931) and 
‘Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle’ (1933). This would clash with Friedman’s 
later work on monetarism. One of the aims of this thesis is to make these kinds of 
distinctions clearer. Even in 2013 historians talked of ‘monetary economists like 
Hayek and Friedman’.20 Although he did have much to say on monetary issues it is 
somewhat misleading to use this label due to Hayek’s distinctly laissez-faire instincts 
on the topic. As Andrew Gamble has written, ‘It was often assumed at that time that 
Hayek and Friedman were the two leading monetarists. But Hayek never accepted 
monetarism.’21 Gamble explored Hayek’s core philosophical positions, and how they 
explain his embrace of liberalism and antipathy towards socialism in Hayek The Iron 
Cage of Liberty (1996). 
 
Friedrich Hayek is the most prominent Austrian thinker studied in this thesis. Ludwig 
von Mises was Hayek’s mentor and produced work, such as Socialism (1922) and 
Bureaucracy (1944), which took possibly the closest position to classical liberalism 
within the New Right. Others in the Austrian tradition, such as Joseph Schumpeter 
and Murray Rothbard, are also briefly mentioned in later chapters. The Austrian 
School will be shown to take a qualitative and normative approach that focuses on 








The Chicago School 
 
If the Austrians were more philosophical in their work, then the other renowned neo-
liberal school took a more empirical and quantitative approach. Early Chicagoans like 
Henry Simons and Frank Knight have been shown by Stedman-Jones to have taken 
more moderate or ‘social’ positions on many issues. After 1946 a new wave of 
thinkers coalesced at the school, such as George Stigler, Gary Becker, Aaron Director 
and most notably Milton Friedman. The latter’s A Monetary History of the United 
States, 1867-1960, written with Anna Schwartz in 1963, was to set out one of the key 
arguments to challenge Keynesianism, the quantity of money theory or monetarism, 
as a guide to macroeconomic policy. This analysis was based on how the Federal 
Reserve acted during the Great Depression, the book concluding that a stable money 
supply would have attenuated the worst impact of the slump.  Friedman’s most 
important book was probably Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and is the other key text 
of neo-liberalism after The Road to Serfdom. Friedman’s central tenets of economic 
liberalism and libertarianism were crucial in the conservative movements in Britain 
and the US, although there were few who subscribed, as Friedman did, to both. 
Friedman was very active in the political debates of the 1970s, effectively bringing 
his ideas into the public sphere, such as economic ‘shock therapy’, for example in 
‘The Road to Economic Freedom: The Steps from Here to There’ (1977), monetarism 
in ‘Money and Economic Development’ (1972) and challenging conventional wisdom 
such as the Phillips Curve in Price Theory (1976). Friedman wrote (with Rose 
Friedman) a popular and more general summary of his thought in Free to Choose 




George Stigler’s work on competition and monopoly became a vital part of the 
modern Chicago School, exploring regulatory ‘capture’ and a reduced role for ‘anti-
trust’ legislation. This is outlined in The Theory of Price (1966) and its genesis 
explored in Hammond and Hammond’s Making Chicago Price Theory. Friedman-
Stigler correspondence 1945-57. This work was to have some overlap with Public 
Choice theory. Gary Becker was another Nobel laureate from the Chicago School 
who expanded an economic analysis to include social issues and human behaviour in 
general.22 Becker’s work, however, is generally not explored in this thesis.  
 
Public Choice Theory 
 
Another school of thought looked at in this study is Public Choice theory, extending 
Hayek’s critique of the state and called by the thinkers themselves the ‘economics of 
politics’. The work of James Buchanan, once of the Chicago School, is central. For 
instance The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of a Constitutional 
Democracy (1962), co-written with Gordon Tullock, as well as The Demand and 
Supply of Public Goods (1968) and Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society (1980). 
Tullock is the other key figure and his work includes The Politics of Bureaucracy 
(1965) and The Vote Motive (1976). Buchanan and Tullock developed Public Choice 
at the University of Virginia in the 1960s around a number of key insights. For them, 
those in government acted in just as much of a self-interested manner as those in the 
private sector. Bureaucracy tends to unchecked expansion, and lastly individuals in 
government are prone to ‘rent-seeking behaviour’, essentially greater reward for the 







influence was probably most clearly seen in Ronald Reagan’s 1981 inaugural address: 




The neo-liberal thinking that originated from the Freiburg School in Germany, called 
ordoliberalism for clarity, has until recently often been omitted from many books on 
both economic liberalism and Thatcherism. Ordoliberalism centres around a number 
of thinkers in 1930s and 1940s Germany: Wilhelm Röpke, Alfred Müller-Armack, 
Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm and Alexander Rüstow. The majority of their work is 
hardly known in the English-speaking world and therefore translations are few and far 
between. One exception is Röpke’s A Humane Economy: The Social Framework of 
the Free Market (1958). Samuel Gregg has also written a biography, Wilhelm 
Röpke’s Political Economy (2010). It is left to more recent studies on neo-liberalism, 
such as those by Stedman-Jones, Boas and Gans-Morse, Turner, and Mirowski and 
Plehwe, to determine the main principles of ordoliberalism. These include an 
emphasis on price but to prevent monopoly formation and maintain competition. 
Ordoliberal thinking most notably manifested itself in the post-war West German 
economic model, the ‘social market economy’, borrowing Müller-Armack’s term. 
The Theory of Capitalism in the German Economic Tradition (2000), edited by Peter 
Koslowski, provides more detail on ordoliberal thinkers while articles such as ‘Adam 
Smith and ordoliberalism: on the political form of market liberty’ (2012) by Werner 
Bonefeld and ‘At the Origins Of Neo-liberalism: The Free Economy And The Strong 
State’ (2010) by Ben Jackson give further context. The movement’s journal, the 
                                                        
23 Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, 1981, [http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/], 




‘Ordo yearbook’, also has short translations that provide some insight into how 
ordoliberal thinking has developed. The idea ‘free economy-strong state’ was first 
framed by Rüstow in 1932. It was this that Andrew Gamble assigned to the Thatcher 
government, making the link between the early ordoliberals and Thatcherism.24 
 
Political Histories of Thatcherism and Biographies 
 
There are several political histories of the Thatcher government, often focussing on 
the personality and battles of the Prime Minister herself. Thatcher and Thatcherism 
(2004) by Eric J. Evans, Britain Under Thatcher (2000) by Anthony Seldon and 
Daniel Collings; and Thatcherism and British Politics. The End of Consensus (1987) 
by Dennis Kavanagh are all wide ranging and cover the main themes that have made 
up the historiographical debate. Some more contemporary books have been generally 
more supportive of the government’s legacy, such as Geoffrey Fry’s The Politics of 
the Thatcher Revolution (2008) and Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it 
happened and what it meant (2006), edited by Subroto Roy and John Clarke, which 
includes retrospective chapters by economic liberals such as Patrick Minford and 
Norman Barry. A Question of Leadership (1991) by Peter Clarke places Thatcher in 
his list of personalities that most changed Britain in the twentieth century. Both The 
Thatcher Revolution. Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair, and the 
Transformation of Great Britain (2003) by Earl A. Reitan and Thatcher and Sons: A  
Revolution in Three Acts (2007) by Simon Jenkins insist that the years of 
Thatcherism carved out a new orthodoxy that successors have broadly followed. The 







(2003), which covers every minutia of her premiership. This has been more recently 
joined by the authoritative ‘official’ biography, Margaret Thatcher. The Authorized 
Biography. Volume One: Not For Turning (2013) by Charles Moore, as well as the 
more thematic Not For Turning. The Life of Margaret Thatcher (2013) by Robin 
Harris. Both reveal insights into the former Prime Minister’s politics as well the role 
played by ideas. In keeping with other biographies, however, there is a tendency to 
group neo-liberal thinking into a homogeneous set of ideas. For instance Moore talks 
about Hayek’s economic ‘shock treatment’ while, as we have already seen, Harris 
puts Hayek and Friedman in the same bracket as ‘monetary economists’.25 Although 
neither is incorrect, they create ambiguity. This thesis attempts to provide more clarity 
on how different neo-liberals influenced the Thatcher government. 
 
Richard Vinen’s Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980s 
(2009) puts Thatcherism in a historical context of reaction against the policies of the 
1960s and 1970s. Vinen sees Thatcher’s politics as a desire to return to the 
conservative Britain of the 1950s as well as framing Thatcherism to a certain extent as 
a defender of a ‘post-war consensus’ of the 1940s and 1950s variety, rather than the 
progressive version of the 1960s.26 The book also rejects a post-1990 orthodoxy of the 
‘Thatcher and sons’ type due to the specific considerations that existed during the 
period. 27  Vinen identifies Thatcherism as a combination of ideology and Tory 
‘Statecraft’.28 The latter was set out by Jim Bulpitt in ‘The discipline of the New 




26 Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain. The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980s. (London: Simon 
and Schuster, 2009), p. 7, 31, 292, 306. 
27 Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain, pp. 8, 306. 




as a tool to pursue the more traditional Conservative objective of achieving and 
holding onto power. 
 
The Anatomy of Thatcherism (1992) by Shirley Robin Letwin explored the various 
aspects of the government’s ideology, including the values and ethics implicit in the 
politics of Margaret Thatcher herself. Letwin also sets out a hierarchy of ideas, that 
nationalism (or patriotism) and anti-socialism were more important than liberal 
economics.29 John Ranelagh described the unusual collection of personalities that he 
believed most influenced the Prime Minister, in Thatcher’s People (1991). These 
included British neo-liberals like John Hoskyns, Norman Strauss and Alan Walters, as 
well as Hayek and Friedman and advisors like Bernard Ingham and Charles Powell. 
Making Thatcher’s Britain (2012), edited by Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, 
examines some of the considered wisdom of the period and puts these events into a 
broader historical context. Jackson’s chapter, ‘The think-tank archipelago: 
Thatcherism and neoliberalism’ sheds light on the Institute of Economic Affair’s 
(IEA) ‘outsider’ reputation as well as the think-tanks’s subtle, but significant, shift in 
focus from anti-competitive business practices in the 1950s and 1960s to the problems 
of government in the 1970s and 1980s.30 Saunders’ chapter, ‘Thatcherism and the 
seventies’, frames Thatcherism as initially diagnostic rather than prescriptive and 
rooted in its particular narrative of the events of the 1970s.31 Saunders identifies this 
as one reason the Conservatives under Thatcher, and later John Major, lost 
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momentum as the targets and memories of the 1970s faded.32 The Conservatives 
Since 1945 (2012) by Tim Bale sets the policies of the Thatcher government into the 
broader history of the Party, such as council house sales and also questions the impact 
of think-tanks in particular on the Party’s strategy.33 A more market-orientated set of 
policies is also traced back to the start of Edward Heath’s leadership in 1965.34 
 
Thatcher’s Diplomacy (1997) by Paul Sharp outlined the foreign policy of the 
Thatcher government, including the idea that the rhetoric of the market helped explain 
the resistance to sanctions against apartheid South Africa. Reagan and Thatcher 
(1990) by Geoffrey Smith identified, as well as the personal closeness, the ideological 
similarities between the two leaders during the 1980s. The revisionist Reagan and 
Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (2012) by Richard Aldous brings the former 
assertion into question. 
 
There are also several books on the wider themes of Britain’s economics and politics 
in the late twentieth century. Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross’s “Goodbye Great 
Britain”: The 1976 IMF Crisis marked that year as the high point in the battle of ideas 
and apparent proof of Britain’s post-war decline. Other historians, such as Correlli 
Barnett have documented what they saw as Britain’s post-war decline in economics 
and in terms of loss of Empire and political influence. There are a number of 
revisionists, however, who contend the declinist thesis was exaggerated. Post War 
British Politics in Perspective (1999) by David Marsh et al. questions how serious 
Britain’s situation was in the 1970s, in particular the perceived power of the trade 
union movement. This sentiment is shared by Andy Beckett in When the Lights Went 
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Out: Britain in the Seventies (2010). Roger Middleton and Jeremy Black, in The 
British Economy Since 1945: Engaging With the Debate (2000) argue that the 
Thatcher government restructured the British economy and so provided some catch-




The majority of the influential politicians of the time have written memoirs. The two 
that most significantly mention ideas are those of Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson. 
Margaret Thatcher’s three books, The Downing Street Y ears, Path to Power and 
Statecraft are also of use. Some accounts by Cabinet members of the Thatcher 
government, like Willie Whitelaw, Lord Carrington and Michael Heseltine, rarely 
mention ideas while James Prior and Ian Gilmour both criticise the policies of 
Thatcherism. Cecil Parkinson and Kenneth Baker provide useful insights for their 
involvement in, respectively, privatization and deregulation, and education reform. 
Likewise Norman Tebbit’s Upwardly Mobile includes detail on his time 
implementing trade union reform and financial deregulation. The notable omission is 
Keith Joseph, who did not write a memoir. It is left to other archives, his speeches and 
the biography written by Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, Keith Joseph (2001), to 
construct his thought. Other influential figures that have written books on the period, 
although not elected politicians, include Just in Time. Inside the Thatcher Revolution 
(2000) by John Hoskyns and Paradoxes of Power, Reflections on the Thatcher 







Chapter one examines the development of the New Right, from the early twentieth 
century to the foundation of the Mont Pelerin Society until the election of the 
Conservatives in 1979. It looks at key thinkers, such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton 
Friedman and Ludwig von Mises; as well as the main neo-liberal schools of thought. 
These are outlined as the Austrian, Chicago, ordoliberal and Public Choice schools. 
The important think-tanks of the period, the IEA, Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and 
Bow Group, are also examined. The ideological debates of the 1970s are explored, 
with specific reference to monetarism and the trade union movement. The chapter will 
show how neo-liberalism developed as a set of ideas during the post-war period and 
how several strains of thought became seen as a homogeneous collective.  
 
Chapter two explores a number of economic case studies, with emphasis on the early 
reforms of the Thatcher government. The areas looked at are the ‘monetarist’ phase of 
economic policy, enterprise zones and exchange control removal.  The lineage of 
these measures is examined to show the different sources that influenced the Thatcher 
government. Economic policy is shown to be particularly ideological while enterprise 
zones and abolishing exchange controls acted as signals for subsequent reforms. 
Together these policies will be shown to be the ‘purest’ application of New Right 
policy recommendations by the Thatcher government.  
 
Social reforms domestically presented more of a challenge in implementing policies 
rooted in economic liberalism. Housing, the NHS and education reform are looked at 




areas owed something to neo-liberalism, either through private ownership of capital 
or market-orientated solutions in the public sector. The relative success of economic 
liberal ideas in penetrating these areas is graduated, with council house sales a 
popular policy compared to the resistance to NHS reform. Even housing though, will 
be shown to be some way from actual neo-liberal models, particularly those of the 
Austrian School.  
 
How vested interests sought to impede Thatcherism is examined in greater detail in 
chapter four, which concentrates on trade union reform, privatization (with particular 
reference to electricity), broadcasting policy and financial deregulation. Although 
there was no co-ordinated attempt to tame special interest groups this objective was 
implicitly a long-term one for both economic liberals and some Conservative 
politicians. The chapter will set out why vested interests are disliked by the various 
neo-liberal schools and how they were confronted by the Thatcher government. Trade 
union reform will be shown to be the most effective reform in reducing the power of a 
vested interest while privatization, broadcasting and deregulation fell short of this aim 
or attenuated one group only to allow another to emerge.  
 
Chapter five explores the foreign policy of the Thatcher government and whether it 
was affected by liberal economic ideas. This is done using a number of examples, all 
with some connection to the rhetoric or ideology of the market: aid policy (including 
ATP and the Pergau Dam project), policy towards apartheid South Africa and the 
Know How Fund to Eastern Europe. The broader Cold War strategy is also integrated 
into these case studies as well as changes in policy in the World Bank and the IMF. It 




traditional foreign policy rooted in self-interest, over the course of its time in power, 
due to a number of reasons, neo-liberalism began to align more comfortably with 
these aims.  
 
The conclusion brings these various case studies together. The proximity of the 
Thatcher government to neo-liberal ideas was graduated. In each example some of the 
broad thinking of the New Right existed, with varying degrees of clarity. Friedmanite 
neo-liberalism will be shown to be closest to Thatcherism due to its attempt to use the 
state to move in steps towards a more liberal economy and society. Ordoliberalism as 
well as the Austrian School had a much more limited impact. The Thatcher 
government will be shown to have attempted to ‘retask’ the state, often for political 
reasons, that fell short of liberal ideals. 
 
The Thatcher government was influenced by neo-liberalism, although mainly through 
conduits. Its policies were also influenced by traditional Conservative thinking as well 
as political pragmatism. Ideas of ‘statecraft’ loom large in Thatcherism as well as the 
‘supporting wind’ of New Right ideas during the period. Essentially Thatcherism 
contained some direct influence from the New Right, which was utilized as Tory 
statecraft while riding a wave of interest in neo-liberalism. This thesis broadly 
identifies three main strains of neo-liberalism - the Austrian School, Chicago School 
and Freiburg School. There is some evidence to suggest Hayek had a philosophical 
impact on some British politicians, mainly through advisors and commentators. There 
was also some very limited lineage between Freiburg and the ‘free economy - strong 
state’ ideas attributed to the Thatcher government. The main influence however, 




was and used the machinery of the state.  For example monetary control, which fed 
through into government policy through those influenced by Milton Friedman, such 
as Alan Walters, Peter Jay, Tim Congdon and Terry Burns. Another would be 
education vouchers, a Friedmanite idea taken up by the IEA, which brought some 
pressure to bear on the eventual education reforms of the Thatcher government. The 
Chicago School was less focused on social outcomes than the ordoliberals but less 
idealistic than the Austrians. These differences were made more opaque due to the 
ascendency of the Chicago School under Friedman as well as Hayek wanting to unify 
and maintain the collective integrity of his Mont Pelerin Society. The military 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile was then important in linking neo-
liberalism with authoritarianism. This sullied the reputation of the neo-liberal project, 
thinkers associated with Chile like Friedman, and by association the governments of 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.35 For all these reasons neo-liberalism has 
come to denote a number of positions that have rarely been clearly defined. Several 
writers have juxtaposed the moderate and progressive connotations of early 
ordoliberalism with the harsh interpretations and vilifications of neo-liberalism that 
proliferated after Pinochet. 
 
Neo-liberal ideas, unsurprisingly, were most closely linked with economic policy and 
deregulation. Its impact on social policy was more diluted and more fiercely resisted. 
Nevertheless, New Right influence was evident in most of the policies of 
Thatcherism. Foreign policy was clearly less ideological but a broad neo-liberal 
impact can be seen as the Cold War thawed. Many of these policies did not satisfy 
neo-liberals. Some advocated ordoliberal ideas, such as competition promotion in 
                                                        




privatization, but most thought that markets were not ‘free’ enough and overly 
compromised by politics and special interests. Thatcherism was initially focused on 
macroeconomic stability while supply-side reforms increased during the course of the 
government. The shift of the former under Nigel Lawson displeased monetarists, 
while the compromised fashion of the latter led to much criticism from Hayekians at 
the IEA. Finally, the case studies examined in this thesis appear to confirm that the 
Thatcher government ‘retasked’ the state, which has been identified as an inherent 
feature of neo-liberalism. That is to say that reforms were broadly liberal, but often 
predominantly political, and led to outcomes that as well as being criticised from the 















Chapter One: The New Right and neo-liberal thought 
 
The political decision-making process is guided, or at least influenced, by ideas; as 
Keynes put it, ‘practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist’.36  In Britain, 
certain goals have tended to be attached to different Prime Ministers and their 
governments. Edward Heath was intent on entry into the European Community, 
Neville Chamberlain wanted to avoid war, while Tony Blair offered a reconstructed 
New Labour or ‘Third Way’ vision for Britain. Partly as a result, each era of British 
politics is synonymous with certain legacies but rarely are they known for a particular 
ideological intensity. There are, however, exceptions. Clement Attlee’s post-war 
Labour government has a reputation, due to its programme of nationalisation and the 
assembly of the welfare state, as having being more radical than other 
administrations. This is matched or even eclipsed, however, by the scope of the 
changes introduced by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. Were the 
policies that began in 1979 reactionary or as Richard Cockett put it, a counter-
revolution? If they were genuinely new, then from where did they originate? An 
accepted view has formed that the Thatcher government implemented several New 
Right or free market inspired recommendations and that important policy makers 
became converts to these at various points before 1979 - in the case of Geoffrey 
Howe, during the 1950s, Keith Joseph in the 1960s and Margaret Thatcher during the 
1970s.37   
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The ideas and progression of the New Right will be examined in this chapter, up until 
the Conservatives came to power in 1979. The intellectual environment of the period 
will also be explored to see how economic liberalism came from the relative obscurity 
of the post-war Keynesian years to the ideological debates of the 1970s and then into 
the Thatcherite programme. It will be shown that monetary control in combating 
inflation was at the vanguard of liberal economic ideas and the first New Right 
principle to gain a degree of acceptance in Britain. The various threads contained 
within the New Right, such as the Austrian and Chicago Schools will be outlined, as 
well as the proliferation of liberal think-tanks during this period. The development of 
the important strands of neo-liberalism, such as ordoliberalism and Public Choice 
theory will also be examined. In addition, the importance of ‘conduits’ between 
theorists and policy makers will be explored.  
 
Classical Economics before World War Two 
 
The work of Adam Smith was important in Britain from the eighteenth century. The 
Wealth Of Nations (1776) and The Theory Of Moral Sentiments (1759) explained and 
legitimised processes, such as both parties gaining in a trade and the division of 
labour, that became defined as core tenets of capitalism. Other British enlightenment 
thinkers, such as John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and David Hume 
made the case for the importance of private property, the rule of law, utilitarianism 
and individual liberty. These principles, in conjunction with the industrial revolution, 
laid the foundation for Britain’s rapid growth in the nineteenth century as well as its 
drive to build empire. Trade and its associated ‘civilising’ effects justified the vast 




governments and often including the annexation of areas of land. David Ricardo was 
another classical economist of the 1800s who outlined comparative advantage in the 
exchange between two trading regions. These beliefs guided the policy makers in 
Britain into the twentieth century. Indeed the main ideological dividing line in the 
early 1900s was between the free traders of the Liberal Party such as Herbert Asquith 
and David Lloyd George and those who favoured tariffs such as Joseph Chamberlain. 
This era of British imperial power driven by free trade would have an important 
impact on New Right thinkers and on Margaret Thatcher herself.38 Adam Smith, in 
particular, was reclaimed by neo-liberals and Conservative politicians in selective 
ways. Smith’s idea of the ‘invisible hand’ was embraced while his promotion of 
social goods like education was downplayed.39 The apparently seamless link between 
classical liberals of the Enlightenment and twentieth century neo-liberals may have 
allowed important ideological distinctions to be blurred.40 
 
Ideas can take decades to filter down into the domain of mainstream politics and often 
the point in time where certain principles are introduced is very different from the 
environment in which they were originally written.41 The seemingly unshakeable 
British faith in markets, trade and capitalism in the nineteenth century was challenged 
by the rise of socialism and in particular the work of Karl Marx, whose critique of 
capitalism was to have a contagious political effect across the world, from the 
numerous socialist regimes that sprang up over the next hundred years, to the social 
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democratic policies that were introduced in Western countries that remained 
nominally committed to markets. It was most clearly seen in Britain, (although Marx 
was not the only prominent socialist thinker here: Robert Owen and the Chartists 
predate him) with the foundation of the Fabian Society in 1884. The Fabians, led by 
writers and thinkers like George Bernard Shaw, Sidney and Beatrice Webb brought 
socialism into mainstream political arguments. One study cited by Andrew Gamble 
suggested that from around 1860 collectivist doctrines began to supplant individualist 
ones in their hold on public opinion.42 Trade Unions were granted considerable legal 
privileges in 1906 while the Liberals, under Asquith and Lloyd George, introduced 
laws that guaranteed certain rights for workers and the beginning of a system of social 
security. Another important, if indirect, political legacy of the Fabians was the 
foundation of the Labour Party in 1900, committed to socialist ideals. Richard 
Cockett, in Thinking the Unthinkable (1995), described the period from 1880 to the 
1930s as a battle of ideas between liberals and collectivists that was ultimately won 
by the latter.43 Cockett also stressed the importance of the Fabian Society in giving 
intellectual weight to collectivism.44 The Fabians were the first ‘think-tank’ in Britain 
and were the most prominent organisation of their kind during this period. The 
Society promulgated a very British and moderate form of socialism. In fact Joseph 
Schumpeter described them as a ‘small group of bourgeois intellectuals’ that ‘hailed 
from Bentham and Mill and carried on their tradition. The spirit of the times made 
socialists of them. They were genuine socialists because they aimed at helping in a 
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fundamental reconstruction of society which in the end was to make economic care a 
public affair.’45  
 
The intellectual heritage of Owen and Marx, cultivated by the Fabian Society, 
manifested itself most famously not in violent revolution but in a more sober form: 
the 1942 Beveridge Report. William Beveridge was an economist and a Liberal social 
reformer, influenced by the Fabians, who saw his task as eliminating the desperate 
poverty experienced by many in Britain, which had been exacerbated by the 
Depression. The 1942 Report’s recommendations became widely accepted during the 
War and gave the Attlee government the impetus it needed to introduce many of 
them. Industries were nationalised, the NHS was founded and the welfare state would 
look after the British people from ‘cradle to the grave’. If socialist thinking had finally 
gained some orthodoxy in the UK another thinker was to prove just as significant for 
the post-war era: John Maynard Keynes. A classical economist, a member of the 
Liberal Party and certainly not a socialist, Keynes was to be crucial in ending laissez-
faire policies in Britain. The Depression and unemployment of the 1920s and 1930s 
had a considerable impact on Keynes and his core aim became the achievement of full 
employment.46 Like many thinkers who exerted mass appeal, Keynes’s work was 
simplified and extrapolated.47 His most influential book, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (1936), was dense and difficult to interpret but the 
term ‘Keynesianism’ came to mean demand management and countercyclical 
government spending and monetary policy designed to combat unemployment and 
avert recession. In summary, the thought of Keynes, the influence of the Fabian 
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Society and Beveridge Report were all interpreted as justification for expansive state 
intervention in the economy. 
 
Defending Classical Economics: The Austrian School 
 
Joseph Schumpeter feared that embedded within the success of capitalism lay the 
forces that could eventually destroy it. Many intellectuals in the first half of the 
twentieth century were typically antagonistic to the market, barely tolerant of 
capitalism and critical of the attitudes, extremes and insecurity it appeared to cause. 
This ranged from Marxists such as Lenin, the critique of ‘finance capital’ by Austrian 
Rudolf Hilferding and the later, more accommodating, followers of Keynes. All 
wanted to overturn or at least attenuate the effects of laissez-faire. It was unsurprising 
that in the aftermath of the catastrophic financial problems of the 1930s and 
subsequent war to which these conditions had seemingly led, thinkers advocated the 
taming and regulation of unfettered capitalism. The idea of market failure also 
encouraged growing state intervention in the economy. Market failure is the belief 
that the market system can break down, causing externalities (adverse and unintended 
effects) that damage wider society and require government intervention.  Yet if 
Schumpeter’s point seemed to be relevant, he himself belonged to a group of 
intellectuals that would have profound effects in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Schumpeter was a classical liberal and belonged to the ‘Austrian School’ of 
economists.  
 
While socialist thought was in the ascendency in the late nineteenth century, Carl 




Vienna. Menger, whose work included The General Theory of the Good, wanted to 
create a new theoretical framework that would more clearly define Adam Smith’s 
system of ‘universal opulence’. 48  Menger’s work concentrated on individual 
behaviour as well as price.49 Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk was also a noted Austrian 
thinker at the turn of the century. It was the third generation though, led by Ludwig 
von Mises and inspired by Menger and Böhm-Bawerk, which began to make 
significant contributions to what we now consider neo-liberalism. Mises included 
social science and political philosophy as well as economics, in his work and became 
mentor to the young Friedrich Hayek in the 1920s.50 Mises and Hayek developed 
thinking on the business cycle during this period. They identified government 
monetary policy as the primary cause for cycles of boom and bust, believing that 
interest rates and the supply of money were being manipulated away from their 
‘natural levels’.51 In an era, particularly following the stock market crash of 1929, 
when most economists advocated more government intervention, Austrians like Mises 
and Hayek stood out for their belief that state interference was at the core of the 
problems experienced in Western countries. 
 
Hayek taught at the London School of Economics in London in the 1930s and entered 
into a series of public and private debates with Keynes over the decade. The full 
effect of Hayek and the Austrians was not to be felt until much later but his 1944 
book, The Road to Serfdom, proved to be an important landmark and became a liberal 
classic. Hayek, at the height of British infatuation with Keynes and the Beveridge 
Report, made an unfashionable argument: the state was not necessarily a benevolent 
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force. Hayek based his analysis on both the Nazis and Soviets, supposedly at either 
ends of the ideological spectrum. Fascists and communists had assembled huge state 
bureaucracies, and were oppressive, autocratic and violent towards their own citizens. 
As well as the potential malignancy of an expanding state, Hayek saw socialist 
utopias and emancipation as ultimately leading to collective misery. Andrew Gamble 
has written that Hayek thought socialism similar to the ‘archaic religions’ of 
traditional society and that liberalism was the natural order of things, based on 
experience, in modern societies.52 The Road to Serfdom advocated renewed trust in 
the power of the market and that individual liberty could only be obtained under 
capitalism. There has been some debate over the ‘social’ aspects found at this stage of 
Hayek’s thinking. For instance, he stated that ‘there can be no doubt that some 
minimum of food, shelter, and clothing, sufficient to preserve health and the capacity 
to work, can be assured to everybody’.53 This will be explored in more detail later. 
Andrew Gamble identified the other key claims of Hayek’s critique of socialism - it 
destroyed the basis of morals, personal freedom and responsibility; impeded the 
production of wealth and may cause impoverishment; and sooner or later leads to 
totalitarian government.54  The Road to Serfdom most notably outlined the latter and 
proved an unlikely success. This led to a speaking tour of the United States for its 
author and subsequently a teaching position at the University of Chicago, although 
not in the economics department. It also attracted the attention of Conservative Party 
Chairman Ralph Assheton as well as Winston Churchill during the general election 
campaign of 1945.55  
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Hayek later claimed that of his generation there were only a handful of economists, 
apart from himself, that believed in classical liberalism: ‘there were just perhaps 
(Wilhelm) Röpke, Bill Hutt, and two or three others.’56 They were part of a broader 
movement that began as an obscure club for intellectual supporters of capitalism. The 
Paris Conference of 1938 was the first convention of this group of (twenty six) 
economists and philosophers, including Hayek, Mises, Röpke and Walter Lippman 
(an American journalist who had influenced Hayek). Those present discussed the 
defence of market economics and individual liberty but were not to convene again 
until after the War, when the Mont Pelerin Society was born.57 
 
The Freiburg School of the 1930s and 1940s 
 
Earlier in the 1930s another group of liberals coalesced in Freiburg, Germany who 
retained interest in market economics. It was here that the birth of ‘neo-liberalism’ 
can be seen. The basic difference with what we might think of as nineteenth century 
free trade liberalism or laissez-faire is that neo-liberalism accepted and desired some 
role for the state. This was to be reference point for all the neo-liberals of the 1930s - 
from Hayek and Mises to the Freiburg and Chicago Schools – they all conceded 
something more than laissez-faire was needed.58 Although the Austrian School - less 
convinced that laissez-faire had failed even in the 1930s - would become associated 
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with neo-liberalism later the concept was initially developed in Freiburg.59 The 
group’s ideas acted as a liberal response to the crisis of capitalism in the late 1920s 
and throughout the following decade.60 Neo-liberalism was first defined by Freiburg 
thinker Alexander Rüstow in his 1932 essay Free Economy-Strong State.61 It was 
originally used to denote a moderate version and revival of classical liberalism.62 The 
Freiburg School believed in markets but also that the state had a role to play in 
providing the conditions necessary for these to operate. This was rooted in the events 
of the time. The Weimar Republic was seen as prey to special interest groups.63 The 
1929 Wall Street Crash and subsequent Great Depression were viewed by some as the 
death knell for laissez-faire, while individual liberty was trampled on in Nazi 
Germany. The Freiburg School sought to reconcile these problems. This early version 
of neo-liberalism wanted the state to ensure competition and to act against 
monopolies forming. They also sought social cohesion as a way to make market 
forces more effective. Freiburg neo-liberals, such as Rüstow but also Wilhelm Röpke, 
Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm and Alfred Müller-Armack, recognized the destructive 
implications of the market.64 This seems at odds with the twenty-first century reading 
of neo-liberalism. These German thinkers put humanistic and social values on a par 
with economic ones and in the 1940s Eucken and Röpke became concerned with 
ideas like social security and social justice.65 
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For reasons of clarity these early German neo-liberals will be called ‘ordoliberals’. 
This subsequently, from the early 1950s, became a recognized term associated with 
the West German journal ORDO, founded in 1948 by Eucken and Böhm. It provides 
emphasis because during this period the Mont Pelerin Society was formed, made up 
of a nucleus of notable thinkers that urged pro-market strategies. Mont Pelerin 
members took a variety of positions, however, some that were closer to classical 
liberalism than others. This notwithstanding, in the space of a few years the different 
views in the collective became interchangeable to some observers. The two major 
strands were to become the more classically liberal Hayekians, or Austrians, and the 
more ‘neo-liberal’ Friedmanites, or Chicagoans, who took a more expedient position 
on many issues. Mont Pelerin meetings were said to always split into two camps: the 
Austrians and the Chicagoans.66 In fact ordoliberals recognized the difference with 
other members of Mont Pelerin and the Austrian School. Ordoliberals dubbed more 
classical liberal thinkers such as Ludwig von Mises ‘paleoliberals’. 67  In one 
correspondence between Rüstow and Röpke the former wrote that Hayek ‘and his 
master Mises deserved to be put in spirits and placed in a museum as one of the last 
surviving specimen of the extinct species of liberals which caused the current 
catastrophe.’68 Nevertheless, the early thinking of the ordoliberals would be lost as the 
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Ordoliberalism was the first comprehensive market response to the challenges of 
socialism. Despite accepting the primacy of the price mechanism, ordoliberals 
advocated this in conjunction with a firm legal framework, social and ethical 
considerations, and demanded a strong state as the means of restoring and sustaining 
the free economy.69 Early ordoliberal thought can be crystallized by the much-used 
term ‘social market economy’. Alfred Müller-Armack first defined social market 
economy in the 1940s and it became the central plank of the West German post-war 
economic ‘miracle’.70 Müller-Armack sought that political interventions not destroy 
the price mechanism while Rüstow even proposed ‘market police’.71 Röpke classified 
interventions as ‘market compatible’ (those that did not affect price mechanisms) and 
‘market incompatible’ (those that did). 72 Exchange controls and quotas, for instance, 
were market incompatible.73 Ordoliberals rejected the Austrian laissez-faire tradition, 
because they believed this system was bound to create socially destructive outcomes, 
especially in the form of ‘proletarianized’ workers who would demand welfare to the 
detriment of liberty and security of private property. 74  The preservation of 
competition and prevention of monopoly were core themes of ordoliberals such as 
Röpke.75 Ordoliberals therefore viewed their model as a way of maintaining order and 
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viewed individuals as ends in themselves. 77  This is fundamentally different to 
subsequent neo-liberals, who saw economic liberty as the precursor to political 
freedoms and social goods, almost viewing markets as an end in themselves.78 
 
West German Finance Minister and later Chancellor Ludwig Erhard was linked to 
both the ordoliberals and Friedrich Hayek.79 After the War Eucken, Böhm, Rüstow 
and Müller-Armack exerted considerable influence upon West German economic 
policy. Böhm was a prominent member of the Bundestag, while Müller-Armack 
served as State Secretary in the Ministry of Economics, close to Erhard.80 In his role 
after the War Erhard responded to shortages by ending price controls. This step, a 
show of faith in market forces, began the remarkable resurgence of the West German 
economy. 81  The ordoliberal inspired mantra came to look like ‘markets where 
possible, the state where necessary’. The role of the state was one of the key themes 
that cut through all these ideas of liberalism and is one reason why it is important to 
define the difference between them. Critics of ordoliberalism believe they had a 
limited idea of freedom and that when democracy and the market collided, the latter 
prevailed.82 In fact ordoliberals did see majority decisions in democracy as capable of 
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that the state knew best can be on one side seen as a variation on conservative 
patriarchy, on the other as a drift to authoritarianism. In addition, Röpke highlighted 
society’s need of strong Christian moral values.84 A criticism of ordoliberalism was 
that their ideas were borne out of Nazi Germany meaning that these thinkers accepted 
that only an anti-libertarian state apparatus could ensure market mechanisms. This 
was clearly at odds with a classical thesis, such as the one found in The Road to 
Serfdom. Hayek, however, was soon branded a neo-liberal. He also fiercely defended 
ordoliberals against any Nazi connection. 85   
 
The criticism itself, that ordoliberalism had anti-democratic and an anti-libertarian 
undertone was contentious. If the first ordoliberal model was post-war West Germany 
then the state was generally effective and progressive, particularly in comparison with 
its Eastern neighbours. The social cohesion achieved and rapid economic growth 
became the envy of Europe, not least Britain. Ordoliberalism has had a profound 
impact on the economic policy making of Germany, before and after unification.86 
Ordoliberal principles, such as those concerning competition policies, may have also 
influenced post-war European treaties and as a result indirectly affected British 
politics.87 Angela Merkel has also openly expressed her admiration for ordoliberal 
thinkers such as Walter Eucken.88 Rachel Turner has written that countries that have 
adopted neo-liberal measures did so as a response to a group or events. If Britain in 
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the 1970s was as a reaction to organized labour then Turner believes post-war West 
Germany, the first neo-liberal state and unique in its emphasis on social justice, was a 
response to Nazism.89 Ordoliberals sought to maintain order, limit the influence of 
special interest groups and utilize a strong state that was limited by rules and the force 
of law. 
 
Why is ordoliberalism important and what significance does it have regarding the 
Thatcher government? Firstly, it is the first real manifestation of neo-liberal ideas in a 
cohesive set of policy recommendations and has not featured in much literature on the 
subject. Secondly, writers like Andrew Gamble have made a direct linkage between 
ordoliberalism and Thatcherism by evoking the idea of ‘free economy-strong state’.90 
Thirdly, ordoliberalism is thought by some to have consistently influenced German 
policy making from the 1940s until the present. The West German economic 
‘miracle’ was a primary concern for the initial research of the Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS) when Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher established the think-tank in 
1974. There is little direct evidence, however, linking ordoliberalism with 
Thatcherism, with a couple of exceptions. A document from 1974 shows how Joseph 
initially considered naming the CPS the ‘Erhard Foundation’ while he also sought out 
Röpke’s Humane Economy.91 Despite his often-ideological pronouncements Joseph 
accepted that it might be ‘necessary for the state to stimulate enterprise.’92 The 
relationship between free markets and the role of the state is a key theme when 
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examining the connection between neo-liberal ideas and Thatcherism. The potential 
ordoliberal elements in some Thatcherite reforms are explored in later chapters. It is 
also of historical interest that ordoliberalism has been both largely ignored in the 
English speaking world as well as engulfed by other interpretations of neo-liberalism. 
Ordoliberals believed that ‘Anglo-Saxon’ theory predominated after the War.93 In 
particular the term became sullied from the mid-1970s due to its association with the 
military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile.94 Neo-liberalism has subsequently 
been consistently framed as being opposed to democracy and social goods, 
privileging economic over political freedom. This can be shown to be generally in 
contradiction to the original version of neo-liberalism, ordoliberalism. This thesis uses 
ordoliberalism as a moderate, rules-based and socially orientated counterpoint to the 
utopian thinking of the Austrian School. Chicagoan neo-liberalism will be shown to 
position itself somewhere between the two. 
 
The Mont Pelerin Society 
 
Friedrich Hayek convened a meeting of like-minded liberals at the ‘Colloque Walter 
Lippmann’ in Paris in 1938. Interrupted by the War, it was not until 1947 that Hayek 
managed to secure a more formal organization, the Mont Pelerin Society, named after 
its initial Swiss venue. For some, like David Harvey, thus began the ‘long march’ of 
neo-liberalism.95 Certainly Hayek had the long-term in mind. Using the Fabian 
Society as his historical model, Hayek sought to change attitudes over a period of 
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years. He persuaded Anthony Fisher, a chicken farmer who had been taken by liberal 
ideas, to found a think-tank as a vehicle for shifting the ideological climate back 
towards economic liberalism. This Fisher did, with some success, establishing the 
Institute of Economic Affairs in 1955 and then attempting to replicate this overseas. 
Hayek recognized that the results of fundamentally altering opinion might take some 
time and that the great social movements were led not by politicians but by men of 
ideas.96 While attempting to break the perceived hold on the establishment that ideas 
like Keynesianism had, Hayek somewhat perversely promoted anti-collectivist 
sentiments by maintaining a degree of ideological homogeneity within his own 
collective. He later admitted that he avoided criticism of what he considered Milton 
Friedman’s macroeconomic ‘nonsense’ for the sake of Mont Pelerin unity. 97 
Articulating his position vis-à-vis the use of the state compared to Friedman, Hayek 
once commented ‘Milton’s monetarism and Keynesianism have more in common 
with each other than I have with either.’98 The Austrian, however, was conscious not 
to allow the group to splinter into Hayekian and Friedmanite wings. In addition 
Hayek also noted that ‘the Ordo circle…was, shall we say, a restraining liberalism.’99 
Mises derided the Freiburg School as ‘ordo-interventionism’ and not much better than 
‘totalitarian socialists’. 100  Nevertheless, some writers have made comparisons 
between the work of early neo-liberals in the 1930s and 1940s.101 Ben Jackson and 
Daniel Stedman-Jones draw attention to the sections endorsing some degree of a 
social safety net in The Road to Serfdom, making some correlation with the work of 
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the ordoliberals.102 Andrew Gamble has also noted even in later works like The 
Constitution of Liberty that Hayek appeared to sanction surprising amounts of state 
intervention.103 Henry Simons too, at the ‘first’ Chicago School, held views in the 
1930s on monopoly, social welfare and regulation that were closer to ordoliberalism 
than his Friedmanite successors.104 The historical context of this early moderate neo-
liberalism was important. The Great Depression, the Second World War and a 
widespread disillusionment with laissez-faire informed this accommodation between 
classical liberalism and state action. Ludwig von Mises was identified as being closest 
to classical liberal thinking, or as Jackson puts it, 1970s neo-liberalism.105 Mises’ 
uncompromising positions were even deemed by Hayek to be naïve and extreme.106 
Yet Mises’ work Bureaucracy (1944), as well as Karl Popper’s The Open Society and 
Its Enemies (1945) and The Road to Serfdom are considered by Stedman-Jones as the 
three key neo-liberal texts of the 1940s.107 If Hayek had any ‘social’ inclinations 
during the 1930s and 1940s it was only a minor part of his thinking. The majority of 
The Road to Serfdom railed against socialism and central planning. His work as a 
whole saw little room for social provision or any role for the state, be it providing 
stable monetary conditions or regulating monopoly. Nevertheless, later generations of 
Austrian thinkers saw Hayek as only on the fringes of their movement as a result of 
this, albeit limited, role of the state. For instance Walter Block lambasted The Road to 
Serfdom and its allusions to state action. Block did not believe Hayek was a 
‘complete liberal’ or an unambiguous advocate of the marketplace, but rather 
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relatively more liberal than his contemporaries in the 1930s and 1940s.108 Others saw 
the thought of Mises, then Murray Rothbard – who believed the state should be 
abolished – as the true manifestations of the Austrian School.109 These sentiments 
probably demonstrate the hardline positions taken by most Austrian School thinkers, 
rather than that Hayek was actually a statist. 
 
Hayek could be strategic. The Mont Pelerin Society was a significant organisation 
that shifted opinion to some extent over the post-war period. By the 1970s one of its 
members, Milton Friedman, was a prominent voice in the political debates of Britain 
and the United States. One of its off shoots, the IEA, has been cited by numerous 
politicians as altering the economic and political debate in Britain.110 Margaret 
Thatcher famously (or at least supposedly) wielded Hayek’s later work, The 
Constitution of Liberty, in a meeting in 1975.111 Whether Hayek, and economic 
liberalism, could have exerted so much influence in the longer term if the Mont 
Pelerin Society had fractured is debatable, if moot. Yet his own thinking could be 
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The Chicago School 
 
The Chicago School of economics was established by a group of thinkers in the 1920s 
and 1930s, including Frank Knight, Henry Simons, Jacob Viner and Lloyd Mints.112 
As we have seen, this ‘first’ Chicago School held some positions closer to that of the 
Freiburg neo-liberals. Henry Simons had stated that monopoly was ‘the great enemy 
of democracy…in all its forms’ and that ‘political and economic power must be 
widely dispersed and decentralised in a world that would be free’.113 Nevertheless, 
Simons was a mentor to Milton Friedman on issues such as monetary theory and the 
causes of the Great Depression.114 Friedman was to become the leader of the 
department from 1946, which Stedman-Jones has dubbed the ‘second’ Chicago 
School, and also included George Stigler, Aaron Director and Gary Becker.115 During 
the 1950s the positions of the School underwent a metamorphosis, in part due to long 
running projects, such as the ‘Free Market Study Group’ and the ‘Anti-Trust 
Project’. 116  Firstly, this altered the Chicagoan perception of monopoly and 
competition. With George Stigler at the forefront, Chicagoans came to believe that 
monopolies were sustained by government but that also large companies could 
replicate the competition function.117 Friedman, who in 1951 appeared to still be 
Simons’ protégé, later relaxed his attitude towards any imposition of competition, 
stating that in most markets there existed ‘giants and pygmies side by side’ and that 
                                                        
112 Stedman-Jones, Masters, p. 90. 
113 Jackson, ‘At The Origins’, p. 142.Stedman-Jones, Masters, p. 99. 
114 Stedman-Jones, Masters, p. 93. 
115 Stedman-Jones, Masters, p. 91, 335. 
116 Daniel Stedman-Jones, ‘The Influence of Transatlantic Neoliberal Politics’, seminar at Queen Mary 
University London, 22 October 2013. 




there was a tendency to ‘overemphasise monopoly’.118 Secondly, the kind of ‘social’ 
proposals made by the early neo-liberals were slowly eroded.119 This may have been 
because of the changing realities of Western societies as the memory of the 
desperation of the 1930s and 1940s began to fade. Stedman-Jones believes business 
activism against the New Deal, as well as the Cold War, were important in 
‘radicalising’ neo-liberalism.120 Friedman explained the shift by saying Simons was 
willing to entertain a relatively active role for the state because he wrote ‘at a time 
when government was small by today’s (1962’s) standards.’121 
 
Milton Friedman produced the first of his several influential works in 1962 with 
Capitalism and Freedom, soon followed by A Monetary History of the United States, 
co-written with Anna Schwartz. Friedman had opinions on a wide variety of topics, 
such as education vouchers, rent control and even legalising recreational drugs, but 
these books crucially outlined his ideas on ‘monetarism’, that the quantity of money 
in an economy was the key driver of inflation. American economist Irving Fisher’s 
1911 work set out the simple quantity theory of money, showing that an increase in 
the volume of money decreased its value. Although abhorring inflation, Keynes 
rejected this thesis in his critique of Weimar Germany. Fisher’s theory was later 
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Importantly, after Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman argued that economic freedom 
was the precursor to political freedom.123 Friedman viewed markets as a means to 
disperse power and therefore freedom, whereas he thought these tended to be 
concentrated by the political process.124 This was a departure in the development of 
neo-liberalism and also provided some justification for Friedman’s later assistance to 
the Pinochet regime in Chile.125 In general, however, the Chicago approach was a 
positivist one based on evidence, data and proof.126 It also received a higher profile 
due to Friedman’s political activism - he advised a number of US Presidents and 
candidates from Barry Goldwater to Ronald Reagan - and the clarity of his rhetoric. 
He managed to condense a little understood and complex theory, monetarism, into a 
memorable sound-bite: ‘inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon.’127 The strength of Friedman’s ideas and personality, backed up by the 
prolific academics at Chicago, were some of the reasons the School became the most 
prominent in the neo-liberal movement after 1950. To suggest, as some contemporary 
writers on neo-liberalism have done, that this was part of the historical development 
of a homogeneous collective that coalesced around Chicagoan thinking from this 
point is again a simplification. It was true that the ‘social’ and anti-monopoly 
elements of neo-liberalism faded in the 1950s but these sentiments can only be 
significantly attached to the ordoliberals or first Chicago School. Neither the schools 
of thought nor the individuals retained rigid positions. Nevertheless there remained 
consistent distinctions between the Austrians and Chicagoans that are worth setting 
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out. Firstly, Austrians focused on microeconomic processes: Friedman of course 
made his name writing about macroeconomics. Monetary control required a 
government to restrict or expand the supply of money to limit inflation. Hayek’s work 
on the business cycle in the 1930s advocated a laissez-faire approach to monetary 
policy that would, according to Hayek, allow an economy to more quickly move to 
equilibrium. In essence, Austrians rejected the concept of macroeconomics.128  The 
two positions also differed on the need for a gold standard and fixed exchange rates, 
as Hayek supported, and Friedman’s preferred floating rates. Chicagoans also 
believed empirical research was a necessity to prove their positions. This was never a 
priority for the Austrians, particularly Mises, and although Hayek did concede some 
empirical testing was relevant he also thought ‘statistical studies don’t get us 
anywhere.’129 Lastly, the two differ on competition, monopoly and regulation. The 
Austrian view on ‘antitrust’ laws was that they were unnecessary, counterproductive 
and a violation of liberty.130 Chicagoans moved some way to that but were never as 
‘hardline’ as the Austrians. Skousen believed this was because many Chicagoans 
aided government in formulating antitrust laws in the United States.131 That is not to 
say there was not a great deal on which the two schools did agree but fundamentally 
there was a difference. Whereas the Austrians took a more puritanical view of market 
processes, Chicagoans accepted that the state could be used to further their objectives. 
That is to say thinkers like Milton Friedman believed they could propose practical 
stepping-stones to a more liberal society, or as he himself remarked much later, ‘you 
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have to have some mechanism of going from here to there’.132 The ordoliberals, 
however, reconciled themselves to a clearly defined role for the state from the 1930s.  
 
The ‘Post War Consensus’ 
 
An accepted historical narrative developed around post-war Britain, with some 
caveats (such as steel nationalisation), that described a broad orthodoxy. Labour then 
Conservative governments constructed a welfare state, moved industries under state 
control and saw the role of economic decision makers as Keynesian demand 
management. Recession and unemployment prompted the Treasury to intervene and 
inject money to reflate the economy. The ultimate success of the state-led action in 
World War Two convinced the British public that collectivism and a bigger role for 
government was beneficial.133 The ‘consensus’ was the belief that both Labour and 
Conservative governments acted, despite their rhetoric, in similar ways. This was 
symbolized in 1954 by the term ‘Butskellism’, which represented the overlapping 
economic policies of Conservative Chancellor R.A. Butler and his Labour 
predecessor Hugh Gaitskell.134 Subsequent Prime Ministers Harold MacMillan and 
Harold Wilson became associated with the policies of corporatism: government-led 
direction of the economy in conjunction with trade unions and business leaders. 
Corporatists believed power blocks in the market would confront each other unless 
their behaviour was co-ordinated centrally.135 In his account of post-war Britain, 
Keith Middlemas wrote that a ‘corporate bias’ became ‘institutionalised’ during the 
                                                        
132 Skousen, Vienna and Chicago, p. 246. Milton Friedman, ‘Say “No” to Intolerance’, In: Liberty 4:6, 
July 1991, pp. 17-20), [http://mises.org/journals/liberty/Liberty_Magazine_July_1991.pdf], accessed 
on 28 November 2013,  p. 20 
133 Barry, New Right, p. 8. 
134 The Economist, 13th February 1954. 




1950s.136 This, in summary, meant that by the 1960s Britain was a heavily regulated 
society with the state involved throughout the economy, from incomes policies to 
price controls and trade union bargaining.  
 
Despite the ‘never had it so good’ affluence under MacMillan just a few years later 
the country faced a number of problems: struggling from persistent inflation, low 
growth and productivity, occasionally crippled by strikes. Did, then, a post-war 
consensus ever exist? If it did, why did it break down? Andrew Gamble has argued 
that most Western social democratic regimes were legitimized by growth and 
prosperity after the War but that this did not convincingly happen in the UK and as a 
result was undermined.137 Contemporary historians reject the consensus thesis, the 
extent of crises in the 1970s and cast doubt on the idea trade unions wielded as much 
power as many claimed.138 Vinen has written that in some respects Margaret Thatcher 
was a defender of consensus, particularly in foreign policy, albeit more specifically of 
a 1940s, rather than a 1960s ‘progressive’ variety.139 Nevertheless Conservative 
politicians were able to capitalize on both the consensus, and ‘declinist’, narratives 
that neo-liberals began to build. Matthijs has described the Party, along with the right 
wing press, as portraying the British state as under siege by the trade unions in the 
1970s.140 The New Right was openly questioning Keynesian answers to economic 
problems before and during this period. Opposition to Keynesian counter-cyclical 
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spending was one issue that united the different strains of neo-liberalism examined 
here.141  
 
As we have seen, as a result of Hayek’s advice, the wealthy Fisher had founded the 
IEA in 1955. It has been considered the most important British think-tank in the post-
war period and had a distinctive strategy. Ralph Harris and Arthur Seldon, in charge 
of the IEA during its formative years, produced pamphlets and papers that promoted 
free market ideas but were ‘pure’ in their approach. The IEA was not aligned to a 
political party and did not present specific policy recommendations. This work was 
not a question of what was possible, rather exercises that returned to liberal economic 
principles. A normative approach, framing the world as it could be as opposed to how 
it was, represented the influence of Hayek’s Austrian lineage. As a result the Institute 
was initially considered outside mainstream political debate and somewhat 
eccentric.142 This image, however, may have suited the group and they did in fact 
receive sizeable donations from high profile businesses and seek to court influence.143 
In addition, neo-liberal influence exerted itself in the FBI (Federation of British 
Industries) and later the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) from the late 1950s 
until the early 1970s under the leadership of Arthur Shenfield and J.B. Bracewell-
Milnes.144 Both attended Mont Pelerin meetings and under their leadership the 
organisation called for pro-business neo-liberal measures such as a reduction in 
excessive government spending, confronting the trade unions, tax reform, cutting 
subsidies for the nationalised industries, opting out of the NHS, removing subsidies 
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on housing rents, and less bureaucracy.145 These details have often been omitted from 
historical accounts of the period and indicate the role business leaders had in the post-
war battle of ideas as well as weakening the notion that the FBI/CBI were part of a 
social democratic or Keynesian ‘consensus’. 
 
Enoch Powell was the most prominent British politician associated with pro-market 
ideas in the 1950s and 1960s. He resigned as Chief Secretary to the Treasury over the 
Macmillan government’s economic policies in 1958, which he believed to be 
inflationary. Powell, also a member of the Mont Pelerin Society, had strong links with 
the IEA in the 1960s and allegedly attributed almost biblical significance to Hayek’s 
The Constitution of Liberty.146 Ralph Harris (as well as Hayek and Friedman) thought 
Powell the best hope of implementing their ideas in Britain but his hugely 
controversial ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in 1968 ended his career on the front bench 
and meant the task of pursuing reforms sought by the IEA was left to others.147 
Nevertheless, most historical narratives pinpoint Powell as the British politician 
keeping the liberal economic flame alive in the Conservative Party after the War. 
Indeed, according to Camilla Schofield, Powell’s combination of anti-Keynesianism 
and nationalism readied Britain for ‘Thatcher’s crusade’.148 Vinen too highlights the 
importance of Powell on Thatcherism, saying his influence was ‘vastly more 
important’ than ‘Austrian philosophers’ or ‘American economists’.149 
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Keith Joseph was introduced to the IEA in 1964 and Margaret Thatcher began to visit 
their offices around the same time. The think-tank had at that time recently published 
a book of essays called The Rebirth of Britain.150 Keith Joseph was an unpredictable 
politician. His enthusiasm for the IEA and market-orientated policies was to fluctuate 
over the next ten years. The IEA, however, was not the only think-tank that became 
linked with the term New Right. The Bow Group was founded in 1951 by members of 
the Conservative Party and although not free of political influence like the IEA, 
became an important proponent of the free market. Geoffrey Howe, one of the key 
contributors to the Bow Group and editor (between 1960 and 1962) of its publication 
Crossbow, said that the organization was originally set up to promote a classless 
Conservative Party, a multiracial Commonwealth, liberal economics and One Nation 
conservatism.151 Howe said the idea for the group was primarily political seeking to 
provide a rival to the Fabian Society.152 There was some contact between the IEA and 
Bow Group, however, with members of the latter attending meetings of the former 
and IEA members writing articles for Crossbow.153 From its inception the Bow Group 
contributed numerous pro-market articles that were to have some subsequent 
influence on the Thatcher government. Geoffrey Howe, for one, believes the Group 
has not been given the credit they deserved for this work.154 The Bow Group though, 
was a different kind of organization to the IEA. Former members Julian Critchley and 
Simon Jenkins both noted by the mid-1960s the Group was being used by ambitious 
young politicians as a platform for Conservative candidate selection and became an 
important component in the Party’s structure.155 According to Barr’s history of the 
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Bow Group, it was only under Peter Lilley’s chairmanship from 1973 to 1975 that the 
organization became explicitly aligned with the New Right and that it came into 
competition with the CPS when that was formed in 1974.  
 
An example of the primacy of the IEA in promoting liberal economics can be seen 
when Geoffrey Howe decided to ask their advice on pension arrangements, as ‘the 
Bow Group could not provide the level of expertise on the semi-professional basis 
which the IEA’s founders, Arthur Seldon and Ralph Harris, could.’156 Howe’s links 
with the IEA and Bow Group along with his quiet determination subsequently made 
him perhaps the most committed economic liberal in the first Thatcher government. 
John Hoskyns later wrote of Howe in office that he ‘repeatedly did the things that few 
of his predecessors would have dared to do. He seemed to me to be all action and very 
little talk.’157 Howe’s long-standing zeal for free market ideas was matched in 
government as Chancellor. Others, such as Keith Joseph and even Margaret Thatcher, 
were more cautious. 
 
The New Right had a transatlantic link long before the well-publicized ideological 
‘special relationship’ between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. 
Friedrich Hayek taught in London and knew Milton Friedman at Chicago. They were 
both founder members of the Mont Pelerin Society. Ideas were shared between 
Britain and the United States as free market think-tanks proliferated, including the 
Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and the Hoover Institution in 
the US. Barry Goldwater was important in the resurgence of economic liberal ideas in 
the United States. As the 1964 Republican Presidential candidate he was a 
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controversial figure, not least because he had opposed civil rights legislation. 
Nevertheless Goldwater brought his version of libertarian and free market ideas to the 
fore in his campaign as well as his book, Conscience of a Conservative.158 Goldwater 
was instrumental in refashioning the Republican Party, moulding together two strands 
of thinking. It became the party that backed a smaller federal government and 
championed capitalism. In this respect Goldwater combined the ideas of Hayek and 
Public Choice theory. Secondly, social conservatism grew louder in its opposition to 
the (socially) liberal policies of the period, particularly after 1964, towards President 
Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ programmes. The process continued under Richard 
Nixon and by the time of Ronald Reagan’s presidential victory in 1980 the politics of 
fiscal and social conservatism had become hugely influential in the United States. The 
American writer George Nash has described this process, of the coming together of 
the various strands of conservatism, as ‘fusionism’.159 This followed a similar, if less 
pronounced path in Britain. More liberal social policies in Britain, the ‘permissive 
society’, led to a backlash. Margaret Thatcher shared the conservative political 
instincts of Reagan. The trend can also be seen in the thinking of Keith Joseph, who 
made a call in 1974 to ‘remoralise our national life’.160 He sought to roll back the 
economic collectivism and social permissiveness of the post-war years and like many 
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The Early 1970s:  the ideological battle takes shape 
 
During his period in office in the 1960s Harold Wilson had presided over a sterling 
crisis and eventual devaluation and been forced to shelve the In Place Of Strife 
legislation that attempted to deal with growing trade union strikes. Edward Heath won 
the 1970 election with a manifesto, titled A Better Tomorrow, of free market 
measures promising to reform Britain’s ailing economy.162 Wilson derided this as 
‘Selsdon Man’ (after the Selsdon Park Hotel where the manifesto was discussed and 
set out) and the programme was discarded in 1972 as pressure on Heath mounted. 
‘Selsdon’ has in fact been traced back to Heath’s first year as party leader, in 1965, 
and a pro-market agenda rooted less in academic or think-tank theory than a desire for 
greater ‘professionalism’.163 Other policies that would come to fruition under the 
Thatcher government, such as council house sales and proposals to introduce business 
practices into the civil service, also developed under Heath.164  
 
The economic situation in Britain, however, continued to deteriorate. After the Yom 
Kippur war oil prices soared leaving the Western world with severe energy 
difficulties. This exacerbated unemployment and inflation in Britain, which, along 
with low productivity, induced stagflation (both a stagnating economy of low growth 
and high inflation). Industrial disputes, the worst being the 1972-74 coalminers 
strikes, left Britain in crisis, a three day week, its politicians unable to effectively 
confront trade union power. Add to this the spate of ever more violent atrocities by 
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Northern Irish terrorists and Heath was faced with several seemingly intractable 
problems.  
 
The main difficulty, however, was to repair the British economy. In the previous 
decade the Phillips Curve was fashionable, suggesting that employment could be 
bought at the cost of inflation. Yet this rule was apparently disproved in the early 
1970s as both unemployment and inflation simultaneously rose. Conservative 
Chancellor, Anthony Barber, poured money into the economy to try and ease 
Britain’s problems. The Conservatives were rejected at the polls in 1974, however, 
Harold Wilson’s Labour government securing a narrow majority after the two 
elections that year. The economy continued to stutter throughout the rest of the 
decade. The explanations and analysis of these events prompted an ideological debate 
of growing intensity.165 As we have seen, the crisis narrative was exploited by the 
right to propose a number of neo-liberal influenced policies.166 
 
Pro-market thinkers, many directly from or influenced by the Mont Pelerin Society, 
had ploughed a lonely furrow for twenty years, but were now being taken more 
seriously.  An example of the disdain that many British politicians had held towards 
the New Right was a comment made in the House of Commons during a debate in 
1968 on inflation by Labour MP for Stoke-on-Trent Central, Robert Cant. ‘If the 
Friedman Chicago school of monetary theory is laughed at in the United States, why 
should we take it seriously here?’167 This was to change, however. Think-tanks like 
the IEA were being taken notice of in the 1970s and ideas they promoted were being 
debated in the political mainstream. Monetarism was a key theme in discourse during 
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this period. Milton Friedman had worked extensively on the causes of the Great 
Depression. His critique concluded that a contraction of the money supply had led to 
depression, while post-war inflation was caused by excessive monetary expansion. 
Monetarism blamed inflation in the 1970s on government intervention in the 
economy. The monetarist prescription was to limit or control the money supply. Later 
monetarists in Britain split into several camps, including those who, like Friedman, 
believed in controlling the monetary base or others, such as those at the London 
Business School (LBS) and the University of Liverpool who developed the ‘rational 
expectations’ theory. This split was to become important during the first Thatcher 
government.168 
 
Monetarism was a good example of the different approaches of the New Right. 
Austrians, such as Hayek, saw little role for the state where as Chicagoans like 
Friedman believed that government had a responsibility for macroeconomic 
management. 169  In the 1970s monetarism became de rigueur in some British 
newspapers, most notably the Daily Telegraph, Financial Times and The Times.170 
Samuel Brittan’s Financial Times column took on a more free market tone from 1969, 
while Peter Jay (who wrote Jim Callaghan’s 1976 Labour Party Conference speech) 
had taken a more neo-liberal stance by 1974.171 Future Conservative politicians like 
Richard Ryder have also cited the influence of Maurice Green at the Daily Telegraph 
as an influence in spreading free market ideas.172 Alan Walters, an academic and later 
an advisor to Margaret Thatcher, wrote Money in Boom and Slump for the IEA in the 
                                                        
168 Patrick Minford, ‘Inflation, unemployment and the pound’, In: Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution. 
How it happened and what it meant, S.Roy and J. Clarke, eds, (London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 50-66. 
169 Barry, New Right, p. 23. 
170 Cockett, Thinking, p. 183. 
171 Jackson, ‘The think-tank archipelago’, p. 54. 




late 1960s. It set out to prove that increasing the quantity of money in an economy, 
compared to growth in national income, caused inflation.173 By using historical data 
Walters not only transmitted a Friedmanite idea, he employed the empirical style of 
the Chicago School. Terry Burns, then at the London Business School (LBS) said that 
Walters more convincingly explained the monetary events between 1973 and 1975 
than others.174 Margaret Thatcher’s official biographer Charles Moore states the 
future Prime Minister had certainly read Walters’ Money in Boom and Slump by 
September 1977. Likewise monetary economist Tim Congdon described his views 
being formed by, as well as theorists like Don Patinkin and Gottfried Haberler, the 
growing influence of Milton Friedman and his explanation of the inflation of the early 
to mid-1970s.175 Future Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont 
said that he first learned of Friedman’s ideas by reading Money in Boom and 
Slump.176 
 
Over the decade politicians in Britain absorbed ideas like monetarism, even if under 
sufferance. Labour MP Robin Cook said in 1979 that Friedman’s ‘spirit has hovered 
over our debates.’177 Keith Joseph, after becoming involved with the IEA in the 
1960s, and announcing his conversion to liberalism prior to the 1970 election 
remained strangely quiet about pro-market policies whilst serving as a high-spending 
minister in Edward Heath’s government 1970-74. When returned to opposition, 
Joseph lambasted that government’s record, embraced monetarism and went on a 
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speaking tour of the UK preaching the ideas of the New Right. He founded the 
‘Hayekian’ CPS, along with Margaret Thatcher (although she later played down her 
role) in 1974 as an alternative to the Conservative Research Department (CRD) to 
promote the ideas of the free market.178 One of Joseph’s aims at the CPS was to 
investigate and emulate the West German economic model, even using the term 
‘social market economy’ (although the word ‘social’, disliked by Margaret Thatcher, 
was allegedly added only to soothe the harsh monetarist prescription). Joseph had 
hopes for a British ‘social market economy’ and produced a pamphlet based on his 
lecture tour called Monetarism is Not Enough. As we have seen, Joseph had an 
interest at this time in ordoliberal West German politicians like Ludwig Erhard and 
thinkers like Wilhelm Röpke. Other Conservative politicians openly became 
proponents of New Right ideas. For instance Rhodes Boyson, along with Ralph Harris 
and Ross McWhirter, set up the Constitutional Book Club in 1970. It published ‘Right 
Turn’ that year as well as publications that included ‘Goodbye to Nationalization’ 
(O’Sullivan and Hodgson, 1971), ‘Must History Repeat Itself’ (Fisher, 1974) and 
‘Rape of Reason’ (Marks and Cox, 1975).179 Other right wing groups that formed 
during this period included the National Association for Freedom (NAFF), whose 
prime concern was the assertion of individual rights against those of the trade 
unions.180 
 
Conservatives were not the only ones interested in strategies like monetarism. David 
Owen, then of the Labour Party, said he became convinced of the necessity of 
monetary discipline via Peter Jay, from 1973.181 James Callaghan also seemed to 
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acknowledge the new thinking in his speech to the Labour Party Conference as leader 
in 1976 – a speech penned by Jay, his son-in-law.182 Labour’s Prime Minister was 
under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its loan conditions of 
that year. Terry Burns identified the IMF as at the vanguard of a movement towards 
more market orientated economic policies in the 1970s.183 Contemporary historians 
use these points to demonstrate that in fact the Thatcher government was not the first 
to employ neo-liberal measures.184 What we can say, however, is that the Thatcher 
government was considerably more enthusiastic in its embrace of economic liberalism 
than its predecessor. The acknowledgement of neo-liberal ideas like monetary control 
by both political parties, sections of the press, and institutions like the IMF indicated 
the broad interest in more market orientated policies by the 1970s. 
 
Bridging the gap between ideology and politics  
 
There are a number of important and influential writers and advisors who played a 
role in transporting New Right ideas into the realm of mainstream politics. Figure 1 
shows how neo-liberal ideas were contextualised and popularised into mainstream 
British political and public debate. As well as think-tanks, journalists and other 
‘conduits’ played an important role in this process.  Adam Ridley, who worked at the 
CRD and subsequently the Treasury, believed the interest of Conservative politicians 
‘in a monetarist approach stemmed exclusively from intermediate exponents’ such as 
Peter Jay and Samuel Brittan, the IEA and other figures like Gordon Pepper.185 Other 
pro-market advocates such as Alfred Sherman, John Hoskyns and Norman Strauss 
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came to influence future policy makers during this period. Sherman, who during the 
1970s thought Margaret Thatcher had ‘beliefs, not ideas’ was the first director of the 
CPS, after its inception in 1974.186 Sherman was attracted to ideological absolutism. 
He had fought in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s on the side of the communists 
before subsequently converting to economic liberalism. As an advisor to Conservative 
politicians he offered an uncompromising and ‘pure’ free market programme often 
focusing on Hayek’s ideas.187 Sherman proved instrumental in persuading Keith 
Joseph that New Right ideas were the answer to Britain’s economic problems. Joseph 
and Sherman were the principal ideological influences upon Margaret Thatcher in the 
early 1970s.188   
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John Hoskyns was another prominent advisor during Thatcher’s years as leader of the 
opposition. Similarly committed to the market as Sherman, as well as ‘all-




was eventually considered too radical to publish.189 Stepping Stones set out a political 
strategy, in particular towards trade union reform, that the Conservatives could 
potentially employ to improve both Britain’s economic performance, and the Party’s 
long-term fortunes. Norman Strauss was also a liberal who advised the Conservative 
Party in opposition in the 1970s as well as the CPS. Gordon Pepper was another neo-
liberal who advised Geoffrey Howe and Margaret Thatcher on monetarism during 
their years in opposition.190 Pepper worked in the City of London and provided a link 
between the business and finance sector and the Conservative Party. As well as 
influencing in particular Geoffrey Howe, Pepper had access to Conservative leaders 
when they gained power. Several documents reveal meetings and letters between 
Margaret Thatcher and Pepper.191 He consistently urged a strict monetary policy and 
became a critic of the government after 1987 when Nigel Lawson abandoned 
monetary targets.192 Tim Congdon was another monetary economist who influenced 
Conservative politicians in the late 1970s and while they were in office. Margaret 
Thatcher wrote in her memoirs that Congdon was an ‘astute’ economist while Nigel 
Lawson also mentioned him. His opinions were sometimes sought by the Thatcher 
government.193  Congdon himself, in an interview in 2012, cited Peter Jay (while 
working together at The Times) as important in helping to form his own monetarist 
beliefs and unique in his prediction of the boom and subsequent inflation during the 
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Heath years and its aftermath.194 Jay has been consistently cited by politicians and 
journalists as an influence during the 1970s. Sherman, Hoskyns, Pepper, Congdon and 
Strauss were all important because they acted as conduits between raw theory and the 
business of policy making. That is not to say that Conservative politicians like Joseph 
and Thatcher suddenly became ideological theorists. Robin Harris wrote that 
Margaret Thatcher’s exposure to the CPS and thinkers like Sherman allowed her to 
work through the connection between her political instincts and her political position, 
but that she was never ‘converted’ to neo-liberals like Hayek and Friedman.195 Rather 
that these ideas provided the ‘instruments’ to seek to achieve already determined 
political goals that the then available tools seemed ill-equipped to reach.196 Alfred 
Sherman said in 1990 that ‘people like Keith and Margaret turned to Hayek and 
Friedman to justify what they already thought’ while Enoch Powell expanded this to 
the Party as a whole in 1989: ‘comprehensive theories are antipathetic to the 
Conservative mentality. It is suspicious of theory.’197 This gives credence to the 
‘statecraft’ thesis or a more general climate of ideas. For historians like Richard 
Vinen, ‘Thatcherism was always about power, and it is the nature of power to adjust 
to circumstances’.198 Conservative politician Peter Lilley has said that rather than 
exerting direct influence on Margaret Thatcher, the think-tanks of the 1970s provided 
a ‘supporting wind’.199 
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Public Choice Theory 
 
The main strands of neo-liberal thinking have so far been identified as the Austrian 
and Chicago Schools led by Hayek and Friedman respectively, and the lesser-known 
earlier variant ordoliberalism. The last significant grouping is Public Choice theory 
based at the University of Virginia. Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan were the 
thinkers most closely associated with Public Choice theory. Sometimes known as the 
economics of politics, Public Choice followed themes examined in The Road to 
Serfdom, which outlined what Hayek believed was the dangerous growth of the state. 
There is a link with several of the schools of thought studied here. Hayek’s work 
warned of the dangers of an expanding state, Buchanan was once of the Chicago 
School while Razeen Sally believes an ordoliberal view of state power also influenced 
Public Choice.200 The Calculus of Consent (Tullock and Buchanan, 1962) and The 
Politics of Bureaucracy (Tullock, 1965) presented examples of the concerns of Public 
Choice theorists. The core features were that bureaucrats were characterised as 
operating in just as self-interested a manner as those in the private sector. 
Government, for Public Choice theorists, was too ‘large and basically inefficient’.201 
They argued that bureaucracy was prone to expansion, inefficiency, waste, and that 
government was associated with processes that hamper market forces, such as perfect 
monopolies. 202  Tullock and Buchanan invoked the idea of ‘rent seeking’ in 
bureaucracy, that is to say a payment ‘over and above that which resources could 
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command in any alternative use.’ 203  Rent seeking was said to be endemic in 
government and reflected a ‘diversion of value from consumers generally to the 
favoured rent seeker, with a net loss of value in the process.’204 Public Choice writers 
advocated a reduction in central government and more emphasis on local 
responsibility. Lastly, Buchanan and Tullock introduced the concept, similarly to 
market failure, of government failure. Margaret Thatcher capitalised on the belief that 
government failure was just as if not more likely than market failure.205 Public Choice 
theory looked at bureaucracy from a new perspective during this period and became 
influential. Not all neo-liberals, however, agreed with the ideas of Public Choice, 
thinking they made too much of an accommodation with the state.206 Admired by the 
Austrians for her libertarianism, novelist and writer Ayn Rand may have also had an 
indirect impact. Her ideas of ‘objectivism’ rejected any kind of state interference, 
encapsulated by her 1943 book The Fountainhead. Rand’s thinking has also been 
described as anarcho-capitalism. She influenced philosophers like Robert Nozick, was 
admired by Milton Friedman and also acted as a mentor to Alan Greenspan, 
subsequently the long serving Chairman of the US Federal Reserve.207 
 
British thinkers also took up the ideas of Public Choice. Madsen Pirie, of the Adam 
Smith Institute (ASI, formed in 1977) later wrote that governments found it very 
difficult to cut their size and cost, while the incentive for the bureaucrat was to 
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increase rather than diminish the work done in their department.208 The IEA’s Arthur 
Seldon also popularized public choice ideas in the 1960s and 1970s, characterizing 
many employees of the state – from teachers to miners – as ‘rent-seekers’.209 The idea 
of inefficiency in government sat neatly with other New Right themes such as reduced 
intervention in the economy and increased personal choice and liberty. The anti-state 
or smaller state movement probably had greater influence on the politics of the United 
States.  Despite running huge budget deficits these ideas were perhaps most closely 
linked with Ronald Reagan’s presidency: ‘Government is not the solution to our 
problem. Government is the problem.’210 Nevertheless reducing the size of the state 
has been consistently aligned with neo-liberalism and by association the Thatcher 
government. Donald Savoie, in Thatcher Reagan Mulroney. In Search of a New 
Bureaucracy (1994), wrote that Thatcher publically endorsed Public Choice as well as 
recommending literature on the subject to senior civil servants.211 The Prime Minister 
urged reform of bureaucracy in Cabinet meetings, to reduce ‘unnecessary duplication, 
co-ordination and inefficiency’ as well as setting up the Rayner and later Ibbs’ task 
forces to investigate ways of achieving these aims.212 Public Choice also chimed with 
Keith Joseph’s idea of the ‘ratchet effect’ of socialism.   
 
Slimming the size of the state has been a notable neo-liberal theme. It was implicit in 
the work of the Chicago, Austrian and Public Choice schools, if not neccessarily in 
ordoliberalism. It closely followed the message of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom. In 
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addition, the emphasis of New Right think-tanks, according to Ben Jackson, shifted 
subtly during the 1970s from its previous focus on anti-competitive business practices 
to the problems of government. This may have reflected the funding of organisations 
like the IEA, who received donations from large companies like IBM, BP and Marks 
and Spencer.213 Whether Public Choice theory exerted significant influence on the 
Thatcher government, however, is debatable. As we have seen, Conservatives had 
proposed greater professionalism and business methods in the civil service since the 
1960s.214 In addition, whether government actually shrank during Thatcherism has 
also been contested. Contemporary critics on the left believe that neo-liberals sought 
to ‘retask’ the state or simply use government in a different way, as opposed to 
doctrinaire reduction.215 
 
When Edward Heath was challenged for the leadership of the Conservative Party in 
1975 some in the party hoped Keith Joseph would stand. A number of controversial 
speeches, invoking among other things eugenics, meant he did not seek the post. Tory 
MPs from the economic liberal wing of the party still wanted a representative, 
however, allowing Margaret Thatcher to stand and surprisingly, win. The year before 
Friedrich Hayek had been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics with Milton 
Friedman emulating this in 1976. The tide was turning for the New Right and 
economic liberals. At the same time the movement began to see a longer decline in its 
reputation. This has been attributed by writers like Taylor Boas and Jordan Gans-
Morse to Milton Friedman’s connections with the Pinochet regime in Chile from 
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1975.216 The link was made that neo-liberalism had authoritarian and anti-democratic 
tendencies, which could also feed into ideas of a ‘strong-state’. The accusation that 
neo-liberalism required curbs on democratic processes has been levelled at not only 
Friedman, but also the Austrian and Freiburg Schools.217 
 
Margaret Thatcher as Leader of the Opposition 
 
The years in opposition from 1974-79 saw a flurry of research and policy initiatives 
by groups close to the Conservative Party. New leader Margaret Thatcher was 
sympathetic to the principles of economic liberalism but was not, in public, zealously 
pro-market at this time. She, like her mentor Keith Joseph, had loyally served Edward 
Heath’s government without dissenting over the U-turns or abandonment of the 1970 
Selsdon programme. Margaret Thatcher was not as vocal about the virtues of the 
market compared to others like Geoffrey Howe, Nigel Lawson or Joseph himself. It 
was this period in the mid to late 1970s when high inflation and trade union strikes 
provided a space for Thatcher to use a different strategy, or at least one that pursued 
more of the neo-liberalism that the Callaghan government had already embarked 
upon. The difficulties Labour had in accommodating the unions and running the 
economy meant the Conservatives could allow Callaghan to govern himself out of 
office. The IMF loan of 1976 was a symbol of Britain’s post-war decline, from major 
world power to debtor; the ‘sick man of Europe’. The IMF attached structural 
conditions to the loan, which in part explained Callaghan’s change in policy towards 
inflation. In their work, Goodbye Great Britain, Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross 
argue that 1976 was a year of crisis in particular and the turning point in ideas of 
                                                        






economic management.218 Monetarism, however, was divisive in Britain, particularly 
as the only practical application of the doctrine was at that time in Chile. From 1975, 
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet allowed a group of economic liberals dubbed the 
‘Chicago Boys’ to guide economic policy. They had either attended the University of 
Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s, or its affiliated institution, the Catholic University of 
Chile.219 The crucial link here was with Milton Friedman, both a liberal and a 
libertarian. Presumably he would have approved of the economic policies and the 
intervention to control the money supply but not the oppression of human rights. In a 
letter to Pinochet in 1975, Friedman argued for ‘shock treatment’ to cure Chile’s ills, 
to reduce government spending by 25% within six months and for ‘the removal of as 
many obstacles as possible that now hinder the private market’.220 Friedman also used 
a phrase more synonymous with ordoliberalism: ‘The key economic problems of 
Chile are clearly twofold: inflation, and the promotion of a healthy social market 
economy.’221 
 
Friedman later commented that economic reform in Chile created a ‘miracle’ and that 
the adoption of pro-market policies allowed the country to make the transition to 
democracy in 1990. Friedman remarked in 2000 that ‘the really important thing about 
the Chilean business is that free markets did work their way in bringing about a free 
society.’222 Friedrich Hayek also praised Chile as a development model. Margaret 
Thatcher, although broadly sympathetic to the Pinochet regime, did challenge Hayek 
on this in a 1982 letter. ‘The progression from Allende’s Socialism to the free 
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enterprise capitalist economy of the 1980s is a striking example of economic reform. 
However, some of the measures adopted in Chile are quite unacceptable.’223 
 
Friedman and Hayek’s attitude towards Chile signified a principle that has been 
attributed to contemporary understandings of neo-liberalism, that when democracy 
and markets collide, the latter will prevail. The theme is one that apples to many 
interpretations of neo-liberalism - that of a general disregard or disdain of democracy. 
Lastly, it presupposes another neo-liberal principle, that essentially markets create 
conditions for the state and civil society, not the other way round. From the more 
benign idea of the state of thinkers like Friedman and ordoliberals like Röpke and 
Rüstow, to the harsher real-world manifestations like Pinochet’s Chile, the market is 
the most important component in society. In this respect, using the state to secure 
conditions propitious for market mechanisms is the defining feature of neo-liberalism. 
 
Jim Bulpitt has written that monetarism was used as a tool of Conservative ‘statecraft’ 
and argued it was an attempt to ‘disentangle the central state from ‘interests’’ as well 
as a way to regain power.224 In the 1970s though, the Chilean example made it easy 
for British politicians to criticise monetarism and other neo-liberal measures by 
presenting the approach as part of an extreme programme. Dr Jeremy Bray, Labour 
MP for Motherwell and Wishaw, said in the House of Commons in 1976, ‘when 
Friedman took on the job of advising the Chilean dictators they made slashing cuts in 
money supply, whereupon the rate of inflation escalated fantastically and the level of 
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unemployment soared.’225 In addition, the idea of macroeconomic control of the 
money supply was not agreed upon within the Mont Pelerin Society and threatened to 
cause a split between its two most notable protagonists. In a letter to the IEA’s Arthur 
Seldon in 1985, Friedrich Hayek wrote, ‘I have long regretted my failure to take time 
to criticize Friedman’s Positive Economics’ but was worried about ‘the constant 
danger that the Mont Pelerin society might split into a Friedmanite and a Hayekian 
wing.’ 226  For Hayek, control of money was yet another form of government 
intervention that was illiberal and would distort the market economy. Hayek 
advocated ending government monopoly on issuing legal tender to allow currency 
competition.227  
 
Monetary policy as a means of bringing inflation under control, however, was 
becoming more prominent in British politics. Even Labour Ministers were 
abandoning Keynesianism. David Owen was ‘very disillusioned with the Labour 
Party in the 1970s’ but ‘hugely encouraged by Jim Callaghan’s speech in 1976’ 
(which Keith Joseph quipped could have been written by Milton Friedman) and that 
‘Thatcher was helped by Callaghan and Healey’s acceptance of monetarism’.228 
Critics on the left, such as Andre Gunner Frank, have criticised the 1970s 
governments of James Callaghan and Jimmy Carter as having introduced neo-liberal 
measures by stealth despite being elected on social democratic programmes. For 
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Gunner Frank, this laid the foundation for Thatcherism and Reaganomics.229 The 
reality was that both Carter and Callaghan had to wrestle with the difficult conditions 
of rising energy prices and ‘stagflation’. Both were voted out of office in favour of 
more neo-liberal manifestos. David Harvey has written that the neo-liberal 
‘revolutionary’ period took place between 1978 and 1980, when Reagan and Thatcher 
were elected, Deng Xiaoping opened up China’s economy and Paul Volcker became 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve.230 Harvey characterized Reagan as closer to the 
conservative libertarianism of Barry Goldwater. Paul Volcker, who drastically raised 
interest rates in an attempt to halt inflation was, according to Harvey, closer to 
Thatcher’s thinking in his adherence to neo-liberal methods. Deng Xiaoping, it was 
claimed, liberalised the Chinese economy in an attempt to emulate Japan, Hong Kong 
and the other Asian ‘tiger’ economies. 
 
The rise of ‘declinist’ literature in the 1970s helped augment interest in the New 
Right.231 The ongoing economic difficulties Britain experienced during the decade led 
intellectuals, politicians and the public to investigate alternative strategies. The IEA 
continued to publish pamphlets and papers in the 1970s but they were joined by other 
pro-market think-tanks. As we have seen, the CPS was founded in 1974 and although 
technically independent, clearly had close affiliation with the liberal economic wing 
of the Conservative Party. The Bow Group aligned itself with the New Right at this 
time and another group, the ASI was also set up. The ASI, founded by 
Madsen Pirie and Eamonn Butler, was not connected to a political party and unlike 
the IEA, actively sought to influence government policies. 
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Margaret Thatcher was quite ambiguous about specific policies in opposition, which 
allowed some space for ideas.232 This, in effect, created competition for the ear of the 
party leader amongst shadow cabinet members, who made various recommendations. 
A degree of rivalry – not all of it ideological - existed between the official CRD run 
by Chris Patten and the more radical CPS. Both were influential in several policy 
groups: The Right Approach (1976), The Right Approach to the Economy (1977) and 
Stepping Stones (1977). These have been viewed as key documents from the period 
and have been examined in much of the literature on Thatcherism. The Right 
Approach was published as a Conservative Party pamphlet. It did not contain radical 
measures but did underline some of the general themes: ‘Socialist policies have been 
a major cause of these distortions of our economy. The Socialist obsession with 
extending the power of the State has led to widespread nationalisation and to massive 
growth of government spending and bureaucracy.’233 
 
The Right Approach did make a brief allusion to monetarism when talking about 
collective bargaining. ‘Monetary restraint, including the setting of targets for 
monetary expansion, is a key feature of economic policy, though by no means the 
only one. Excessive wage claims should clearly not be accommodated by an easy 
expansion in bank lending.’234 Rising labour costs and trade union demands had 
exacerbated stagflation in the 1970s by causing ‘wage stickiness’ (the cost of wages 
not responding to other market signals, such as declining productivity).  
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The following year came The Right Approach to the Economy, authored by 
Conservative MPs Keith Joseph, Geoffrey Howe, David Howell and Jim Prior. This 
again emphasised the necessity of realistic and responsible collective bargaining. In 
this document, however, the explicit control of the money supply was outlined as well 
as a reduction in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR).235 There was a 
prescription of ‘strict control by the Government of the rate of growth of the money 
supply and of its own spending. Unless public spending is reduced, price inflation 
cannot be contained.’236 
 
Here we can see the direct application of New Right thinking into (albeit in 
opposition) a policy making document. Margaret Thatcher later thought much of the 
Party’s politics were weak in opposition but the formulation of ideas was vital.237 The 
two main themes of The Right Approach and The Right Approach to the Economy 
were the urgency to tackle industrial relations and the persistent problem of inflation. 
From 1976 to 1978 the Callaghan government attempted to forge a ‘social contract’, 
an underlying agreement with the TUC to limit pay rises to (an arbitrary) 5%. Over 
this period the fragile compromise seemed to have some effect as inflation declined 
and strikes were kept at bay.238 So good, in fact, were things looking for the Labour 
government that Callaghan almost called an election in Autumn 1978, his personal 
popularity constantly remaining higher than that of Margaret Thatcher. This was to 
prove a pivotal moment in post-war British history. Callaghan dithered and did not go 
to the polls and was to rue his decision as the social contract came apart. The ‘Winter 
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of Discontent’ cost him his majority and gave added legitimacy to not only the 
Conservative policy recommendations in opposition but also the general intellectual 
climate that a change in approach was needed. Margaret Thatcher also identified 
individual responsibility and law and order as paramount, as opposed to the 
permissive and collectivist culture that she thought had predominated since the 
1960s.239 She saw the turmoil of 1970s Britain as a loss of state authority that had to 
be reversed.240 The crisis and declinist narrative, particularly after the Winter of 
Discontent, were relentlessly exploited by Thatcher according to Matthijs.241 The 
strikes of 1978 and 1979 also inadvertently acted as a ‘stepping stone’, of the kind 
described by Hoskyns in his unpublished report.242  
 
Although her beliefs during this period were developing, by the time she came to 
power Thatcher was more explicit in extolling the potency of the market. In a speech 
in 1979 she said: ‘the greatest economic successes since 1945 have come in those 
nations where free enterprise has been allowed to flower without impediment.’243 One 
account sets out Thatcher’s three objectives upon coming to power: to significantly 
change the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy, a ‘conscious redefinition of the role 
of the state in the economy with a renewed emphasis on the virtues of the free 
market’, and a gradual rebalancing of relations between labour and capital in favour 
of the latter.244 The re-imposition of the authority of the state and an economy 
powered more by free enterprise gives broad credence to a ‘free economy-strong 
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state’ thesis, although in a cruder way than envisaged by the Freiburg neo-liberals of 
the 1930s. For them a strong state was about allowing markets to operate efficiently 
and providing preferable social outcomes by preventing monopoly and corruption of 
the political process. 
 
Stepping Stones, a policy project led by John Hoskyns working with Norman Strauss 
during 1977 and 1978, was never published. It is of some significance for the insights 
it provides into the ideas being tabled at the time, the internal divisions in deciding 
policy and the battle between neo-liberal ideology and political expediency. Margaret 
Thatcher decided that the publication of Stepping Stones would be too much of a risk 
and could make the public wary of her leadership. In her memoirs, however, she 
claimed Stepping Stones had been the main inspiration behind policy formulation.245 
Some historians believe Stepping Stones has been mythologized by Thatcherites, 
while others see certain policies, such as trade union legislation, as evidence that the 
approach was actually employed in power.246 Hoskyns’ role was to ‘produce and 
outline a ‘strategy framework’ for the Tory Party to cover what we have called the 
Turn-around.’ This was intended to formulate a set of policies that could provide 
substance for a manifesto or programme in government.247  
 
Strategically Hoskyns thought that policies ‘will in some cases require changes in 
“public consciousness” before they are politically possible.’248 This was envisaged as 
‘Phase Three of a process which starts with the injection of new ideas, in order to 
                                                        
245 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 40. 
246 Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain, p. 90, Matthijs, Ideas and Economic Crises, p. 132. 
247 The Hoskyns’ Papers, (Cambridge: Churchill Archives, hereafter HOSK), 1/21 ‘Second Draft of 
note by Hoskyns to Keith Joseph summarising the “assignment you would like me to undertake”’, 14 
July 1977.  




soften up public opinion, followed by public debate, leading finally to the 
implementation of policy through legislation.’249 This fitted with Hayek’s views on 
shifting the ideological climate before the governing reality could change. This 
process had in fact been taking place for several years before Hoskyns’ 1978 
comment. As we have seen, some politicians, journalists, commentators and 
academics, had accepted some of the tenets of neo-liberal thought over the previous 
decade. This shift meant that some of the policies found in Stepping Stones would 
indeed become ‘politically possible’.   
 
One conversation between Geoffrey Howe and Hoskyns in August 1977 showed the 
priorities of the then Shadow Chancellor. Hoskyns said that Howe’s key policies were 
curing inflation (‘he agreed the real explanations of inflation are a combination of 
Keynes and Friedman’) and to create a liberal economic climate by deregulation, 
switching from direct to indirect taxation and reducing the overall tax burden.250 
Howe also wanted to ‘liberalise exchange control on capital outflows’ and discussed 
his enterprise zone idea.251 It is also clear that Hoskyns became infuriated at the 
reluctance of Margaret Thatcher and her shadow cabinet, as well as the CRD, to take 
a more radical position. In one note to Keith Joseph, Hoskyns wrote ‘my 
interpretation is at present that she (and therefore her advisors) are completely lost 
and confused.’252 The friction between Hoskyns and Chris Patten at the CRD was also 
a regular theme. Hoskyns accused Patten of being ‘concerned with election results 
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only. He therefore sees no need for the stick-on-stick process of changing attitudes 
and behaviour for the long haul.’253 
 
The Right Approach, The Right Approach to the Economy and Stepping Stones had 
some impact in guiding the Conservative Party’s policies. There were a number of 
other groups that would also be significant, such as the Economic Reconstruction 
Group, and Nicholas Ridley’s report on the nationalised industries. The work 
produced by the IEA, Bow Group, CPS and ASI also had some impact. Some of their 
recommendations would be examined as discrete policies, such as the Bow Group’s 
work on enterprise zones, but for the most part the collective work done by the New 
Right during this period acted as pressure or a ‘supporting wind’ for liberal economic 
ideas. Some of the ways in which ideas were transmitted from original thinkers such 
as Hayek to politicians and public opinion are shown in figure 1. In the British 
context this meant that intermediaries were often important, from academics like Alan 
Walters to journalists like Peter Jay and Samuel Brittan, to think-tanks like the IEA 
and CPS. Rarely were these direct disciples of one ideological viewpoint. One could 
say the IEA and CPS were more generally Hayekian or that Walters’ monetarism was 
Friedmanite but more than likely there would be an array of influence on groups and 
individuals. This may have also been a reason that neo-liberalism became 
homogeneous to many. What we can say, however, is those that made direct policy 
recommendations were leaning more towards Friedman’s Chicago School. This is for 
the simple reason the Chicagoans dealt in evidence, data analysis and therefore real 
world models. The more philosophical and abstract Austrian School, based on first 
principles, was less suited to direct influence or the ‘politically possible’. This may 
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have also been a reason that the modern reading of neo-liberalism in general took on a 
Chicagoan hue. These distinctions though, were probably not important to the 
Conservatives as the 1979 election approached. The problems of an unstable economy 
and trade union militancy were uppermost in voters’, and the Party’s, thinking. The 
events of the decade, and most recently the Winter of Discontent, created the 
opportunity for a change in approach. Margaret Thatcher won a clear majority on 3 
May 1979 and wrote to Friedrich Hayek a few days later: 
 
I am very proud to have learnt so much from you over the past few years. I hope 
that some of those ideas will be put into practice by my Government in the next 
few months. As one of your keenest supporters, I am determined that we should 
succeed. If we do so, your contribution to our ultimate victory will have been 
immense.254 
 
Whether the Constitution of Liberty, and Hayek’s ideas in general, would in fact be 
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The rise to prominence of New Right ideas was due to several mechanisms. Liberal 
economic thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman provided the 
intellectual foundations as a response to the rise of collectivism in the early to mid 
twentieth century. They represented thinking from the Austrian and Chicago Schools 
respectively and although agreeing on much, also took distinctive positions on several 
issues. The Freiburg School of thinkers in 1930s and 1940s Germany, also called 
ordoliberals, was in fact the first recognizable version of neo-liberalism. Influencing 
post-war West Germany this movement put more emphasis on social outcomes and 
measures such as enforcing competition than their Austrian and Chicagoan 
counterparts. The ordoliberal heritage was aligned with Thatcherism later by 
academics such as Andrew Gamble by invoking the ‘free economy- strong state’ 
theme.  
 
Neo-liberal ideas were contextualized and condensed by think-tanks and journalists 
that, over the space of 30 years, altered the ideological climate. Eventually these 
principles gained traction. The model that the think-tanks and writers like Hayek 
wanted to emulate, in the British context, was the Fabian Society. Much has been 
made of the impact of the New Right but in the 1970s the first major policy that 
gained a degree of acceptance in Britain was the cross-party interest in monetary 
control. Journalists such as Peter Jay and Samuel Brittan provided a bridge between 
theory, think-tanks and public opinion. Newspapers like the Daily Telegraph, 
Financial Times, The Times and The Economist were important in altering 




politicians by promulgating the virtues of the market. Gordon Pepper, John Hoskyns 
and Alfred Sherman, amongst others, helped persuade some Conservative politicians 
of the credibility of neo-liberal ideas. Out of these politicians it was Geoffrey Howe 
who had the longest standing interest in liberal economics and who most doggedly 
pursued New Right ideas during the first Thatcher government. He was determined in 
his policy of monetary restraint to tame inflation and was at the forefront in 
implementing several liberal reforms: removal of exchange controls, enterprise zones 
and lower rates of income tax. Although Hayek and the Austrian School were 
seemingly at the forefront of the revival of economic liberalism, it was the Chicago 



















Chapter Two: The New Right and the Thatcher government. Domestic 
Economic Case Studies. 
 
The previous chapter looked at the different schools of thought that led the resurgence 
in liberal economics before and after the Second World War and how they began to 
exert influence on the political process in the 1970s. The ideological debate took 
place especially intensely around economic policy and in particular the control of 
inflation. New Right thinkers believed that markets and fiscal conservatism should be 
privileged over Keynesian economic instruments. The next two chapters will consider 
several case studies, split into the domestic economic and social policy of the 
Thatcher government. Differing strands of neo-liberal thought will be shown to have 
been present (to varying levels) in the different examples, from a broad shift in 
thinking, pressure from journalists to more precise think-tank inspired 
recommendations. New Right models will be shown to have been implemented in a 
more faithful way in economic rather than social policy. Lastly, although a number of 
thinkers can be seen to have had an impact, it was the more expedient brand of neo-
liberalism of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School that was more important than 
other strands, such as Friedrich Hayek and the Austrian School. Monetary policy will 
be examined first as this was central to the government’s early anti-inflation strategy. 
Exchange control removal and enterprise zones will also be considered because of 
their significance as pro-market signals as well as the first step towards broader 
deregulation. 
 
The Thatcher government made economic recovery its priority following the inflation 




familiar Keynesian instruments were abandoned demonstrated how Thatcherism 
broke with accepted orthodoxy and was influenced by the New Right, most 
significantly with monetary control between 1979 and 1983. Exchange controls had 
existed since the outbreak of World War Two but were abruptly abolished by 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe soon after coming into office in 1979. 
Enterprise zones were a novel idea to stimulate business and jobs in run down inner 
city areas on state owned land. These three areas: economic policy, exchange control 
removal and enterprise zones will be examined in order to show the perceived 
successes and limits of New Right recommendations during the early years of 
Thatcherism. This will be continued in the next chapter by analysing several social 
reforms. There was a spectrum of New Right influence in domestic policy, with early 
economic policy, removal of exchange controls and enterprise zones some of the 
‘purer’ –if still compromised - applications of this, compared to the more limited 
implementation of social reforms. 
 
It was during the crises of the 1970s (stagflation, oil price hikes, widespread industrial 
action) that journalists, politicians and possibly even the general public began to 
entertain the possibility of challenging the status quo. The model of Keynesian 
economic policies, collective bargaining by powerful trade unions and heavily 
regulated private enterprise appeared to be faltering. Some, such as the left of the 
Labour Party and militant trade union leaders (as well as an increasingly vocal 
Trotskyist left) believed this was the opportunity to pursue a more socialist path. The 
inevitable crises and eventual collapse inherent in capitalism were, according to 
Marxist analysis, apparently close at hand.255 What these groups proposed was higher 
                                                        




taxes, more nationalization and state control. MPs like Tony Benn came to 
encapsulate this line of thinking in mainstream British politics and it was to cause the 
schism in the Labour Party that led to the creation of the centre-left Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) in 1981. On the pro-market right, however, a different viewpoint was 
taken. According to liberals, the problems of the 1970s were down to the ‘ratchet’ 
effect of socialism. New Right thinkers proposed a shift to market orientated policies 
which would allow British companies and individuals to create wealth and help the 
economy grow. The public sector was perceived to be ‘crowding out’ the private 
sector during this period. It was this polarized ideological debate that made the 
change of the period so turbulent. For economic liberals though, the basic importance 
of free markets was not in question, but what they should look like.  
 
This section will illustrate that the Thatcher government, in particular during the first 
term, pursued an economic strategy that was rooted in the thought of the New Right, 
in particular of the Friedmanite brand of neo-liberalism. This will contrast with the 
more complex compromises that occurred when trying to apply economic liberal 
ideas to social policy. 
 
The First Thatcher Government’s Economic Policy 
 
With a majority of 43 seats and after a decade of apparently interminable problems, 
manifest in the Winter of Discontent, James Callaghan’s ‘sea-change’ narrative 
suggested many would be receptive to a new approach in 1979.256 Several of the 
themes that became most synonymous with Thatcherism: privatization, a showdown 
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with the trade unions, Big Bang in the City of London; were to lie ahead. Some 
economic liberal writers have concluded that the first Thatcher government was too 
slow in bringing about reform and that the only major success was the reduction in 
inflation.257 In its pursuit of this goal unemployment rocketed to three million by 
January 1982, the figure having been less than one million in 1975. The economic 
policies and deregulation of the first term, however, paved the way for later reforms. 
Although Geoffrey Howe (Chancellor from 1979-83) said ‘I didn’t give myself a 
course in economics’ he introduced significant changes rapidly when he came into 
office based on the ideas of economic liberals.258 Exchange controls were abolished in 
1979 and monetary targets quickly introduced. Margaret Thatcher described the 
former as showing the rhetorical commitment to the market would be matched by 
action, and Howe initiated the idea he had enthused about in opposition, enterprise 
zones.259 Howe, influenced by Professor Peter Hall at the University of Reading and 
aided by the Bow Group had built on ideas from a 1961 series on urban renewal 
relating to New Towns.260 Howe’s key speech on enterprise zones was on the Isle of 
Dogs in 1978, three years after he had asked the Bow Group for help on the topic.261 
The policy was to have some results during the 1980s, most notably in Canary Wharf 
in London, transforming the derelict Docklands area into a world financial centre.  
 
Firstly, though, the early economic policy of the Thatcher government will be 
examined as so much else was built on this. The quest to defeat inflation and reduce 
public borrowing was the primary goal for the Conservatives in 1979. Inflation had 
dogged the British economy for several years (it was 10% in May 1979, down from 
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27% in 1975).262 By 1983 it had fallen to 4% and remained low until the end of the 
decade and the ‘Lawson Boom’. The methods used to bring this down were to 
exacerbate an already deep recession, the dogmatic adherence to monetary control 
suggesting economic policy in the Thatcher government was guided by ideology.  
 
Neo-liberals, such as those from the Chicago School or London Business School 
(LBS), believed a key role of government was to maintain stable and benign 
macroeconomic conditions.263 Although the means to achieve the objective differed, 
the importance of this was shared by all the strains of neo-liberalism studied here. For 
instance, one of the architects of ordoliberalism Walter Eucken outlined in ‘Policy for 
a Competitive Order’ his primary goal as monetary policy and a stable currency, 
isolated from political influence.264 The most prominent ‘monetarist’, however, was 
Milton Friedman. He firmly opposed inflation, as did all neo-liberals, for a number of 
reasons. Friedman had written extensively on the monetary conditions that he 
believed caused the 1930s Depression and that a contraction of the supply of money 
made a recession much worse.265 According to Friedman, where inflation occurred in 
an attempt to prevent or ease unemployment it caused several problems. Wages and 
prices increased while productivity and output often did not. ‘Wage stickiness’ 
occurred, whereby wages should have (if left to the free market) decreased with 
declining productivity but were either maintained or increased. Friedman’s critique of 
the Philips Curve showed that inflation and unemployment were not mutually 
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exclusive; one could not simply be bought at the cost of the other but could happen 
concurrently.266 This challenged post-war orthodoxy. In his 1963 book A Monetary 
History of the United States, written with Anna Schwartz, Friedman’s much repeated 
phrase was first set out: ‘Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon.’267 Friedman rejected Keynesian demand management, asserted that the 
Philips Curve was a temporary phenomenon and that both unemployment and 
inflation had risen in the 1960s and 1970s.268 His ideas were taken up in the 1970s by 
think-tanks such as the IEA, journalists such as Peter Jay and Samuel Brittan and 
economists like Gordon Pepper, David Laidler, Brian Griffiths, Alan Walters and 
Geoffrey Wood.269 The growing interest in this theory also attracted academics like 
Terry Burns and Alan Budd, who examined the international dimension of 
monetarism at the London Business School. 270  Burns later said he introduced 
monetary elements into his LBS research because the previous Keynesian models and 
forecasts had performed poorly during 1972 and 1973.271 Keith Joseph was the most 
prominent politician interested in monetarism during this period and made several 
speeches that advocated the technique. It was the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
however, which first imposed monetary discipline on a British government, as part of 
the conditions of the 1976 loan.272 
 
Monetarism reasoned that excess money had to be squeezed out of a system to bring 
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fashion. Monetarists reasoned that when inflation was rising, the rate of growth of 
money supply should be reduced, while deflation should be met with a monetary 
expansion. 273  By most calculations, the first Thatcher government set about a 
monetarist economic strategy, reducing the growth of the quantity of money in the 
economy through a variety of policy instruments - raising interest rates, abandoning 
prices and incomes policies, reducing the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR), and reducing spending whilst altering the tax burden. In July 1979, economic 
advisor to the Chancellor, Peter Middleton, produced a paper on different monetary 
approaches. This included ‘A Monetary Base for the UK’ by Gordon Pepper, ‘Cash 
Base Control and Institutional Change in the UK Financial System’ by Geoffrey 
Wood, ‘Controlling the UK Money Supply’ by Brian Griffiths and ‘A Proposal for 
the Control of the UK Money Supply’ by Duck and Sheppard.274 These differing 
approaches were critiqued, some as being too complex and unworkable. Pepper’s 
approach was seen as closest to the classical monetary base control (MBC) model.275 
It was this technique of attempting to influence the quantity of money in the British 
economy that was pursued in the first two years of the Thatcher government. The 
aggregate £M3 was chosen as the most appropriate method of doing this and targets 
were set, although consistently overshot. The choice of aggregate itself proved 
contentious. Nigel Lawson consistently backed the ‘broad’ money aggregate £M3 
while for instance, Milton Friedman generally based his work on £M2, which 
included ‘time deposits’, and sometimes on ‘narrow’ money, £M0.276 
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The aggregates, targets and methods of monetary control were much criticized and 
debated by economic liberals. There was no broad New Right economic model and 
much disagreement over whether the very concept of macroeconomics was even 
liberal.277 Austrians and Hayekians believed monetary control was another method of 
government intervention that would distort market forces. Hayek consistently 
proposed other monetary principles, first the gold standard, then competition of 
currency itself, as ways to restrain inflation.278 An article in the ORDO journal during 
the first Thatcher term perceived the monetary squeeze in Britain as too tough on the 
private sector but too ‘soft’ on a state sector that still received sizeable subsidies.279 
The ordoliberals believed a concerted effort to reduce the fiscal deficit would be a 
surer way to combat inflation, which is what in fact happened. The tight monetary 
control of the first two years was perhaps the most ideological policy of the first term. 
It was explicitly neo-liberal in the Friedmanite sense. After 1981 other influences 
marked economic policy, particularly the London Business School and ‘rational 
expectations’ on monetary strategy.  
 
Geoffrey Howe, although declaring in 2006 that ‘I think those who proclaim either 
monetarism or Keynesianism as ‘isms’ in which you have to believe are profoundly 
misguided’ and that ‘now, I do not believe in monetarism’, went about fervently 
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trying to defeat inflation as Chancellor of the Exchequer.280 Howe’s measures in his 
first three budgets, most notably in 1981, and his use of high interest rates eventually 
brought it down. Direct taxation was reduced (83% to 60% as a top rate in the 1979 
budget) while indirect taxation like VAT was increased. The First Thatcher 
government, however, was hamstrung in its attempts to reduce the PSBR by its 
election promise to honour the Clegg Commission. This had recommended substantial 
increases in public sector pay and the Conservatives, during the 1979 campaign, felt 
that without an assurance to keep these they would lose crucial votes. Clegg made 
Howe’s aim of reducing public spending all the more difficult. Indeed, when Milton 
Friedman was asked his opinion on the government’s anti-inflation strategy (upon 
news that spending was increasing) his response was typically iconoclastic (also 
invoking the Virginia School), blaming ‘resistance from bureaucracy, the Civil 
Service and the Conservative Party’ but praising the Prime Minister for ‘sticking to 
her guns.’281 
 
The 1980 budget saw the introduction of the Medium Term Financial Strategy 
(MTFS), devised by Financial Secretary to the Treasury Nigel Lawson. A theme that 
Lawson believed in (and was to return to when he was Chancellor with the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism) was that market credibility required a stabilizing force 
and the certainty of rules. Back in 1976 Lawson said ‘parliamentary control over 
monetary policy means in practice that the policy would be expected to follow certain 
rules, whether they be rules of the gold standard or rules for a certain increase in the 
money supply as propounded by Professor Friedman or in the ideas of Professor 
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Hayek.’282 Lawson, working under Howe at the Treasury, set out a plan for a medium 
term strategy of setting declining targets for both the PSBR and the money supply in 
September 1979.283 This belief in a framework to provide stability invoked elements 
of Keynes (herd behaviour) and ‘rational expectations’ thinking (investors need 
confidence in likely medium term interest rates). The MTFS set out a number of 
monetary and PSBR targets that were intended to give markets confidence in the 
British economy. 
 
Documents regarding the MTFS hint at how economic policy was formulated in the 
first Thatcher government and also the influence of the New Right. Special advisor to 
the Chancellor Adam Ridley communicated a message on 18 February 1980 that he 
had spoken to two monetary economists, Brian Griffiths and Tim Congdon, who said 
they were broadly supportive of the government policies. 284  The Government, 
however, was coming under pressure from journalists to publish monetary targets for 
the succeeding years. This included from Samuel Brittan (who was ‘quite friendly’ 
with both Nigel Lawson and Terry Burns at the Treasury) in the Financial Times on 
the 20 and 28 February.285 Geoffrey Howe wrote to Margaret Thatcher saying, ‘I have 
been considering whether it would be possible to present our monetary and financial 
strategy for the medium term in a manner and context that would strengthen its 
credibility.’ 286  Against the liberal economic policy makers and commentators, 
however, was considerable opposition. Regarding the MTFS the Prime Minister and 
Chancellor received several notes, on 22 February saying the Governor of the Bank of 
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England had ‘serious misgivings’, from head of the Central Policy Review Staff 
(CPRS) Sir Kenneth Berrill on 25 February ‘doubting the wisdom of the MTFS’, 
from Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong on 26 February saying it ‘would give the 
Government very little room for manoeuvre’ and lastly even by the Chief Secretary to 
the Treasury – and arch-monetarist - John Biffen. 287  Writing to Howe, Biffen 
despaired on 4 March that ‘the demand for such a Financial Strategy comes from 
journalists, academics and commentators rather than those in the commercial 
world.’288 These documents give an insight into how few people within government 
were guiding economic policy during the first Thatcher term and suggest that the New 
Right did indeed exert some influence over them. It also showed that both Geoffrey 
Howe and Margaret Thatcher had to act steadfastly in the face of opposition to the 
strategy they were pursuing. When asked during an interview in 2012 about Biffen’s 
comment, another monetarist, Tim Congdon, remarked: ‘It’s absolutely true…John 
Biffen didn’t know what he was talking about and we did.’289 
 
The early economic policy of the Thatcher government, designed to squeeze inflation 
out of the economy, had a number of ideological interpretations. Milton Friedman 
was well-known for being a proponent of economic ‘shock-therapy’. Typical of his 
thinking was the 1977 speech, ‘The Road to Economic Freedom: The Steps from 
Here to There’. Friedman set out two courses: ‘gradualism’ and ‘shock treatment’.290 
Gradualism could steadily reduce inflation in an economy that exhibited single figure 
price rises but higher figures needed more drastic action. The two examples Friedman 
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used were post-war West Germany under the guidance of Ludwig Erhard and 1970s 
Chile.291 Friedman stated that the British case was somewhere between a stable 
economy such as the United States and the more extreme examples of West Germany 
and Chile. He therefore believed ‘modified shock treatment’ was appropriate for 
Britain using instruments such as reduced government spending, lower tax rates, 
denationalization of state industries and reduced government bureaucracy. 292 
Friedman also believed in using the central bank to control money in the economy by 
using aggregates. It was this latter point that was most anathema to Austrian neo-
liberals like Hayek. By advocating the gold standard, then choice in currencies, the 
Austrian fell back upon the School’s idea that markets will move towards equilibrium. 
The result would have been even more of a shock to the economy in terms of short-
term employment. 293  Monetary policy was another example of how Hayek 
represented a more idealistic form of neo-liberalism, closer to ‘market 
fundamentalism’ than Friedman’s more pragmatic ideas, despite the widespread 
criticism the latter received from the left. Other Austrian thinkers may have 
considered Hayek as compromising some of the School’s beliefs, but nevertheless his 
ideas were often distinct to other strands of neo-liberalism such as the Chicago 
School.294 It may have been that Hayek, buoyed by his Nobel prize, became more 
radical in his old age. In 1975, when he visited Chile, Hayek made a speech 
advocating abolishing all trade restrictions, income tax and the central bank itself. 
Arnold Harberger, of the Chicago School, described him at this time as ‘remote from 
                                                        
291 Friedman, ‘Road’, pp. 43-44. 
292 Friedman, ‘Road’, pp. 43-48. 
293 Mark Skousen, Vienna & Chicago. Friends or Foes? A Tale of Two Schools of Free‐Market 
Economics. (Washington: Capital Press, 2005), pp. 7‐8, 37. 
294 Walter Block, ‘Hayek’s Road to Serfdom’, In: Journal of Libertarian Studies, (12:2, Fall 1996, pp. 




the real world’.295 Mark Skousen wrote that Hayek was ‘shockingly impractical and 
idealistic.’296 The first two years of economic policy of the Thatcher government was 
loosely based on a Friedmanite aggregate model, or the monetary base. Although not 
entirely true to their respective positions, David Willetts (then a researcher for Nigel 
Lawson), later said ‘though we were trying to do Friedman, we were actually doing 
Hayek.’297 This was presumably because there was a sharp rise in unemployment 
during this early phase of monetary control. Even monetary economist Tim Congdon 
thought interest rates were too high, that ‘policy was too tight in much of 80… I 
objected to the severity of policy’.298 These theoretical positions and the drastic 
impact of the Thatcher government’s early economic measures were the backdrop of 
the 1981 Budget. 
 
The controversial Budget saw a reduction in the ‘public sector borrowing 
requirement’ (PSBR) and an increase in taxation. Criticised for being deflationary in a 
time of recession, most famously in a letter to The Times signed by 364 economists, 
this juncture signified the determination of Howe and Thatcher that the battle against 
inflation was of primary importance. It also marked a shift from strict monetary 
control to a more concerted effort to reduce the deficit. The driving force behind the 
budget, however, has been contested and in particular the role of the Prime Minister’s 
advisor Alan Walters. A diary entry made by Walters shortly before the budget was 
announced suggests it was the Prime Minister who demanded a tougher stance from 
Howe on reducing the PSBR. ‘Saw MT at 10.00. What should she do about Geoffrey. 
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Who could she promote. No-one.’ 299 Shortly afterwards Walters reported on a 
discussion with Tim Lankester that echoed these sentiments: ‘He (Tim) said PM told 
GH that he must get the PSBR down or “you are for the chop” – very unlike her.’300 
Despite this early example of the tension that would build between Thatcher and 
Howe, they continued to work together to pass the tough 1981 Budget. Norman 
Tebbit, a central member of the Thatcher Government saw the budget in clear terms. 
‘Their (the 364 economists) longing for the old ways of compromise was echoed by 
those who wanted to give in to the threat of jailed IRA criminals to starve themselves 
to death in a hunger strike. Few people believed the Government would stand 
firm...but it did.’301  
 
The 1981 Budget, however, saw a shift that has often been neglected. Monetary 
aggregates were still important but the emphasis moved towards reducing the deficit. 
This was in keeping with ‘rational expectations’ thinking, that focused on the 
inflationary outlook based on likely interest rates. Friedman had previously shed light 
upon this work, citing in particular John Muth’s ‘Rational Expectations and the 
Theory of Price Movements’ (1961) and Robert Lucas’s ‘Econometric Testing of the 
Natural Rate Hypothesis’(1972).302 Adam Ridley believed that rational expectations 
was known and understood by only ‘a very small proportion of the policymaking 
world’ but that the work of Alan Budd and Terry Burns at the LBS in the 1970s was 
important in this respect.303 By the time of the 1981 Budget Burns was Chief 
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Economic Advisor to the Treasury. Another advocate of rational expectations, Patrick 
Minford, thought the crucial turning point however was when Alan Walters entered 
the fray prior to the 1981 Budget and ‘threw his considerable influence into the 
rational expectations monetarist camp and engineered a very large contraction in the 
budget deficit.’304 Endorsing the rational expectations approach, Walters later said 
that after the 1981 Budget ‘at first gradually, then much more rapidly, expectations 
adjusted to the reduced rates of inflation.’305 What do these theoretical positions tell 
us about the economic policy of the first Thatcher government? Firstly, it was broadly 
neo-liberal and had shifted away from Keynesian orthodoxy. Secondly, although the 
techniques differed from monetary base control to deficit reduction, the chief 
contemporary influence was Milton Friedman and his ideas on monetarism. The use 
of empirical evidence, monetary aggregates and interest rate manipulation all follow 
the methods set by the second Chicago School. Although the unemployment that 
resulted from this strategy led some to say the Government was ‘doing Hayek’, it can 
be concluded that the actual policy owed little to the work of the Austrian School.  
 
The cost of these methods, however, was high. Thatcher liked the scientific certainty 
of ideas like monetarism but was criticized as being attracted to ‘gimmicks and 
dogma’ in trying to solve complex and subtle economic problems.306 Unemployment 
and factory closures soared, while interest rates and inflation remained high. A strong 
pound, buoyed by its petrocurrency status, made British exports uncompetitive, 
intensifying these difficulties. Inflation had been seemingly tamed in 1983 but the 
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structural impact (or adjustment) done to the British economy was to prove intractable 
in some regions. Several of her own ministers were doubtful about the Prime 
Minister’s path. Jim Prior said of both Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph that they 
saw Hayek and Friedman as ‘gurus’.307 Yet Margaret Thatcher made her reputation 
during this first term by remaining resolute in the face of overwhelming pressure, and 
in 1982, the Argentines who invaded the Falklands. Also important was Geoffrey 
Howe’s determination to follow through on the Government’s strategy to reduce 
inflation. It was he, as well as the Prime Minister, who came up against resistance 
from within his own Party as well as the establishment. Margaret Thatcher made the 
decision to trust in Howe’s judgment. This will also be shown in the removal of 
exchange controls. 
 
Monetary targets were effectively abandoned during the second Thatcher government 
when Nigel Lawson took over as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Lawson, from 1985, 
pursued a policy of shadowing the Deutschmark (in a different attempt to maintain 
stability and as a precursor to joining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism).308 He 
later believed that the Medium Term Financial Strategy worked better on the fiscal 
rather than on the monetary side.309 Lawson’s thinking was that market credibility 
was paramount, which had been achieved by monetary targets in the early 1980s but 
by the middle of the decade a new method was required.310 Lawson’s predecessor 
remarked over twenty years later that, ‘I attach great importance to monetary policy. I 
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attach great importance also to the learning of Keynes, but they have to be married 
together and judged.’311 
 
It was this transitory commitment to their principles that incensed monetary 
economists in the mid to late 1980s. Shadowing the Deutschmark, as well as easier 
credit, fuelled the ‘Lawson Boom’ of the latter part of the decade and caused a surge 
in asset prices.312 £M3 aggregates increased by 20% between June 1987 and June 
1988.313 This in turn led to high inflation in 1989 and 1990, punitive interest rates that 
effected homeowners and a recession in the early 1990s.314 Monetary economists Tim 
Congdon and Gordon Pepper had warned of swollen asset prices between 1986-88 
and were proved correct in their inflationary predictions.315  
 
Why was monetarism abandoned, allowing the inflationary cycle to return in the late 
1980s? Tim Congdon, interviewed in 2012, said that ‘deep down, British economists 
don’t believe in monetarism.’316 Congdon said that Nigel Lawson repeated the 
mistakes of the Heath-Barber boom of the early 1970s and that the Prime Minister, 
too dependent on Alan Walters (an economic advisor to Margaret Thatcher at several 
points during her Premiership) did not really understand the technicalities. 317 
Congdon said of Lawson and monetarism, ‘I don’t think he believed in it at all.’318  
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Figure 2 shows the trend in inflation before and after Thatcherism. Limiting price 
rises has clearly become a prime goal of British governments. After almost reaching 
10% in 1989, inflation did not exceed 5% in the UK in the 15 years from 1991. 
Prioritising low inflationary conditions are a legacy of the Thatcher government, 
despite the surge at the end of the 1980s. Terry Burns said in 2011 that the monetary 
control ‘we (the LBS) preached…became orthodoxy.’319 After the 1981 Budget, fiscal 
policy (according to Tim Congdon) was neutralized until 2008, as a clear result of the 
influence of monetarism.320 The primacy of monetary policy, however, has not 
reached the heights of the first Thatcher government, although the MTFS remained 
Conservative policy, under the influence of Burns as Permanent Secretary to the 
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Treasury.321 Both Nigel Lawson and Geoffrey Howe, with reputations as ‘dry’ 
economic liberals, have both distanced themselves from monetarism. Some neo-
liberals, meanwhile, have advanced monetarist explanations for the 2007-08 financial 
crisis.322 The response to the crisis, according to them, allowed the supply of money 
to contract too quickly and the resulting recession worse.323 The early economic 
policy of the Thatcher government was influenced by neo-liberal thinkers like Milton 
Friedman and his Chicago School, think-tanks like the IEA, academics like those at 
the LBS and journalists like Samuel Brittan. The impact of monetarism on the British 
economy during and since Thatcherism has meant low inflationary conditions are a 
key aim of policy makers.  Peter A. Hall, in ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and 
the State’ (1993) examined the shift from Keynesian to monetarist macroeconomic 
policy-making in Britain. Hall explored how ideas came to impact on institutions and 
policy-makers. He identified the role of the media and to a lesser extent ‘experts’ in 
the 1970s, as well as competition for power between the political parties – particularly 
one that suited long-term Conservative objectives like lower public spending – as 
important.324 Hall wrote that the shift in economic policy instruments, as well the 
hierarchy of objectives, represented a change in ‘policy paradigm’ so that independent 
ideas managed to ‘induce changes in institutional routines’.325 In this way, the 
changing methods and aims of economic policy during Thatcherism represented a 
‘retasking’ of the role of the state. It can also be seen in its approach to the 
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The role of the state was also prominent in one of the early acts of ‘deregulation’ by 
the Thatcher government, that of enterprise zones. Although less prominent compared 
to reforms like privatization, enterprise zones were another idea that became closely 
linked with Thatcherism. In March 1979 Labour MP Bruce George remarked that a 
Conservative proposal that ‘free enterprise will move into…inner urban areas’ 
exposed the ‘hand of Friedman’.326 Although the Chicagoan did consistently eulogize 
pro-enterprise city states such as Hong Kong and Singapore, the enterprise zone idea 
had a much more diverse lineage. Its development was closely associated with 
Geoffrey Howe and the Bow Group, promoted business by incentivization and 
satisfied several New Right themes, such as reduced state intrusion, wealth creation 
and lower taxation. Enterprise zones were taken from a number of strands of thought 
and policies of the post-war period, although not specifically thinkers like Friedman. 
The Bow Group was a key influence but the planning concept of ‘New Towns’, 
Fabian academic Professor Peter Hall and the economic success of Singapore and 
Hong Kong were all important contributors to the eventual 1980 legislation. Although 
not exclusively of the New Right, enterprise zones were a good example of the impact 
of ideas on the Thatcher government, and particularly in this case on Geoffrey Howe. 
In terms of neo-liberalism, however, enterprise zones were pro-business without 
necessarily being liberalising or an act of free market deregulation. The more radical 
elements of Hall’s initial model, such as the removal of immigration controls in the 
zones, were heavily watered down or excluded from the eventual legislation. This 
follows several of the Thatcher government’s ‘pro-market’ policies. 
                                                        






The ‘New Towns Act’ of 1946 was part of the post-war housing strategy and over the 
subsequent 25 years a number were built to absorb the growing UK population. This 
was very much in keeping with the programme of the Attlee government, where 
policy, from health to housing, was the result of state planning. Geoffrey Howe saw 
New Towns as one of the successes of planning. Howe, a longstanding liberal, viewed 
the allocation of land for certain purposes as a potentially positive role for the state.327 
Enterprise zones were earmarked for disused state owned land in urban and inner city 
areas. A 1962 article in Crossbow (the Bow Group periodical) by journalist Godfrey 
Hodgson called Wigan Delenda Est has been cited as a precursor to the enterprise 
zones idea.328 It was part of a series on urban renewal after New Towns and 
concentrated on publically owned derelict land.329 Labour governments had attempted 
to manipulate the cost of land or nationalise it, with the 1967 Land Commission and 
1976 Community Land Acts. The enterprise zone principle also tried to influence the 
use of land but rather than claiming it for government purposes, providing incentives 
on disused areas that the state already owned. 
 
The other element in the development of enterprise zones was deregulation. The rapid 
growth of the Asian Tiger economies, such as Hong Kong, in the post-war period 
acted as an ideal for economic liberals. Through deregulation, low taxation, minimal 
building restrictions and ease of starting a business, ports like Hong Kong and 
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Singapore developed rapidly. 330  Export-led growth unleashed the potential of 
enterprise and trade alongside a strong central authority (the Asian Tigers were not 
democracies). Some proponents of capitalism, as well as more unlikely figures saw 
this as a model. An academic from the University of Reading and a former chairman 
of the Fabian Society, Professor Peter Hall, used the examples of the Asian Tigers. He 
co-wrote ‘Nonplan: An Experiment in Freedom’ in 1969 and gave an influential paper 
in June 1977 setting out his idea of ‘freeports’.331 Hall outlined a freeport as being an 
area exempt from certain regulations, like Hong Kong and Singapore, that would 
provide incentives for business and trade. Geoffrey Howe said he was ‘delighted’ that 
‘distinguished Socialist Professor Peter Hall’ had begun to ‘reach for the same 
prescription’ as him.332 Howe said, ‘why not aim to recreate the Hong Kong of the 
1950s inside Inner Liverpool or Inner Glasgow?’333 
 
As Shadow Chancellor between 1975 and 1979 Howe developed the enterprise zone 
idea. He has also cited future Conservative Cabinet member Nick Ridley’s work done 
on ‘non-planning agreement(s)’ as influential: that an area of land may be exempt of 
regulation to increase productivity and attract business.334 John Hoskyns, whilst 
working on the Stepping Stones project in the late 1970s, described a meeting he had 
with Howe in August 1977. Hoskyns said of Howe that a key policy was to ‘create a 
liberal economic climate’ and that he was ‘very keen on an interesting idea from 
someone called Peter Hall for tax exempt, planning regulation exempt areas – e.g. 
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regional, inner urban decay areas – where entrepreneurs could really let rip as in 
Singapore (and) Hong Kong.’335 At first Margaret Thatcher was not convinced. A 
document from 1979 shows how Howe tried to win over the Conservative leader. 
‘Can I have another go at persuading you to endorse my “enterprise zone” proposal as 
something we should put forward in the Election?’ Howe also attached an article 
written by the conservative US think-tank Heritage Foundation (‘Enterprise Zone: A 
Solution to the Urban Crisis?’) which came out in support of both the idea and the 
then Shadow Chancellor himself. Peter Hall later said, however, that the 
Conservatives rendered his radical idea ‘harmless’ by omitting his proposals 
regarding free migration and exemption from mainstream legislation within the 
zone.336 Hall thought these inner city areas required such an overhaul they needed to 
be ‘completely open to immigration of entrepreneurs and capital’ and ‘effectively 
outside the UK’s normal legislation and controls.’337 Despite his Fabian links Hall 
demonstrated the kind of anti-state and internationalist sentiment more associated 
with Austrian radicals.  
 
Howe’s set piece speech regarding the policy had been in June the previous year on 
the Isle of Dogs, site of a proposed pilot scheme, setting out his idea of ‘New 
Enterprise Zones’. He had asked for help with the formulation of this idea two years 
earlier from the Bow Group. Enterprise zones were to give free reign to construction, 
providing exemptions from planning permissions and reducing the bureaucratic 
process. Taxation on business was lower and local and central control reduced. Howe 
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described the dereliction of cities like London, Manchester and Glasgow and how 
they were ideally placed to reverse the process by their innate advantages: nearby 
commercial centres, often close to rivers and housing communities that yearned for 
jobs.338 The policy of enterprise zones was to transform some of these areas and 
satisfied some New Right themes. As we have seen, however, other more radical ones 
were not included. 
 
Enterprise Zones and the ethos of the New Right 
 
Enterprise zones were important in setting the general tone of the policies of the 
Thatcher government and aligned them with some of the tenets of economic 
liberalism. Primarily, the shift that the idea encapsulated was an emphasis on 
favouring business and wealth creation over redistribution and producer interests such 
as trade unions. Enterprise zones represented the importance the Thatcher government 
attributed to economic growth and entrepreneurship. They incorporated some themes 
of Public Choice theory, such as incentivization and a reduced role for the state. Only 
a few years later Canary Wharf, in the enterprise zone set up on the Isle of Dogs, 
invoked a Hong Kong in miniature with high rise neon towers hosting several 
successful global financial companies. Canary Wharf became an iconic image of the 
Thatcher years and represented private sector resurgence. From the viewpoint of a 
‘model’ market it can be said the policy reduced barriers to entry for producers and 
using the example of Canary Wharf, which drew in foreign direct investment, 
increased consumer choice and competition. 339 This in turn drove up economic 
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activity in the enterprise zone and surrounding economy and widened ownership at 




Enterprise zones were not included in the 1979 manifesto, possibly because Margaret 
Thatcher thought the idea had ‘Heathian overtones’ and was regional policy by 
another name.340 Nevertheless the initial enterprise zone legislation was introduced in 
1980 and was incorporated in two acts: the Local Government Planning and Land 
Act, and the Finance Act. Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe had 
announced the scheme and Michael Heseltine, as Secretary of State for the 
Environment helped implement the policy. Six enterprise zones were initially 
allocated in 1980 and were given tax concessions, simplified planning procedures and 
rates exemptions.341 These areas included the Isle of Dogs, Salford in Manchester and 
Clydebank in Glasgow. In the early part of the first Thatcher government Britain sank 
into a deep recession. The Prime Minister and Chancellor’s focus on reducing 
inflation meant that numerous factories faced closure and many jobs were lost. As 
unemployment soared to 3 million and social unrest flared in 1981, the government 
came under pressure to act. Schemes such as enterprise zones acted as incentives to 
create jobs and were seen by some as palliatives in areas particularly affected by 
recession.342 On the Isle of Dogs the enterprise zone fell into the area controlled by 
the newly created London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), an example 
of an Urban Development Corporation (UDC). The LDDC had wide-ranging powers 
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and access to public funding, encouraged by Heseltine and initially resisted by 
Geoffrey Howe and Keith Joseph.343 The role the state played in the regeneration of 
the Docklands was important. For example, the LDDC helped clear sites, build 
infrastructure projects such as the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and make land 
available to private developers.344 Certainly the business activity in the enterprise 
zone was assisted by this government-led action. In this respect, the state acted as a 
‘pump-primer’ for the private sector and sits well with Harvey’s post-1970s neo-
liberal model, that the state creates the conditions for markets.345 
 
Geoffrey Howe described the enterprise zones idea as his ‘hobby horse’ and he 
expanded the scheme in 1981-82, designating another ten zones, and a further 13 
during 1983-86.346 Both Geoffrey Howe and Michael Heseltine were reluctant to 
expand the policy any further during this time. Letters to the Prime Minister state that 
enterprise zones were ‘experimental’ and that expansion should wait.347 Howe did 
target some of the areas that had been particularly effected by the government’s 
austere economic policies, such as Liverpool, Tyneside and Clydebank. In this respect 
the scheme had a political element. Howe later thought the idea was a successful 
reform and part of a package of liberalization measures that became influential 
overseas. Howe said that ‘Thatcherism’, including enterprise zones, was a British 
export that was taken up by other governments during this period.348 In this way 
Howe later proclaimed the Thatcher government had acted as the world’s leading 
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export agency for free market ideas and that it had ‘set about making the whole of 
Britain into one massive “enterprise zone.”’349 Enterprise zones were one idea (albeit 
a lesser known compared to a policy such as privatization) that was used by other 
governments. Geoffrey Howe said in 1988 that ‘the United States has proved to be the 
main importer of the enterprise zones concept’ and gave examples such as Ohio 
(which had allocated 51 zones) and Pennsylvania (26 zones).350 Perhaps the most 
significant example of the use of enterprise zones was in China. In essence, Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reforms were state orchestrated capitalism focused on export-
led growth.351 China, with an eye on the success of Hong Kong, implemented their 
own enterprise zones (known as Special Economic Zones (SEZs)) in Shenzen and 
Zhuhai.352  
 
Enterprise Zones: Analysis 
 
In his 1988 speech, Geoffrey Howe extolled the success of enterprise zones, using the 
Isle of Dogs as the example. Howe quoted the employment figures in the area, from 
641 in 1982 to 3700 in 1987, while the number of firms grew from 105 in 1982 to 270 
in 1987.353 Economic growth, creation of jobs through incentivization of the private 
sector as well as attracting foreign investment all satisfy the philosophy of the 
Thatcher government and neo-liberalism.  Add to this the fact that the idea was 
mimicked in other countries and enterprise zones appear to be an effective reform of 
the Conservatives in the 1980s. As an example of deregulation, however, enterprise 
zones have not worn as well as some of the other policies of Thatcherism. In the UK 
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they were not extended after their initial roll-out and were not considered as an option 
by the Major government. In addition, and unlike some of the other policy areas 
looked at in this study, New Labour did not take up the idea. In 1987 an article in 
Economic Affairs (the IEA’s periodical) wrote that there was no evidence to suggest 
enterprise zones had addressed the significant imbalances in employment rates in the 
UK.354  
 
The policy met with other criticism. Opponents of enterprise zones challenged 
whether new jobs were actually being made or just transferred from one area to 
another, if businesses were being started or just moving.355 Enterprise zones were said 
to favour large and mobile businesses and therefore act as a barrier to smaller 
businesses, where innovation was (according to Butler) more likely to occur.356 
Lastly, the location of enterprise zones has been criticized. Canary Wharf played its 
part in solidifying and increasing the comparative wealth of London and the South 
East, while the lesser known zones tended to be situated in areas that were most badly 
affected by the government’s economic policies. That enterprise zones were unevenly 
distributed and targeted in this way could also lead to the conclusion that this was 
regional policy (government assistance to less prosperous areas) by another name.357 
Lastly, the role of the state such as the ‘pump-priming’ by the LDDC has often been 
overlooked. 
 
In summary, enterprise zones have had their critics but were important for acting as a 
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private over the public sector, and that economic liberalization measures would be 
one of its preferred tools. The lineage of the idea was a combination of the broad 
ethos of liberal economics but with a role for the state in fostering markets, while 
simultaneously attempting to draw back the role of government. In this respect 
enterprise zones were a good example of a neo-liberal policy, in the Friedmanite 
sense. As other writers have identified, the nominal rise in neo-liberal influence often 
translated into pro-business rather than pro-market policies. 358  Enterprise zones 
looked less a ‘market fundamentalist’ measure in the Austrian tradition, which 
implementation of Hall’s model could have resembled, than a political compromise. 
Another early indicator that the Thatcher governments would back markets to restore 
Britain’s economy to health, and consistently cited as crucial by neo-liberals, was the 
abolition of exchange rate controls.359 
 
Removal of Exchange Controls  
 
The removal of exchange controls in 1979, according to Geoffrey Howe, ‘sent out a 
message to the world about our commitment to liberal economics as the means of 
reviving Britain’.360 Howe wrote in his memoirs that the decision was the only he lost 
a night’s sleep over due to politics.361 It was a move that the revival in liberal 
economics in the previous years had helped create space for, that of freer trade and 
markets. Howe made a clear case for abolishing the controls, saying the system had 
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‘cost us dear’ by stifling financial markets and competition.362 He cited a pamphlet 
published by the IEA, written by John Wood and Robert Miller in February 1979, 
which helped break the ‘intellectual icepack.’363 Adam Ridley said the two main 
reasons for removal were the increasing cost of operating them and ‘the long 
standing liberal economic tradition of open markets and freedom from control’.364 
Nigel Lawson also favoured abolishing exchange controls, including the issue in his 
maiden speech in the House of Commons in 1977 and wrote to Margaret Thatcher 
about it in October 1978: ‘Removal of exchange control would be highly beneficial in 
itself.’365 Geoffrey Howe relaxed investment restrictions in summer 1979 and then 
completely abolished them in October later that year. 
 
Exchange controls were introduced in 1939 as a means of buttressing the pound and 
preventing capital flight. They existed as part of the ‘sterling area’ that consisted of 
colonies of the British Empire and its dominions. This was what Geoffrey Howe 
described as further evidence that the UK was ‘statist’, using measures that were 
intended to protect British interests but actually acted as an impediment to enterprise. 
The controls also led to a layer of bureaucracy in Whitehall and Customs (at a cost 
according to Nigel Lawson of 750 staff and £14.5 million per year) that monitored the 
controls.366 Permission was required for importing and exporting and this curtailed 
investment and trade. Other Western European countries had removed their exchange 
controls after World War Two but there was strong institutional resistance to ending 
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them in Britain.367 The country’s entry into the European Community, however, made 
a tacit commitment to remove controls.368 In her memoirs Margaret Thatcher said the 
reason for exchange controls was ‘in the hope of increasing industrial investment in 
Britain and of resisting pressures on sterling.’369 She said that the controls had not, if 
ever, achieved their objectives and by 1979 ‘with sterling buoyant and Britain 
beginning to enjoy the economic benefits of North Sea oil, the time had come to 
abolish them entirely.’370 The former Prime Minister, however, omitted the fact that 
she equivocated over whether to impose inflow controls in 1980 and 1981. 
 
Benefits and Risks of Abolition 
 
The case for abolishing exchange rate controls called on several liberal themes. The 
liberalization of capital flow would potentially increase the amount of trade and 
promote foreign direct investment (FDI). It can be seen as favouring risk and 
entrepreneurship over the cautiousness of exchange controls, promoting wealth 
creation over state planning. Abolishing exchange controls also sat neatly with the 
general ethos of the New Right and in particular of Public Choice theory and the 
Hayekian critique of the state. A layer of bureaucracy was removed by the 
implementation of the policy and the general paternalist government approach was 
reduced by this example of liberalization.  
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The arguments against exchange rate abolition were a combination of conservatism 
and the uncertainty of the impact of North Sea oil. Removing exchange controls 
exposed British industry and companies to international markets. This was potentially 
a problem for unproductive UK firms that but not a plausible ideological reason for a 
government committed to the virtues of capitalism, as well as its associated risks and 
instability. The more difficult issue was the impact of North Sea oil and the 
government’s monetary policy. A CPRS paper in the first week after the 1979 
election described Britain as being potentially at risk of the ‘Dutch disease’. The 
report said that this would mean ‘the tendency for oil and gas revenues to raise the 
exchange rate and so, in the short term at least, to lower competiveness. The 
Government’s commitment to a strict monetary and fiscal stance will reinforce the 
strength of sterling.’371 
 
The exchange rate began to rise as the benefits of North Sea oil started to be felt, 
effecting Britain’s export capacity. Removing exchange controls caused sterling to 
appreciate and the strong currency exacerbated factory closures and the 
manufacturing collapse in the recession of the early 1980s. Geoffrey Howe is said to 
have initially favoured liberalising exchange controls solely on capital outflows to 
prevent North Sea oil tax revenues rising too far.372 Exchange control abolition did 
play havoc with the government’s economic strategy, making monetary aggregates 









Exchange Control Abolition: New Right Themes 
 
The removal of exchange controls in 1979 has not been studied in as great detail as 
the flagship reforms of Thatcherism. The policy, however, was consistent with several 
New Right themes and important in charting the general direction of the government. 
Removing controls reduced bureaucracy in Whitehall and in the customs service. In 
his memoirs, Lord Howe quipped: ‘the consequent loss of jobs for 750 controllers at 
the Bank of England, so far from being a cause for concern, provoked the production 
of a celebratory tie, which I wear to this day.’374 Nigel Lawson said of those 750 that 
‘some took early retirement and others were redeployed, most finding jobs in the 
City.’375 The latter point is of some importance by setting out the liberal thinking (in 
line with Public Choice theory) that superfluous jobs in bureaucracy can be absorbed 
by a vibrant private sector. 
 
The policy also encouraged competition and choice, consistent New Right mantras, 
by reducing the barriers to trade and investment. It was also an example of how 
market forces were given priority by the Conservative government in an attempt to 
promote wealth creation, economic growth and to allow markets to function more 
efficiently. Removing exchange controls reduced barriers to entry and therefore 
theoretically increased producers in a particular market. In this respect removing 
exchange controls satisfied all strands of neo-liberal thinking. Hayek had stated in 
The Road to Serfdom that government control of ‘foreign exchange’ was a ‘decisive 
advance on the path to totalitarianism and the suppression of individual liberty’.376 
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Also important, and in a similar way to enterprise zones, abolishing exchange controls 
acted as a signal of the policies of the Thatcher government and showed a faith in 
liberal economics. Geoffrey Howe said ‘it was an act of faith, but it worked.’377 It also 
showed the dynamic of the early cautiousness of the Prime Minister compared to her 
more committed pro-market ministers, such as Howe. Despite Margaret Thatcher’s 
firmness in her own memoirs, Lord Howe’s opinion fitted in with other accounts of 
the early years of the government. After the initial relaxation in summer 1979 a full 
move to abolition was urged by the Chancellor. Margaret Thatcher’s ‘initial reaction 
was against further action.’378 Nigel Lawson went further by suggesting that Howe 
was also ‘cautious’ in moving to complete abolition (which Lawson favoured) while 
the Prime Minister was ‘even more hesitant.’379 In any case, the combination of 
pragmatism and commitment to economic liberalism led to a result that was 
satisfactory to neo-liberals such as Milton Friedman, who believed it was the 
precondition for later reforms.380 Exchange controls also show a tension between 
nationalism and economic liberalism. Nationalist sentiment in the government might 
well have been attracted to a measure that protected British interests. In this case 
though, a commitment to free markets was favoured over protectionism. Geoffrey 
Howe wrote, ‘Abolition improved the return on capital, and thus the efficiency of our 
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Lastly, although only a relatively small measure in one economy - albeit still a major 
one despite all the talk of decline - removal of exchange controls can be seen as 
providing impetus to the globalization of trade. A number of catalysts can be 
identified in this trend. The end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, when US 
President Nixon ended the convertibility of the dollar to gold (allowing floating 
exchange rates and accelerating international trade and finance) was an earlier, and 
crucial step in this process. Geoffrey Howe said ‘the success of that approach 
(removing exchange controls) helped fortify the commitment of other countries, not 
least those in the European Community, to the same course.’382 After exchange 
control removal this was to continue further with Big Bang in 1986. 
 
The 1980/81 Wobble 
 
Documents released from the 1980 and 1981 Prime Minister’s papers indicate the 
second thoughts some, including Margaret Thatcher, had about removing exchange 
controls. This was due to the appreciating exchange rate caused by North Sea oil and 
the effects this was having in worsening the recession. The Prime Minister’s private 
secretary, Tim Lankester, sent a note to Chancellor Geoffrey Howe on 14 February 
1980 saying that ‘the Prime Minister is concerned about the upward pressure on 
sterling which the current level of interest rates appear to be causing, and has asked 
whether we should not be urgently considering the imposition of controls on inward 
flows.’383 This indicated the priorities of Margaret Thatcher. She was still anxious to 
reduce inflation but a pro-market measure like free movement of capital was 
considered as subordinate to that. In addition, Robin Ibbs (head of the CPRS) wrote to 
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the Prime Minister in October that year urging reconsideration of inflow controls: ‘I 
suggested that in considering ways in which industry can be helped high priority 
should be given to finding methods of reducing the exchange rate. Some system of 
inflow controls might provide necessary relief.’384 Different viewpoints amongst 
economic liberals could also be seen. Monetarist economist Gordon Pepper’s main 
concern was stable monetary conditions. Lankester wrote to the Prime Minister: ‘I 
spoke to Gordon Pepper this evening. He is very worried about the continued upward 
pressure on Sterling, and thinks the Treasury should be seriously considering 
introducing exchange controls and/or negative interest rates on inward flows.’385 Alan 
Walters, however, saw matters in a more free market way. He also wrote to Thatcher 
about the issue in 1981 stating concern about the rumours that controls were about to 
be re-imposed. Walters said that would be ‘very damaging.’386 
 
Although investigating the impact of introducing inflow controls, the Chancellor 
would not be moved on the subject. He wrote to the Prime Minister towards the end 
of 1980 saying ‘I do not see inflow controls as offering a secure or apt way forward. I 
understand very well the concern which the CPRS expressed. This sort of device is 
not simply one that I find philosophically unattractive; it can offer no substitute for 
the far reaching changes we need in the economy (which will inevitably have to come 
to terms with a higher real exchange rate than in the past because of the fact of our 
North Sea oil).’387 This passage revealed some of the dynamics in the first Thatcher 
government. Geoffrey Howe often behaved as the most steadfast economic liberal in 
the Cabinet (including Keith Joseph) and invested most faith in market forces. 
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Margaret Thatcher too had some commitment to the ideas of the New Right but was 
more constrained by political expediency. Her claim that she was ‘not for turning’ 
was in some cases a presentational device with the historical shadow of the Heath 
government in mind. Behind the scenes the Prime Minister could equivocate about 
policy decisions. On several neo-liberal measures, such as enterprise zones and 
exchange control abolition, it was Geoffrey Howe that seemed most committed to 
reform.  
 
The abolition of exchange controls was the forerunner of the Big Bang of 1986 when 
financial markets in the City of London were liberalised. In his memoirs Lord Howe 
said that removing controls ‘forced the City to become more competitive, and helped 
consolidate it as a world financial centre.’388 Former Chairman of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), Nicholas Goodison, said the catalyst for financial deregulation and 
later Big Bang was this early act of the Thatcher government: ‘The real cause I think 
was the abolition of exchange controls in 1979, because that completely freed 
international capital markets as far as London was concerned.’ 389  The early 
liberalization measures were important in the process of globalization and acted as 
significant indicators on how the government intended to proceed. Nigel Lawson put 
these policies in their wider terms: 
 
We had, by the time of the 1980 Budget, not only abolished exchange control: 
we had also abolished all forms of pay controls, price controls, and dividend 
controls, all of which had been in operation, under governments of both parties, 
for most of the previous decade. It all added up to a coherent and far-reaching 
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programme of deregulation, whose magnitude and importance was not, in those 




The Thatcher government did introduce some far-reaching economic reforms. 
Inflation was drastically reduced for much of the 1980s and the more secure monetary 
climate provided a degree of economic stability and a basis for growth. The assault on 
inflation was ideologically based and made a priority from the beginning of the 
Thatcher years. Both exchange control abolition and enterprise zones were less visible 
policies but were also rooted in liberal economic principles. They acted as important 
signals that Britain was once more a place to do business, showed a faith in the 
processes of capitalism and a shift towards wealth creation over state directed 
policies. As such, economic policy to defeat inflation, exchange control abolition and 
enterprise zones can be seen as policies most faithfully based on New Right 
principles. These economic case studies show the broad influence of liberal thinkers 
such as Hayek, think-tanks like the IEA and Bow Group, and journalists like Samuel 
Brittan. In ideological terms they are most closely linked with the neo-liberalism of 
Milton Friedman and the Chicago School, using the state to create stable monetary 
conditions and incentives to promote markets and economic activity. Friedman was 
concerned with a shift towards more liberal societies and economies. In this respect 
he was more willing to engage with the world as it really was, particularly the state, 
than his more idealistic Austrian counterparts. This was most clearly seen in the 
techniques he advocated to provide stable monetary and inflationary conditions. 
                                                        




Although not a Friedmanite policy, enterprise zones, particularly the LDDC’s role in 
the success of the Isle of Dogs followed a similar pattern: that of the state being 
utilized to create conditions for business if not necessarily freer markets. Exchange 
control removal, on the other hand, was a measure that broadly satisfied neo-
liberalism as a whole for its effect on more open trade, markets and movement of 
capital.  
 
In summary, a spectrum of New Right influence and ‘success’ existed in these 
domestic case studies. On the one hand, monetarism, exchange control abolition and 
enterprise zones can be seen as the clearest early Thatcherite applications of liberal 
economic ideas. These will contrast with social reforms, examined in the next chapter, 





Chapter Three: Social Policy Case Studies: council house sales, 
education and NHS reform 
 
Neo-liberal thinking had greater influence on the Thatcher government’s economic 
strategy than on its social policy. This is unsurprising due to the neo-liberal 
preoccupation with economics and free markets. However, while it may not have 
spent as many pages criticising or making recommendations towards social policy, 
the latter was still important to those on the New Right. In straightforward economic 
terms social policy impacted on the public finances and state spending. Ideologically, 
areas like education represented the contested role and view of the state. Social 
reform had the potential to introduce liberal principles such as competition, ownership 
and incentivization while realigning the broader political ethos away from the state 
and vested interests towards the individual. This chapter will examine three case 
studies: council house sales, education and health policy. All three areas were 
influenced to some extent by liberal economic thought, although in some cases only 
in a broad fashion. Other factors and forces will be shown to have been important too. 
The political reasons for liberal economic ideas being relatively diluted in this sphere 
will also be explored. These examples, more so than the other cases looked at in this 
study, will highlight the limits of liberal economic ideas on the policies of 
Thatcherism.    
 
Matthijs has written that Margaret Thatcher saw a ‘spreading network of corporatist 
institutions as the main obstacle to achieving a free economy.’391 Indeed the Thatcher 
government had in its sights the central pillars of the post-war British state. The last 
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chapter examined several economic case studies of early Thatcherism. Social reforms 
were to prove more difficult. The monolithic NHS (National Health Service), state 
education and social (council) housing were to present major resistance to change. 
Nevertheless they were subject to significant reorganisation during the Thatcher 
years, although to different extents. These three areas: education, health, and housing 
will be examined in order to show the perceived successes, failures and limits of 
liberal economic influence on the social policy of the Thatcher years.   
 
Although initially focusing on inflation and trade union reform, the various 
components of post-war Britain subsequently proved targets for economic liberals. 
Neo-liberals stressed several pervading themes that could be applied to these case 
studies: supply side reforms that would increase productivity and efficiency; 
decreased bureaucracy and state intervention; increased competition and choice; a 
transfer of power from the producer to the consumer; increased ownership and 
individual responsibility; and emphasis on what makes the market effective such as 
lower entry barriers. This chapter will examine to what extent these principles were 
applied in these domestic case studies. 
 
The Role of the State 
 
A question that preoccupied liberals was the role of the state. Its role and scope has 
differed throughout modern British historical periods. For instance, in Victorian 
Britain there existed the idea of deserving and undeserving poor. Welfare was often 
administered by charities. Subsequently Seebohm Rowntree’s research on living 




erode Victorian opinions. That poorer families might need assistance from the state to 
break out of poverty became accepted by the Liberal governments of Herbert Asquith 
and David Lloyd George. An expanding system of welfare insurance, some state built 
housing and schools existed until the Second World War. The 1942 Beveridge Report 
then marked another catalyst, as well the results of central planning in the War, for the 
wider provisions of the welfare state constructed by the Attlee government. This 
phase, although promising assistance from ‘cradle to grave’, essentially set up a safety 
net or ‘security from loss of wages.’392 This was extended by the more complex 
interventions of the Labour government of Harold Wilson in the 1960s. Wilson came 
under pressure after the 1965 report by Peter Townsend and Brian Abel-Smith, The 
Poor and the Poorest, indicated relative poverty was still widespread in the UK. This 
led to increased state involvement in welfare.393 Economically, Keynesian counter-
cyclical fiscal policy was nominally practiced to maintain employment.394 Intrusive 
prices and incomes policies were intended to hold back inflation and excessive wage 
demands. Planning was in vogue and, to some on the New Right, government 
virtually controlled where the citizen should live, where their children went to school 
and how much businesses should charge for goods.  
 
At the same time as collectivism appeared to be strengthening, social individualism 
was growing. In particular the ‘permissive society’ reforms of the 1960s allowed 
many in Britain to act in a more socially liberal and individualistic manner. These two 
trends - growing state planning in the economy and public services alongside 
increasing individualism - were set on a collision course in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
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opposition the Conservatives bemoaned the intrusive nature of the state (potentially 
absorbing the Hayekian ideas of Public Choice theory) and the loss of morality and 
responsibility after the ‘permissive society’. Matthew Grimley has identified 
Thatcherism as ‘part of a wider reaction against permissiveness in 1970s Britain’ 
while David Marquand identified a ‘paradoxical continuation’ of the social changes of 
the 1960s.395 Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite has described a Conservative shift in 
opposition from ‘paternalistic, state-centred policies to a radical skepticism about the 
virtues the state can inculate’.396 In government Thatcherism utilized the growing 
desire for choice and individualism to change the role of the state. Council houses 
were sold to their tenants, parents were encouraged to actively choose from a variety 
of possible schools and personal taxation reduced, allowing a higher percentage of 
take home pay to be spent as each person desired. The size of the state, however, by 
some measurements did not alter much during the Thatcher years. Yet the constant 
battle by successive Chancellors to reduce the PSBR (Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement) and lower capital investment in the public sector suggested that the 
state did retreat from several areas of British life.  
 
The oft-cited ‘Victorian values’ of Margaret Thatcher also altered the relationship 
between poverty and the role of the state. The concept of deserving and undeserving 
poor returned in the 1980s. Critics claimed Thatcher ‘exploited and magnified popular 
resentments to redefine the welfare state’. 397  Arch-Thatcherite Norman Tebbit 
famously suggested that if someone could not find a job, they should emulate his 
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father and ‘get on their bike’ and find one. Therefore this role altered as a result of 
several reasons, including the social changes of the 1960s as well as the liberal 
critique of planning. The separate strands of neo-liberal thinking viewed social 
policies in different ways. The ordoliberalism that stemmed from the Freiburg School 
saw social outcomes as of prime concern. To avoid ‘proletarianization’ of the working 
classes, markets could be utilized for social purposes, hence the idea of a ‘social 
market economy’.398 Austrians saw things in a more laissez-faire way. Although 
accepting some level of welfare Hayek was generally antagonistic to social policy. He 
once said that ‘”social justice” is nothing more than an empty formula and 
intellectually disreputable’ and that egalitarianism was ‘fundamentally immoral’.399 
Others in or close to the Austrian tradition, such as Murray Rothbard and Robert 
Nozick went further in calling for a ‘nightwatchman’ or ‘ultraminimal’ state that did 
little apart from guarantee law and order.400 Chicago School academics like Milton 
Friedman sought a more pragmatic path, sympathetic to the kind of liberal society 
Hayek envisaged but astute enough to provide practical recommendations. One 
example of this was Friedman’s long running support for education vouchers, which 
would have some impact on the Thatcher government. 
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Council House Sales 
 
The sale of council houses to their tenants has been widely acknowledged as one of 
the most popular, if not the most popular, reform of the Thatcher government. 
Housing was, and still is, a defining feature of British life. The country is sometimes 
considered unique in its obsession with home ownership.401 Since the mid-1800s as 
urban areas expanded and throughout the twentieth century, how to improve housing 
for the poorest people had been of concern, often in a paternalistic fashion. Some of 
the industrialists of the Victorian-era provided homes for their employees. The 
Cadbury family, famous for its confectionary business in Birmingham, was one 
example: they built an entire village in Bourneville for the workers of their factory 
and very much in their image - the family were Quakers so pubs were prohibited and 
exercise was encouraged.  
 
Government subsequently began to build social housing and this was accelerated after 
each world war. The period after 1945 saw a huge increase in council house building, 
including the numerous ‘new towns’ allocated by the state. The situation for many 
who moved into these homes was a drastic improvement from inner city 
overcrowding.  Yet post-war council housing was to lead to problems. The housing 
was mostly built in concentrated areas and, especially in the 1960s, in the 
architectural fashion of the time for ‘brutalism’: huge tower blocks in a futuristic style 
that soon lost its allure. Margaret Thatcher, although no architecture critic, described 
post-war high-rise flats as ‘badly designed monstrosities’.402 Third, there was usually 
a waiting list to gain a place in a council home. Rents were cheap and once in a house 
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there was little advantage in losing this (relatively) privileged position. Cheap rents 
also often meant low maintenance. This created a situation that was not propitious for 
labour mobility or a dynamic economy.  
 
Labour mobility was a consistent liberal theme and often linked with a critique of rent 
controls.403 These were also branded a hindrance to good quality housing in Britain. 
The issue had been identified in the 1950s by Geoffrey Howe (and Colin Jones for the 
Bow Group in the 1956 pamphlet Houses to Let) as a problem and had other liberal 
critics over several years (Milton Friedman and George Stigler as far back as 1946), 
including another future Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson.404 The 1957 
Rent Act was attacked for creating perverse incentives for landlords, who in return for 
artificially low rents meant they often did not maintain their properties. Rent controls 
were introduced in 1915 due to the wartime shortage but continued after 1918 as 
insufficient houses were built.405 In their 1956 pamphlet, Howe and Jones wrote that 
rent controls fed inflation elsewhere in the economy, removed an incentive for private 
enterprise to build houses and limited supply and quality.406 They concluded that rent 
control ‘betokens wastage of housing, distortion in the economy and injustice for 
many.’407 Hayek wrote, in The Constitution of Liberty, that rent controls meant 
property was essentially ‘expropriated’ and led to ‘weakening the respect for property 
and the sense of individual responsibility’.408 
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Limits on rents could be understood as a way of protecting tenants from exploitative 
landlords and to keep housing affordable, similar to subsidised building of council 
houses. Maintaining rent at below market levels, however, acted as a disincentive to 
the private construction of new property, therefore increasing demand on existing 
houses, which led to shortages and, to many, reduced quality. The state was then 
further relied upon to provide new homes. The Conservatives made a commitment to 
build more social housing than Labour at their 1950 conference – much of it in the 
public sector.409 After the subsequent government’s target was reached in 1953, 
however, the Conservatives turned more towards private housing provision. 
Nevertheless, though Labour was more inclined towards social housing than the 
Conservatives, council housing building continued at various levels until 1979.410 
Governments also continued to subsidise rents. These policies exposed one 
ideological divide between economic liberals and post-war socialists (or social 
democrats). In 1978 Margaret Thatcher said of rent control, ‘Labour's policy in fact 
produced derelict property and more homeless people.’411  
 
Hugh Rossi, one of the architects of the Right to Buy legislation, also commented on 
the decline of private rented property. ‘The 1974 Rent Act was part of Labour's 
deliberate policy to break the private landlord, to drive him out of business and, at the 
same time, provide local authorities with the funds to buy him out.’412 This assertion, 
however, has been disputed. Alec Nove, writing in Economic Affairs in the 1980s, 
questioned whether rent controls had negative effects on housing by comparing inner 
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city areas where rent controls existed and those that did not. Nove claimed there was 
little or no difference.413 It was a counter factual claim that was difficult to quantify. 
Nevertheless, rented property was an issue that was important to economic liberals 
because it was closely aligned with labour mobility.414 
 
The idea to sell council houses 
 
One of the key ideas of classical economics was that private property was sacrosanct. 
For many on the left the principle was heretic, and land should be put into common 
ownership. The tension between these two positions appeared to lie behind housing 
policy in Britain. Council housing, built and owned by the state, allocated to those 
most in need was a project inspired by socialism and state planning. Some 
Conservatives believed Labour’s council house building strategy in London was 
intended to gain political advantage, part of a ‘longstanding gerrymander’.415 
 
The vast expansion of trade during the industrial revolution and the huge 
improvements in quality of life for many in Britain, according to liberals, had been 
possible because human beings act in a self-interested way. Private property and the 
ability to enjoy the fruits of labour lay behind this rapid development. These instincts, 
according to the New Right, would be reignited if ownership and private property 
could be expanded. Margaret Thatcher tellingly commented on a large and 
particularly down-trodden council estate in Toxteth in Liverpool, that the residents 
took little pride in their neighbourhood, questioning ‘how people could live in such 
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circumstances without trying to clear up the mess and improve their surroundings’.416 
To this line of thinking private ownership could reverse these trends. Indeed 
Conservative activists claimed, following the Right to Buy scheme, they could tell 
who owned their home ‘at a glance’ by the improvements they had carried out to their 
property.417 
 
Alan Peacock, liberal academic, writer and subsequently a government adviser, lays 
claim to introducing the idea of council house sales (and that councils should retain 
fixed term freeholds) in the UK in 1961.418 Yet the idea of transferring housing away 
from the state and to the individual had germinated some time before this. An unlikely 
source of liberal inspiration was Anthony Eden, who became an advocate of a 
‘property owning democracy’ in the 1940s and himself revived the term from the 
1920s ‘constructive conservatism’ of Noel Skelton who feared that ‘socialism has 
force, fire, energy indeed’ but that it meant ‘economic disaster and moral despair.’419 
Skelton rejected state ownership, saying ‘what everybody owns, nobody owns’ and 
came to have a profound impact on a generation of Conservative politicians.420 
Although it did not solely mean home ownership Skelton wrote in 1924 a sentiment 
that would infuse Conservative thinking all the way through to the 1980 Housing Act: 
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Until our educated and politically minded democracy has become 
predominantly a property-owning democracy, neither the national equilibrium 
nor the balance of the life of the individual will be restored.421  
 
Stanley Baldwin and Harold Macmillan both used the phrase ‘property owning 
democracy’ in the 1920s and Skelton also encouraged Anthony Eden to use it.422 
Eden aligned the term more toward home ownership with his speech to the 
Conservative Party Conference in 1946 while Winston Churchill later said in 1950 
that this was an essential part of Conservative policy.423 
 
The Bow Group published a piece aimed at increasing home ownership in its 1954 
pamphlet, Industry and the Property Owning Democracy by Russell Lewis. Three 
reasons for home ownership were set out. Firstly, it was a bulwark against socialism, 
secondly it had an ‘excellent effect on character’ and lastly encouraged independence 
and self-confidence.424 Lewis said that property ownership catered for the ‘country’s 
real needs.’425 In opposition during the 1960s the idea of selling council houses to 
their tenants took shape for the Heath Shadow Cabinet following a local government 
initiative in Birmingham.426 Subsequently Geoffrey Howe wrote to Margaret Thatcher 
in September 1978 that ‘property-owning democracy is undoubtedly a most important 
theme’ and this should be focused ‘overwhelmingly on council house sales.’427 In 
short, property ownership had long been favoured by Conservative Party politicians. 
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They articulated a belief that home ownership was the natural order of things in 
British life.  
 
Another unlikely liberal reformer, Peter Walker - considered a ‘wet’ subsequently in 
Margaret Thatcher’s government - championed the idea of selling council houses to 
their tenants and managed to include the proposal into the October 1974 Conservative 
Election Manifesto, with agreement from Thatcher who was briefly Shadow 
spokesperson for the Environment. It said its ‘proposal for extending home ownership 
is to give a new deal to every council tenant who has been in his home for three years 
or more. These tenants will have the right to purchase their homes at a price one-third 
below market value.’ 428  Of course the manifesto pledge was unable to be 
implemented as Labour won the election but by 1979 the Conservatives had expanded 
the policy. Walker had initially floated giving away council houses to long-term 
tenants but Margaret Thatcher resisted this on the grounds that it would appear to 
punish those who had worked to buy their home. Walker pointed out that this could 
also be applied to those who had paid years of council rents but Thatcher was 
concerned on how that would look to ‘our people’.429 The 1979 manifesto said that 
‘discounts will range from 33 per cent after three years, rising with length of tenancy 
to a maximum of 50 per cent after twenty years. We shall also ensure that 100 per 
cent mortgages are available for the purchase of council and new town houses.’430 
Michael Heseltine, similarly to Walker, justified the large discounts in a 1978 paper 
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he wrote in opposition: ‘The tenant in an older house has in some cases paid out more 
in rent than the cost of the house to the local authority.’431  
 
Another influential political figure regarding the council houses was Horace Cutler, a 
leading member of, and leader of between 1977 and 1981, the Greater London 
Council (GLC). In the late 1960s Cutler advocated, and put into motion, selling 
council houses to tenants. Margaret Thatcher (and Hugh Rossi in the same 1978 
interview) praised Cutler for transferring power from the state to the people.432 Upon 
gaining power in 1979, Thatcher turned to another moderate not particularly known 
for his liberal leanings, Heseltine (as Secretary of State for the Environment), to 
implement the policy of council house sales. Therefore compared to several other 
Thatcherite reforms, the Right to Buy legislation and lineage had as much to do with 
One Nation and traditional conservatism as economic liberals like Keith Joseph or 
Geoffrey Howe. The details of the scheme for the 1979 manifesto were worked 
through by Hugh Rossi, who had been a long-time proponent of the idea, but was also 
considered closer to Edward Heath than Margaret Thatcher.433  
 
Neo-liberal themes and Council House Sales 
 
Although several of the prominent personalities involved in implementing the policy 
of selling council houses may have not been typical economic liberals the policy idea 
itself could be viewed as a barometer of the shift to liberal economic thinking under 
the Thatcher government. Peter Mandelson later wrote Labour dogma in this period 
                                                        
431 THCR 2/6/2/187 Paper by Michael Heseltine, ‘The Sale of Council House Sales’, 28 June 1978. 
432 MTF 103662 





‘could leave us [the Labour Party] opposing policies of far greater benefit to our own 
voters than anything we were offering’. Council house sales was the one Conservative 
policy that Labour should have admitted was worthy of reversing their position on, 
according to Mandelson, and opposition against it in the 1983 election was a vote 
loser.434  
 
Council house sales satisfied broad liberal principles for several reasons. Council 
house provision was a state subsidy. Some saw Right to Buy as a ‘cut’ and a means of 
reducing government spending.435 In terms of a broadly Austrian microeconomic 
view of the market this would distort prices and drive out producers (private landlords 
and construction) from the housing market.436 Social housing was planned from 
central government. This would allocate resources in the way a bureaucrat saw fit and 
not, to the Austrian School’s way of thinking, by the price mechanism in a market that 
would respond to demand more quickly and efficiently. A constant idea alluded to in 
the writing of the New Right was dependency. In creating the welfare state, British 
governments provided numerous methods of free assistance to its citizens, from the 
NHS to child benefit to cheap council housing. Once initiated, this help was difficult 
to withdraw. This was of course anathema to economic liberals who believed people 
themselves should decide how to spend their own money and that they were better at 
doing this than the paternalist state. Home ownership was, in part, a way of achieving 
this. If tenants became property owners it would widen ownership of capital, reducing 
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state control and planning from the centre. Nigel Lawson expanded on this in his 1988 
lecture, ‘The New Britain, The Tide of Ideas’, when he said that the ‘moral’ basis of 
capitalism was shown in home ownership and this represented a desire of the British 
people for ‘self improvement’, denied to them by previous housing policies.437 
 
Housing and the role of the state cut further into liberal thinking. Friedrich Hayek’s 
warning that bureaucracy was self-perpetuating and Keith Joseph’s ‘ratchet effect’ of 
socialism could be interpreted in one respect by the increasing number of council 
houses built in the post-war period, and the combination of that and rent controls 
pushed private provision out of the market. Furthermore, according to Public Choice 
theory it would be in the interest of those working in government to expand their 
control over housing policy. Selling state assets, in this case housing stock, showed a 
fundamental realignment in the relation between the government and the private 
sector. The New Right believed, to sum up, that the state should only concern itself in 
areas where private provision was flawed, in effect where there was either a missing 
market or ‘market failure’. The building, buying, selling and renting of houses was 
not, according to liberals, one of these areas.438 Therefore the policy of council house 
sales, or property ownership in general, had been a favourite principle of 
Conservative politicians. It was also a component in the Party’s strategy to widen its 
support to traditional Labour supporters. Nevertheless, as a result of the prevailing 











As seen from the differences between the 1974 and 1979 Conservative Party 
manifestos, the terms that council houses would be sold on became more generous. A 
maximum discount to tenants was proposed as 33% in 1974, while by 1979 a 
reduction of up to 50% was on offer. As Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Michael Heseltine decided to allocate the job of preparing the legislation to Minister 
of State John Stanley.439 The Housing Act of 1980, also known as the ‘Right to Buy’ 
legislation, included several core features. The level of discount offered on the sale of 
a house depended on the length of time that person or family had lived there. This 
ranged from 33% on a minimum of three years tenancy to 50% maximum after 20 
years incumbency. If a tenant wanted to sell the house within five years of buying it 
they would have to repay the discount. A statutory right to buy would exist for tenants 
who had been in either a council house or non-charitable housing association 
residence for at least three years.440 These conditions were extended in 1984, such 
was the success of the scheme, allowing tenants that had lived in their houses the right 
to buy after two years and increasing the discount to 60% for over 30 years 
incumbency.441   
 
The Politics and Economics of Council House Sales  
 
The policy of selling council houses to their tenants proved wildly popular.442 When 
the Housing Act was passed in 1980 approximately 53% of British homes were owner 
occupied. At the end of the decade this figure rose to 66% with 1.5 million council 
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houses sold.443 Cynics have said the policy was primarily a electoral winner and 
effectively converted many traditional Labour supporters into Conservative voters.444 
It has already been noted that architect of New Labour Peter Mandelson, thought that 
his party in the 1980s should have accepted this was a successful and popular policy. 
Tony Blair, in his memoirs, went further. He described strategies such as Right to Buy 
as chiming with the ‘aspirational’ nature of the British people, something that ‘old’ 
Labour never understood or recognised and that his New Labour project did.445 As 
outlined previously, Conservative politicians since the 1920s believed capital 
ownership would strengthen the Party’s support and predated its relationship with 
neo-liberalism. 
 
The 1976 policy document, The Right Approach, criticized what it believed was 
socialism’s tendency to heighten ‘class feeling’ through industrial unrest and 
municipal housing. Home ownership was one mechanism to dilute this feeling.446 It 
should also be noted that home ownership had been rising over the previous decades 
and in this respect favoured the Conservatives’ housing policy.447 Daniel Stedman-
Jones goes as far to say that the Thatcher government simply expanded a trend backed 
by both major parties over several years, but that the Conservatives added ‘a thick 
coating of ideological paint’.448 Margaret Thatcher certainly acknowledged that home 
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ownership favoured her government and the ethos of her domestic programme. It 
could, at times, even override the need to reduce inflation. In a 1979 meeting with 
Gordon Pepper the monetarist admitted he was ‘very worried about the money supply 
figures’, hinting at an interest rate increase. The Prime Minister replied that ‘it would 
be disastrous if the mortgage rate rose.’449  
 
The Prime Minister came into conflict with Chancellors Geoffrey Howe and Nigel 
Lawson over interest relief on mortgages. Mortgage Interest Relief at Source 
(MIRAS) allowed home-owners to claim tax relief on the interest payments of their 
mortgages. Although MIRAS was actually introduced by then Labour Chancellor Roy 
Jenkins in 1969, also to encourage home ownership, it was expanded under the 
Thatcher government. The Prime Minister said that MIRAS was a reward for ‘our 
people’.450 Tax relief on mortgages was considered cheaper for the state than council 
housing. The Right Approach estimated that the average annual subsidy on a newly 
built council house was about £1300, while the tax relief on a new mortgage was 
about £300. 451  Documents show Thatcher and Howe clashing over raising the 
mortgage relief ceiling in 1982 and 1983.452 The Prime Minister consistently wanting 
it to rise further than the Chancellor thought acceptable. 
 
If the politics of council house sales looked like a one-way street, the economics were 
not as clear. The wider ownership of capital was a success, it later encapsulated the 
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Thatcherite idea of ‘popular capitalism’ and paved the way for a programme of 
privatization that accelerated during the second and third Thatcher terms. Yet it did 
little to tackle the problem of labour mobility. By addressing home ownership and not 
the rental market, and also by setting the seemingly sensible five-year resale 
restrictions, Right to Buy may have contributed to continued inertia in regional 
mobility.453 This in turn may have worsened the employment difficulties of the 1980s. 
The lack of new council housing stock following the 1980 Act increased demand and 
therefore prices, working against one of the central targets of the Thatcher 
government. Critics of council house sales and its implementation were to appear on 
both left and right. 
 
Criticism of Right to Buy 
  
The Right to Buy legislation satisfied some general New Right themes. It widened 
ownership of housing and capital, reduced state control and provision of housing, 
dependency on central government and created over a million ‘capitalists’ that 
previously may have identified more with the Labour Party. Economic liberals were 
less impressed, however, with the way the scheme was implemented. Firstly, prices 
were subsidised and discounted, in some cases heavily. Price is a key consideration in 
the market process, particularly to the Austrian School. Subsidies distort this market 
mechanism, government intervention can lead to inflation and one criticism that stood 
out from the Austrian School was that subsidising prices generated queues.454  This 
tied in with a criticism of council house sales from the left. The Thatcher government 
prevented local authorities from using the revenues to replenish housing stock. Social 
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housing was then left to housing associations. This led to a shortage of new houses 
which in turn caused increased homelessness (exacerbated by the 1983 Mental Health 
Act that meant many more patients were treated in the community). This problem was 
made worse by elevated rents in existing council housing.455  
 
Subsidised prices and reduced housing stock did increase demand for homes in the 
1980s, with some negative consequences. Going back to the question of where 
government should step in after a market failure, many on the left would consider the 
advent of increased homelessness as just that. Liberals, on the other hand, thought that 
state interference in the implementation of Right to Buy created new market 
distortions. Housing policy and the implementation of strategies such as Right to Buy 
were advantageous to many but disastrous for others. The liberal criticism focused on 
Austrian microeconomics, the market mechanism and the primacy of price. This is a 
pervading theme of much of Thatcherism, namely that Hayekian politics were more 
influential than its economics, or at least the wider school of thought Hayek 
encapsulated. 
 
Right to Buy, as Skelton predicted in the 1920s, reignited (or consolidated) the British 
obsession with home ownership. To many it was a situation from which you could 
only benefit. As well as subsidizing prices of council houses the government provided 
further incentives with privately owned homes in general with MIRAS tax relief. 
Nigel Lawson, following in Howe’s footsteps, wanted to limit MIRAS but met fierce 
opposition from Margaret Thatcher. MIRAS and price subsidies worked against the 








The rules that governed Building Societies mortgage lending also changed in the mid-
1980s, which generally made it easier to buy a house.456 Credit further fuelled an 
increase in owner occupation during Thatcherism and beyond. Figure 3 shows how 
owner occupation expanded 
between 1981 and 2006 in 
comparison with housing 
associations, local authority 
housing and private renting. 
The overall critique of 
Margaret Thatcher’s 
housing policy is consistent with much of the government’s programme. Political 
strategy appeared to align with the principles of economic liberalism policy 
formulation. Yet a purer adherence to New Right models, particularly Austrian 
microeconomics, was jettisoned when actually implemented. In some respects this 
again showed that Thatcherism was closer to Fredmanite neo-liberalism than the more 
puritan classical liberalism of Hayek. That is to say the Government utilized the state 
to liberalise or create markets, but that the methods introduced their own 
contradictions. In addition the reform of the rental market, important for labour 
mobility and identified as such by thinkers like Hayek as well as Tory politicians like 
Howe and Lawson, was not attempted. Robin Harris has noted that any attempts at 
reform of the rental market met a ‘wall of prejudice’. 457  Margaret Thatcher 
compromised her free market beliefs in housing policy in the 1980s by endorsing 
subsidisation and price distortion; encouraging more borrowing and fuelling 
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          1981 2006 
Owner Occupation (%)    57.7  70.1 
Private renting (%)    11.1  11.4 
Housing Association (%)  2.2  8.4 






inflation.458 A focus on home ownership in the UK, as well as the United States is a 
long-term trend that has been encouraged by governments. This can, most 
notoriously, be seen in the subprime housing market in the US, where owner 
occupation was promoted aggressively and acted as a trigger for the financial crisis of 
2007-08.459 The Economist gave its verdict on housing in 2011: ‘In Britain the main 
problem is the fetish for home-ownership and high house prices in the south-east, 
partly the result of severe shortages of supply.’460 As such, the Thatcher government 
went about decreasing the potency of one vested interest (state sponsored council 
housing) while creating another (home owners, given their own benefits and perks, 
sponsored by the state). This is seen in several of the Thatcher government’s policies 
and is dealt with in more detail in chapter four. 
 
Education Vouchers  
 
State education had long been criticised by economic liberals. The IEA has claimed it 
‘damaged the poor and led to lower literacy rates than those in pre 1870 Britain.’461 
One idea to improve education that emanated from neo-liberals, and a favourite policy 
recommendation of both Milton Friedman and the IEA, was education vouchers. It 
was one model that had taken form before 1979 and had some level of support in the 
UK in the shape of FEVER (Friends of the Education Voucher Experiment in 
Representative Regions). The period that was considered the possible window when 
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education vouchers could have been introduced was the end of the first Thatcher term, 
with Keith Joseph as Secretary of State for Education. When this opportunity was 
missed it appeared that education vouchers would not be trialed. Instead there were 
some attempts at creating competition and improving standards in the Education 
Reform Act of 1988, which set out a public sector reform agenda that was to be 
followed in a similar way with the NHS legislation of 1990.  
 
Statutory state education can be traced back to the Elementary Education Act of 1870, 
which set out the provision of compulsory education, delivered by local boards, up to 
the age of 12. To this point schooling had been provided privately and as the quote 
above claimed, many liberals even today consider this to be a better way to deliver 
education for all. Typically Friedrich Hayek saw little role for government in 
providing education.462  
 
State funded education was expanded in the twentieth century. One of the key pieces 
of legislation regarding the modern British system was the 1944 Education Act. This 
split state funded schools into three categories: grammar schools, secondary technical 
schools and secondary modern schools. Grammar schools proved to be the most 
contentious because they had a selection procedure, which only allowed pupils 
admission if they passed an exam. This selection, at age 11, was increasingly resisted 
by the Labour Party in the post-war period. They felt that the process discriminated 
against children from working class or poorer backgrounds. From 1965, Secretary of 
State for Education in Harold Wilson’s government, Anthony Crosland, attempted to 
force local authorities to convert all schools to non-selective comprehensives. 
                                                        




Crosland was vehemently opposed to grammar schools and most became 
comprehensives over the next 15 years. Margaret Thatcher was Education Secretary 
in the Heath Government 1970-74 and as Shirley Williams pointed out in 2008, 
closed more grammar schools than any other minister. 463  This, however, is 
misleading. The future Prime Minister actually ended the compulsory shift from 
grammar schools to comprehensives but by this point the process was politically 
difficult to reverse.  
 
The end of the ‘tripartite’ schooling system (grammar, secondary technical and 
secondary modern schools) was associated by some with the general malaise in 
Britain by the 1970s and fitted in with the mood of declinism.464 What the demise of 
grammar schools signified to its critics was not a move towards egalitarianism but to 
a reduction in academic standards and opportunities for children from poorer families. 
Post-war British politicians had attempted to reduce elitism and in so doing create 
equal opportunities in education. After most of the grammar schools closed, parents 
paying to send their children to independent schools increased, potentially reinforcing 
elitism.465  
 
Development of the Education Voucher idea 
 
Liberal economic thinkers had an alternative to the state education system which 
developed over a number of years: the education voucher scheme. It appealed to 
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Conservatives like Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph because it challenged 
sedentary, LEA-organised comprehensives. In its basic form parents would be given a 
voucher for each of their children, which they could use to send them to a school of 
their choosing. The idea was intended to promote competition between schools, raise 
standards of teaching and induce some degree of market discipline into the state 
school system. It was initially proposed by Milton Friedman in 1955, in an article 
titled ‘The Role of Government in Education’.466 Friedman wrote that government-led 
education was neither ‘required’ nor ‘justifiable in a predominantly free enterprise 
society.’ He said a voucher scheme ‘would be a sizeable reduction in the direct 
activities of government, yet a great widening in the educational opportunities open to 
our children.’ Lastly, ‘Government would serve its proper function of improving the 
operation of the invisible hand without substituting the dead hand of bureaucracy.’ 
Friedman’s idea was an example of the neo-liberalism with which he came to be 
associated. That is to say that the state should act to promote market forces, creating 
markets if they did not exist. In this sense Friedman saw the potential of government 
as an enabler. Hayekians (or the more classical liberals of the Austrian School) saw 
no role for the state in education and that the private sector would operate effectively 
without government interference. In The Constitution of Liberty Hayek applauded 
Friedman’s voucher idea but nevertheless said that ‘it would undoubtedly be possible 
to leave the organization and management of education entirely to private efforts’ and 
that ‘the case against the management of schools by government…[is] stronger than 
ever’.467 It may have been another attempt to conceal the real differences Hayek had 
with his fellow Mont Pelerin member. Again we see similar thinking between 
Austrian and Chicago schools, diverging with the former’s more puritanical liberal 
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view compared to Friedman’s more practical engagement. The Chicagoan’s support 
for vouchers administered by government was a prime reason he would have to 
defend himself against accusations of being ‘statist’ by more idealistic, or as he put it 
‘utopian’, economic liberals.468  
 
The first advocates of the voucher scheme in the UK were Alan Peacock and Jack 
Wiseman in their 1964 IEA pamphlet Education for democrats. A  study of the 
financing of education in a free society. Peacock, in 2010, said that he had been 
looking at post-war social policy and wanted to improve education for the poorest 
families in Britain. He originally looked at vouchers in health policy but thought this 
would be too controversial, subsequently transferring his focus to education. Peacock 
wanted to increase the power and choice of the consumer, in this case the parent.469 
He was a member of the Liberal Party at this time and later said that most 
Conservatives were against the idea when it was first suggested, with the exceptions 
of Keith Joseph and Geoffrey Howe.470 
 
The Institute of Economic Affairs became closely associated with education vouchers 
from the 1960s, in particular its president Arthur Seldon and his wife Marjorie, who 
was the Founder Chair of FEVER. The pressure group was set up in 1974 to promote 
the voucher scheme. During this period some Conservative MPs began to look at the 
idea, including Rhodes Boyson, who backed the scheme in a 1975 paper called The 
Fight for Education.471 Milton Friedman returned to his idea in Free to Choose in 
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1980, and the accompanying television series devoted a whole episode to education 
vouchers.472  
 
Like many liberal economic policy recommendations, education vouchers were seen 
by many as eccentric. It is apparent, however, that the education strategies in the 
1960s and 1970s had caused some disquiet and there was space for new thinking. 
Central to this was the end of the tripartite system. What the voucher scheme 
attempted to do was represent the same amount of money that the state allocated to a 
child’s education but in a mobile form that could follow the best performing and 
sought after schools. The intention was to force institutions and teachers to improve 
their standards. Vouchers were a typically neo-liberal proposal, attempting to impose 
market forces and discipline on a state-run system, in the belief this would increase 
quality and productivity. 
 
Education Policy of the Conservative Party, 1979 
 
By 1979 the principles set in train by Crosland’s policies in the 1960s had taken root. 
It would prove difficult for the Thatcher government to alter the establishment’s 
consensus on education. One example was that of grammar schools. Selection aged 
eleven for elite schools was an idea that appealed to Conservatives. Grammar schools 
and elitist education, however, has proved divisive for the Conservative Party. Even 
in 2007 David Cameron had to announce that his party would not reintroduce 
selection and grammar schools if returned to government, receiving an ‘angry 
                                                        
472 Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose. (London: Pan Books, 1990 (originally published 




backlash’ for his troubles from backbench MPs.473 
It might have been expected that the Thatcher government would be keen to alter the 
education status quo. Within Thatcherism’s broader strategy there were several 
reasons for this, economic and political. Comprehensive schools were seen to be 
under the control of LEAs (Local Education Authorities). Politically this layer of 
bureaucracy was deemed as being left leaning and inclined to support Labour. From a 
New Right perspective LEAs would have been a target for advocates of Public Choice 
theory. LEAs had been seen as a particularly inflexible arm of government. 
Chancellor Nigel Lawson said in a speech in 1988 that he saw one of the central 
government’s roles as empowering the individual. Regarding education, Lawson said 
that since local government (in most cases) showed no signs of divesting power 
voluntarily, central government had to step in. The aim was to transfer power from 
bureaucratic and often obstructive bodies directly to the people. This explained 
several reforms of the Thatcher government and why it wanted to reduce the influence 
of LEAs.474 Although vouchers would still require administration the policy could 
remodel this type of bureaucracy, which allocated pupils to schools and the associated 
resources. Public Choice theorist Gordon Tullock believed education vouchers could 
reduce the power and prestige of civil servants.475 In addition, the Labour Party had 
become the champion of producer groups such as teachers. Economic liberals felt that 
education policy should be aimed at the consumers (parents and their children) and 
not the producers (teachers and bureaucrats). As with council house sales, education 
vouchers had the potential to reduce the influence of forces antagonistic to the 
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Conservative Party. Unlike housing though, vouchers in education would not be a 
vote winner in the short term (particularly the electoral cycle) and would possibly take 
several years to produce results. 
 
The Thatcher government’s desire to reform education had another dimension. The 
Prime Minister herself has been characterised as being driven by the need to defeat 
‘enemies’. In his biography of Thatcher, John Campbell wrote a chapter, titled 
‘Enemies Within’ that described a ‘need for enemies’ and a ‘taste for 
confrontation’.476 During her tenure Margaret Thatcher identified and took on, for the 
most part shrewdly, a number of individuals and groups that she saw as reactionary. 
The trade union movement and the coal miner’s leader Arthur Scargill, the civil 
service, the communist world, the European Community: all were targets. Local 
authorities and the education establishment were seen as intransigent, another bastion 
of leftism in the UK. Education reforms that reduced their power, however, could 
(and later did) enhance the power of central government. The Prime Minister also saw 
academics as another foe. She would criticise universities and the anti-capitalist 
sentiments they would (according to her) encourage.477 Shirley Letwin wrote that 
Margaret Thatcher saw education as a means to improve economic efficiency and 
therefore treated individuals as a means of production, not independent agents.478 
Famously her alma mater Oxford University did not award the Prime Minister an 
honorary degree in 1985 due to the sizeable resistance of the academic world to the 
government’s measures.  
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Therefore it is unsurprising the Thatcher government saw radical education reform as 
desirable and part of its wider objectives. Attacking the entrenched education 
establishment was not only an opportunity to improve school standards but also to 
shape British political thinking and practices to Thatcherism’s broader programme. 
Secretary of State for Education between 1986 and 1989 Kenneth Baker summed up 
many Conservative’s opinion of the education establishment. He believed there had 
been a deterioration in standards of education due to the ‘1960s ethos’ of the 
Department of Education and Science (DES) which had left it ‘rooted in [the] 
“progressive” orthodoxies’ of the comprehensive system, and ‘in league’ with 
teaching unions.479  
 
Education Vouchers: Keith Joseph’s opportunity 
 
Keith Joseph had been Secretary of State for Industry from 1979, taking over from 
Mark Carlisle at education in 1981. He was perhaps the most ardently pro-market 
(intellectually if not in practice) of the politicians in the Thatcher government and was 
interested in the voucher scheme when he became education secretary.480 He was also 
the closest politician to the Institute of Economic Affairs, who had pushed the scheme 
hard in the previous years. Subsequently, voucher proponent Arthur Seldon said that 
the possible phase for introducing the idea was between October 1982 and June 1983, 
when the government was riding high after the victory in the Falklands and the 
economy was coming out of recession.481 The scheme was examined in this period 
but was eventually shelved. It was left to Kenneth Baker to present the key piece of 
                                                        
479 Kenneth Baker, The Turbulent Years. My Life in Politics, (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), pp. 
160-168. 
480 Denham, Think-tanks, p. 81. 
481 Anthony Seldon, The Riddle of the Voucher. An inquiry into the obstacles to introducing choice and 




education legislation during the Thatcher era, the 1988 Education Reform Act. If 
education vouchers were going to be introduced it would surely have been while the 
economically liberal Joseph was in charge of the department. So why were they not 
implemented? Several reasons have been proffered: that the DES proved too resistant 
to the scheme, that Joseph was an ineffective Secretary of State or that it was simply 
unworkable. 
 
Keith Joseph had wholeheartedly embraced economic liberalism after 1974. In 
opposition he toured universities around Britain delivering numerous speeches that 
espoused liberal ideas, such as ‘Monetarism is Not Enough’.482 In 1974 he was the 
driving force behind the founding of the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), one of the 
more influential New Right think tanks, with the aim of trying to emulate the West 
German economic ‘miracle’.483 In 1976 Joseph allegedly provided Margaret Thatcher 
with a list of key liberal economic texts, such as Hayek.484 One of the most original 
thinkers in the Thatcher government, his policy-making often changed course 
rapidly.485 James Prior criticised his enthusiasm for ‘hare-brained schemes’ while 
even supporters like Milton Friedman expressed disquiet over Joseph’s interventionist 
policies at the Department of Trade and Industry.486 The latter point was based around 
keeping British Leyland afloat but had been identified by Michael Heseltine as 
electorally crucial in the contested region of the West Midlands.487 Some liberals, 
such as Alfred Sherman, believed Joseph became guided by his civil servants, who 
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were resistant to change.488 A one time advisor, Alan Peacock, thought that vouchers 
would have stood more chance of success if the ‘rougher’ Rhodes Boyson had led the 
department.489 The role of civil servants has consistently been cited as a reason 
education reform proved so drawn out. The Prime Minister apparently told Joseph 
that he headed ‘an awful department’.490 
 
While examining the possible voucher scheme Sir Keith asked Alan Peacock for a 
memo and recommendations on the policy.491 Peacock was an economist who had 
been an advisor at the DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) under Joseph during 
the Heath government. Peacock subsequently believed he was obstructed by civil 
servants while attempting to fulfill his role.492 He described most of the top civil 
servants at the Ministry of Education as against the voucher idea, that it would have 
lessened their power and that Permanent Secretary Sir James Hamilton was 
‘vehemently opposed.’493 These revelations were of course meat and drink to Public 
Choice advocates. Milton Friedman later said that bureaucrats had overstepped their 
remit and should have helped policy making, not be making it themselves.494  
 
In 1982, after Rhodes Boyson announced that the government was looking into a 
voucher scheme in education, the civil service produced an internal paper called 
‘Educational Vouchers. Some thoughts from California.’ A voucher system had at 
that time recently been introduced in parts of the state. It said that vouchers had met 
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‘widespread opposition’ but that the idea was unlikely to fade due to ‘widespread 
public dissatisfaction with state education.’495 It concluded with several criticisms, 
perhaps most pertinently that there was ‘a real fear that the market mechanism is not 
appropriate in education’ but also that vouchers could encourage separatism, that 
parents chose schools that strengthen their own views, inequalities would be 
reinforced, voucher supporters underestimated true costs involved (such as transport 
issues) and that the view of diligent parents researching competing schools was 
unrealistic.496 Lastly, most parents just wanted and preferred a good local school.497 
These points may have all been valid and it is worth noting, with a few exceptions 
predominantly in the United States but also Chile, the education voucher scheme has 
not been used extensively.498  
 
The electoral cycle, it should also be said, could have worked against a radical 
proposal. After the victory in the 1982 Falklands War and with inflation falling and 
the economy recovering, an election was planned for 1983. With this looming, 
unemployment still high and the slump of 1980-81 still fresh in the memory, the 
Conservative leadership may have seen a voucher experiment as an unnecessary risk. 
In addition, the idea of education vouchers was not canvassed hard enough within the 
Conservative Party and was simply ‘not a high priority’ for Margaret Thatcher, 
despite her apparently liking the policy.499  
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Education Vouchers: For and Against 
 
There were a number of cases for and against the idea of education vouchers. Two of 
the key components of Thatcherism were choice and competition. Choice would 
potentially give parents the opportunity to look at different schools and pick what they 
thought was the best one for their child. This would then (it was hoped) increase 
standards at schools, which were competing for pupils and therefore funding. 
Competition would mean that poorer performing schools would inevitably fail, which 
was a prerequisite for improving standards. Schools, as well as teachers, could not be 
compelled to get better without the fear of failure. Reducing the power of LEAs 
would lessen the role of local bureaucracy, increasing parent power. Vouchers would 
increase consumer power (parents) over that of the producers (teachers and schools), 
increase competition and inject market forces into education. Another liberal theme, 
ownership, could be thought of as parents taking more control of their children’s 
education by having the power of the voucher.  
 
There were a number of arguments against implementation of education vouchers and 
these were similar to the civil service report of November 1982 mentioned above. It 
was feared the voucher scheme was incompatible with a common culture and that its 
true costs would be higher than advocates hoped. Ian Gilmour, a minister in the first 
Thatcher government, claimed the public was hostile to the voucher idea. He also said 
that the Prime Minister did not understand intellectual investment as it did not 
produce an immediate cash return. Gilmour believed Thatcherites treated education as 
a simple commodity, when in fact it was more complicated.500 It was also feared that 
                                                        




due to the plummeting morale of teachers in the 1980s, introducing education 
vouchers would not have helped good teachers but only acted as a further disincentive 
to bad ones.501 
 
Lastly, education vouchers were criticised for potentially only standing to benefit 
middle class families. It is a theme that persisted with education reform, Tony Blair 
said in his memoirs that his academy system was different from Conservative reforms 
because he wanted to target poorer children, as opposed to middle class ones.502 
According to voucher opponents, the decision to research different schools, apply 
pressure to teachers for improvements and pay for transport to school and even 
relocate would be pursued more rigorously by middle class parents. Furthermore, 
critics declared education an inert market and by implication one of the areas where 
the state had to intervene. Arthur Seldon said that the economic basis for opposition to 
vouchers was based on this conclusion and the fear that school facilities would be 
inelastic to changing demand.503 This critique, led by civil servants and teaching 
unions, was central in preventing the education voucher from being attempted by the 
Thatcher government. Ultimately Keith Joseph concluded that vouchers would have 
involved ‘hugely controversial and complex legislation, splitting the Conservative 
Party, as well as creating a tumultuous split between the parties, alienating most 
teacher unions, most local authorities, perhaps the churches and leading if we went for 
a pilot scheme possibly to a mouse at the end.’504 
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Pressure Groups and the Education Voucher 
 
The failure of the education voucher idea in 1982-83 can be examined further as an 
example of the underlying dynamics of British society. Who was against the idea and 
why were they so hostile? Those on the New Right considered that the failure to 
implement vouchers showed that education had in essence been captured by the 
producers. Parents and supporters of the voucher scheme (despite FEVER) were not a 
coherent and organised group, teachers were.505 As Secretary of State for Education in 
the early 1970s Margaret Thatcher had noted what she thought was too close an 
association between civil servants in the department and the National Union of 
Teachers (NUT).506  
 
The resistance to education vouchers demonstrated the potency of the education 
establishment as a vested interest in attempting to maintain the status quo. This was 
broadly aligned politically with Labour, who had become the guardian of producer 
groups.507 The limits of democracy had been identified as problems by Hayek and 
Mises who saw free markets as the key component of society.508 Ordoliberals also had 
a long-running dislike for organised groups that influenced the political process.509 
Vested interests as powerful blocks would, according to Hayek and Mises, need 
placating and buying off, restricting market mechanisms and therefore a free capitalist 
society. Hayek thought democracies had become civil associations, when their proper 
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function was to protect civil association.510 This was, to the liberal economic view, in 
effect what had happened in Britain by 1979. Whether it was ‘beer and sandwiches’ in 
Downing Street or the pacifying of teachers, keeping various producer groups happy 
had limited how the market process could operate. Taking on these vested interests 
would be one of the great domestic challenges of Thatcherism (explored further in 
chapter four). After the failure to introduce education vouchers in the first term, 
economic liberal writers rallied vociferously. 
 
Mid-1980s Education Policy: Economic liberals fight back 
 
Looking at economic liberal periodicals in the mid-1980s such as Economic Affairs 
(the IEA’s journal), the spectre of education reform looms large. Whether it was 
lamenting the failure of Keith Joseph to experiment with vouchers, reinforcing the 
merits of vouchers or offering other market orientated strategies for state education, 
economic liberals had much to say on the subject. The IEA had long been proponents 
of education vouchers.511 When Keith Joseph shelved the project the think-tank was 
unhappy. In 1986 head of the IEA Arthur Seldon published his polemic against what 
he saw as the government’s failure, titled The Riddle of the Voucher. An Inquiry into 
the obstacles to introducing choice and competition in state schools. In the same year 
Economic Affairs published a special ‘Symposium on Education Vouchers’. Seldon 
blamed teachers, their unions and the civil service for obstructing Joseph and invoked 
the themes of Public Choice theory.512 Seldon rejected the idea that education was an 
inert market and asserted that parents had the strongest incentive to serve the interests 
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of their children, not the state or local authorities.513 He made several suggestions: 
local experimentation with the scheme, extend the ‘assisted places scheme’ (a 
recommendation by E.G. West) and try the ‘half way house’ proposed by Alan 
Peacock in 1982. The latter idea involved parents ‘contracting out’ of the state system 
receiving a taxable voucher to help pay fees at preferred private schools. The next 
phase in Peacock’s plan would mean all parents would receive a voucher which, if 
they wanted to remain in the state system, could be surrendered to the local authority 
who would then allow them to apply for the school of their choice. This was, in the 
spirit of John Hoskyns’ approach in the late 1970s or Friedman’s broad thinking, 
considered a stepping stone to a wider scheme.514 Seldon also concluded, invoking 
much neo-liberal thinking and in particular that of Hayek, that the failure of the 
scheme in 1982-83 had shown the flaws of British democracy.515 
 
The symposium in Economic Affairs included several articles. John Barnes, in 
‘Political Pressure and Government Inaction’, examined the dynamics that caused the 
bureaucracy and teaching establishment to resist change and thought that the idea had 
not been pushed hard enough by those in the policy making elite. ‘Half Way House or 
Dead End?’ by Richard Henderson set out what he thought was a model for state 
education: purchase of education at the point of entry, payment with money not 
substitutes like vouchers, a more rational definition of what education is, a transfer of 
the subsidy from institution to individual, maximum obstacles to bureaucratic 
interference and maximal voters affected so reforms were difficult to overturn.516  
 
                                                        
513Seldon, Riddle, p. 24. 
514 Seldon, Riddle, pp. 46-50. 
515 Seldon, Riddle, p. 66. 
516 Richard Henderson, ‘Half Way House or Dead End?’, In: Economic Affairs, (6:6, August-




Ray Robinson, in ‘Another Stick to Beat Teachers?’ countered that vouchers would 
further demoralise the teaching profession. Public Choice theorist Gordon Tullock 
described the ‘extreme hostility by civil servants to vouchers’, that bureaucrats were 
no more unethical than anyone else but they pursued their own interest, which often 
meant defending the status quo.517 Finally, in ‘Education Reform: Administrative 
Objections Over-ruled’, E.G. West challenged the criticism that vouchers would be 
impracticable due to buildings, travel costs and administrative issues. He argued that 
transport costs should be factored into the price of the voucher and that independent 
schools were generally cheaper per pupil than state schools, so if pupils migrated then 
the state would make a saving. The suggestion that certain schools may not accept 
students if demand was too high was said by West to still be preferable to the then 
current system, where there was no choice at all.518 
 
Another liberal economic think tank, the Adam Smith Institute (ASI), also joined the 
education debate. They thought education vouchers would be an impractical 
‘overnight revolution’ and therefore proposed an ‘invisible’ voucher scheme.519 The 
ASI recommended what it called ‘micropolitical reforms’: ‘open entry’ to state 
schools and to make the schools more independent in operation, determined by a 
board of governors. Lastly, central funding should be on a basis of the number of 
children enrolled.520 The Adam Smith Institute had always been keener on making 
precise policy prescriptions than the IEA. The ASI claimed its suggestions were 
included in the 1987 Conservative Party Election Manifesto, the basis for the eventual 
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legislation of 1988.521 What both the ASI and IEA agreed on was the initial 1982-83 
proposal was too radical and that a step-by-step approach was required.  
 
The 1988 Education Reform Act 
 
The Thatcher government did not implement the education voucher scheme. Its most 
important piece of legislation on education however, the 1988 Education Reform Act, 
did include a number of elements of the liberal economic critique of the period. The 
results were an attempt to initiate an ‘internal market’ in state schools. A group of 
Conservative MPs published a pamphlet in 1985, which made similar suggestions to 
that of the ASI.522 In 1986 Keith Joseph left the Cabinet and was replaced as 
Secretary of State for Education by Kenneth Baker. He had few liberal economic 
credentials but Margaret Thatcher liked him (as with many of the more ‘One Nation’ 
Tories in her cabinet) for his ‘presentational’ ability. He shared much of the 
Conservative sentiment towards the education establishment of the time. Baker 
believed the voucher scheme had been ‘scuppered’ by civil servants first delaying the 
proposal and then suggesting a ‘super-voucher’ so radical that it frightened the 
Cabinet.523 He aimed to take a more robust approach to the DES. 
 
The eventual legislation introduced the National Curriculum and several reforms that 
were intended to fulfill the new Secretary of State’s two ‘watchwords’: standards and 
choice.524 Baker apparently thought that the CPS Education Study Group was setting 
the agenda regarding education policy recommendations. This was set up in 1980 and 
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included Caroline Cox, John Marks, Fred Naylor, Lawrie Norcross, Stuart Sexton and 
Marjorie Seldon.525 The Education Study Group did exert some influence in pushing 
for more accountability, parent choice and improving standards.526 Four members of 
this group set up the Hillgate Group and published Whose Schools in 1986. It wanted 
to reduce the funding difference between state and private schools and to weaken 
LEAs. 527  The 1987 Conservative Manifesto outlined four areas for reform in 
education. The first was to set up a National Curriculum that would have a 
standardised syllabus and exams for a number of basic subjects. The second was to 
allow head teachers and governing bodies to control their own budgets. Thirdly, 
funding would be provided by the number of pupils enrolled at each school and 
parents would have the opportunity to choose between a number of types of schools, 
such as a pilot scheme for City Technical Colleges. Lastly, schools would have the 
choice to ‘opt-out’ of LEA control, receiving funding from the central government 
and becoming charitable trusts.528  
 
These points drew inspiration from both the CPS Group and the ASI, and provided 
the basis for the 1988 Act. The opt-out scheme had been put together by Kenneth 
Baker, Nigel Lawson and Margaret Thatcher (with four years as Secretary of State for 
Education herself), although Ian Gilmour later said the idea had come from Nick 
Ridley.529 The opt-out system was a way to bypass a layer of bureaucracy and an 
attempt to improve standards by promoting choice and school autonomy. The key link 
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to the previous voucher proposal was per capita funding, which was similar to the 
ASI’s suggestion. Baker believed this was an essential step to achieving the results of 
a voucher system, without actually implementing one.530 This and the other main 
themes of the 1988 legislation was the compromise the Thatcher government made 
with already entrenched interests and neo-liberal recommendations. The National 
Curriculum was an attempt to raise standards to a minimum of what was deemed 
acceptable in core skills such as maths, English and science. The range of schools 
available was intended to promote choice. Funding per child enrolled in a school was 
a ‘follow the money’ measure that had some similarity with the later NHS internal 
market. City Technical Colleges were again institutions that operated outside LEA 
control where pupils who were less academic could gain skills that would equip them 
for the workplace.  
 
A brief appraisal of the 1988 Act shows the aims of the government only partially 
matched those of the New Right. Some market style discipline was introduced into 
state funded education. The reforms were intended to encourage choice and standards 
and reduce the power of LEAs and bureaucratic interference. The National 
Curriculum, however, led to increased centralised control, and reduced the autonomy 
of teachers. The much maligned assessment system of SATs, GCSEs and A-levels has 
seen grades annually increase, classifications adjust accordingly (the top grade in 
GCSEs was altered from A to A*) with the overriding suspicion that standards of 
attainment were not rising in line with the marks, that is to say this was grade 
inflation. Nigel Lawson wrote that central government had to intervene as local 
authorities were incapable of delivering improvements in education. The reforms have 
                                                        




led to more bureaucracy. The International Baccalaureate (IB), based in Switzerland, 
has been increasingly used in the UK during recent years due to disillusionment with 
the state system of assessment.531 This point of view was indicative of one element of 
both the legacy of the Thatcher government and the potential long-term impact of 
Hayekian and Public Choice thinking: a distrust of the state. The opt-out system did 
not prove particularly popular but it was a principle Tony Blair’s government built on, 
allowing schools (mainly in inner city areas) to apply for ‘academy’ status, gaining 
more autonomy and by some measures raising standards. In 2011, one in six state 
schools was an academy. 532  The academy scheme, in keeping with much of 
Thatcherism, suggested the problem with British schools lay with local government. 
Clearly, school autonomy that bypasses some level of bureaucracy is an idea that has 
endured and is seen by politicians as a means to increase standards. Choice in schools 
did increase following the 1988 legislation. Whether standards increased because of 
this is much more difficult to quantify due to the relationship between exam results 
and government policy. A constant criticism of school reforms has been that the 
beneficiaries tend to be middle class families. Alan Peacock said his aim was to 
improve education for the poorest.533 Whether this has been achieved by the reforms 
of the Thatcher government or afterwards, is disputed. What we can say, however, is 
that the eventual education reforms of Thatcherism had some lineage, albeit much 
compromised and diluted, with the ideas of Milton Friedman and latterly neo-liberal 
think-tanks. 
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The Health Reforms of the Thatcher Government 
 
The education reforms of the late 1980s attempted to create choice and greater 
competition within a state-financed system. This was intended to improve efficiency, 
productivity and accountability without privatizing a public service. Standards would 
be improved as good practice ‘followed the money’. Something similar was 
introduced in the National Health Service (NHS) in the third Thatcher term. NHS 
reform, however, represented the absolute limit to the reforms of Thatcherism. If neo-
liberal recommendations encountered resistance from producer groups in education, 
both the health establishment and the public opposed the government in its strategy 
toward the NHS. 
 
The NHS, founded in 1948, incorporated the then system of insurance-based 
healthcare and essentially nationalised hospitals. At the time, ironically in light of 
later events, the medical profession put up some resistance to the formation of the 
NHS, fearing they would lose autonomy and managed to secure the treatment of 
private patients in public hospitals. Hayek identified the role of doctors as key in his 
critique of the increasingly intrusive state. He laid out the sort of argument that 
inspired the Virginia School, writing in 1960 that nationalised healthcare transformed 
doctors from ‘members of a free profession primarily responsible to their patients, 
into paid servants of the state.’534 Nevertheless, the NHS became the central pillar of 
the post-war welfare state and the most enduring reform of the Attlee government. 
Yet the context in which the NHS operated had changed by the 1970s. Britain was not 
well placed to meet the rising costs of free healthcare. In some respects the NHS was 
                                                        




a victim of its own success (life expectancy rose from 64 years in 1940 to 74 years in 
1980) and the rapid developments in science.535 Where as in 1948 drugs such as basic 
(and relatively cheap) antibiotics had only recently been discovered, within the space 
of a few years there were numerous diagnostic techniques and treatments available, 
and were often very expensive.536 The cost weighed heavily on a free service for a 
country the size of Britain.537 The principle, however, remained unassailable when the 
Conservatives took power in 1979 and throughout its time in power.538 Robin Harris 
has written that Margaret Thatcher’s caution at reforming the NHS was justified due 
to its ‘quasi-mythological status’.539 
 
The New Right and Healthcare 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s the New Right concentrated on the defeat of inflation and 
trade union reform. Other areas were pursued but healthcare was not widely tackled. 
Alan Peacock says that as part of his examination of post-war social policy he had 
looked at health vouchers as a way to improve conditions for the poorest. Healthcare 
was so controversial, however, that he moved onto looking at vouchers for 
education.540 It is clear that the whole ethos of writers on the New Right would have 
considered private rather than state provision of healthcare to be more effective. 
Arthur Seldon launched an attack on free health care in his 1968 IEA work After the 
NHS while Hayek characteristically lambasted the British system in The Constitution 
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of Liberty. The Virginia School’s James Buchanan turned his attention to Britain in 
1965, writing The Inconsistencies of the National Health Service for the IEA. In 
keeping with the rest of his Public Choice theory, Buchanan deemed the ‘failure’ of 
the NHS a result of bureaucracy and the ‘structure of the institutions’.541 Buchanan’s 
chosen remedy was a ‘market-like set of institutions which supplement the publicly-
financed, publicly-supplied facilities’ and that would impose ‘limits’.542 This had a 
flavour of the internal market reforms that were enacted 25 years later by the Thatcher 
government. 
 
The NHS and the Thatcher government 
 
In the 2010 general election, David Cameron’s Conservative Party promised to ‘ring-
fence’ NHS spending from cuts. This was a legacy of Thatcherism, which faced 
persistent accusations that free healthcare was under threat. Thatcher had to make 
repeated statements that the NHS was ‘safe’ under the Conservatives but plainly 
many in the media and the public did not agree. It is difficult, however, to trace the 
precise pattern of spending on health during the Thatcher years.  By some estimation 
spending actually increased in real terms from 1979 to 1990. The first Thatcher 
government made an election pledge to honour the Clegg Commission, which 
guaranteed certain increases in public sector wages. Margaret Thatcher wrote that in 
their desire to cut public borrowing and spending, the Clegg Commission ‘boxed in’ 
her new government.543 One way to make a small dent in the funding gap was to raise 
NHS prescription charges, which had not been increased for eight years, during a 
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period of high inflation.544 Charges for drugs had finally been introduced by the 
Conservatives in 1952 and then abolished by Labour in 1964, only to be reintroduced 
by it in 1968 but with several exemption categories.545 This set the tone for the health 
policy of the Thatcher government. They, like previous Conservative administrations, 
were tougher on NHS spending. Prescription charges were to carry on rising during 
the 1980s, as were the costs of dental and eye treatment. 
 
As the economy began to move out of recession in 1982 and after the military victory 
in the Falklands the Prime Minister started to think about re-election. In September 
1982, however, Margaret Thatcher was ‘horrified’ to learn that a Central Policy 
Review Staff (CPRS) report was leaked. The report, written in the summer of 1982, 
had made several controversial suggestions for cuts if the economy did not pick up, 
such as education vouchers and an insurance-based health system (replacement of part 
of the NHS with private insurance according to Nigel Lawson).546 At the core of the 
CPRS report was that the government would need to look at other methods to reduce 
the PSBR in the economic conditions of 1982. Geoffrey Howe had circulated the 
paper to the Cabinet and it was believed that Peter Walker leaked it to The 
Economist.547 Nigel Lawson said that ‘Geoffrey certainly did not recommend all or 
any of these specific proposals’ but that it was the ‘nearest thing to a riot in the history 
of the Thatcher administration.’548 The Prime Minister’s response also shed light on 
why another sensitive idea, the education voucher scheme, was not introduced during 
this pre-election period. 
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The leaked document provoked suspicion and criticism of Thatcher and her 
government. It confirmed to many that the Conservatives were extreme and capable 
of dismantling a key institution of the British welfare state, potentially leaving many 
without access to healthcare, or at least with inferior treatment. The Prime Minister 
acted quickly to dampen the furore caused by a brainstorming document that her 
government had (apparently) no intention of implementing. This led to the well-worn 
rhetoric that the NHS was ‘safe in our hands’, ‘safe with us’ and generally ‘safe’. It 
also hampered the ability of the government to reform the health service. The episode 
invoked a feeling amongst the public that the Thatcher government was planning to 
privatize the health service, possibly by stealth. If not then many thought treatment, 
waiting times, spending, investment, working conditions and pay for NHS workers 
worsened under the Conservatives.549 It was a reputation that the government was 
unable to shake. Right up until the 1997 general election Labour gained from the poor 
standing of the Thatcher and Major governments on health. Investment in the NHS 
was a key plank of the New Labour programme. 
 
In 1983, the Griffiths Report (led by businessman Sir Roy Griffiths) was published 
looking into management of the NHS. The result was a drive to make more use of the 
often scarce resources available to the health service. The Griffiths Report followed in 
the footsteps of the Efficiency Unit, run in the first Thatcher government by fellow 
businessman Sir Derek Rayner. The unit looked at ways of making savings across 









14%.550 After the 1983 Report a number of efforts were made to improve the 
management of budgets. Some services, such as laundry and cleaning in hospitals, 
were put out to private tender while pressure was exerted on clinicians to 
economise.551 Cost Improvement Plans (CIPs) were introduced such as restrictions on 
prescribing. Drugs for self-limiting conditions, such as indigestion or common colds, 
were no longer prescribable on the NHS and therefore ‘blacklisted’.552 Hospitals were 
encouraged to generate income, such as charging for car parking, and to become more 
efficient. The Thatcher government also encouraged private healthcare and there was 
an increased number of non-NHS hospitals built after 1979 as well as a growing 
number of American insurance companies operating in the UK.553 These changes 
indicate the potential influence of neo-liberal thinking, that market forces needed to 
be injected into the state sector to reduce spending and increase efficiency. 
 
Public Health Policy in the 1980s 
 
The popular image of health provision for the poorest in the 1980s was one of neglect. 
There was a perception that waiting times and quality of treatment worsened, often 
delivered by overworked and underpaid staff in crumbling facilities. A number of 
front-page newspaper articles were indicative of the public anxiety toward the NHS in 
1987 and 1988.554 Yet by some estimates spending on the NHS actually increased 
under the Thatcher government, by as much as a third in real terms between 1979 and 
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1990.555 The problem was that the costs of treatment, including state of the art 
diagnostic techniques, procedures and medicines, were growing much faster, as was 
demand. Public Health policy under the Thatcher government was also seen as 
ineffective. 
 
One of the most common accusations aimed at the Conservative government of 
Margaret Thatcher was that it amplified inequality and was indifferent to the plight of 
the poorest in British society. The influential 1980 Black Report on public health 
made the direct correlation between deprivation and health. The report said that 
mortality could be associated with class and income.556 Thatcherism was perceived to 
have done little to address this in its public health strategy and even to have ‘buried’ 
the Black Report.557 Their thinking was, like much else in its programme, focused on 
individual responsibility and choice. Public health policy had two strands; which 
sought to change individual lifestyle by education and through mass media campaigns 
(for instance the 1986 ‘Drugwatch’ campaign that urged youngsters to ‘Just Say 
No’).558 The Conservatives’ attempts to improve public health were criticised for 
being too narrowly based and at times counterproductive. Education, critics said, 
should have been linked to complementary social and public policy and advertising 
was often of poor quality and inconsistent.559 Sir Donald Acheson, the Government’s 
Chief Medical Officer, blamed the increasing number of poverty related illnesses over 
the Thatcher years on poor diet and poor housing.560 If this was the case the increased 
pressure on secondary care had some root in the broader policies of Thatcherism and 
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the associated unemployment of the era. The individual responsibility the 
Conservatives tried to promote in public health may have been ineffective. 
 
The picture of healthcare by the end of the second Thatcher government in 1987 was 
not favourable. Over the previous eight years the Government had initiated numerous 
bold policies, often tied in part with the thinking of liberal economics. Health policy, 
however, despite some efforts to improve efficiency, had been notably immune from 
reform. This torpor reflected the highly sensitive political nature of the NHS and the 
fear that change would alienate the electorate. It appeared that the NHS represented 
the limits of what was politically possible for either a Thatcherite or neo-liberal 
agenda. Yet at the end of the Thatcher years, legislation was passed that finally 
brought change to the health service. Like education, health reform was a 
combination of marketisation measures, while remaining state funded. The result 
reflected the overriding ethos of the Thatcher government and also the broad 
influence of the New Right, which adapted to the political realities of the 1980s. The 
‘internal market’ that was set up in the NHS was an idea taken up from the CPS, 
which was influenced by an American economist.  
 
The NHS and the internal market 
 
The third Thatcher government, between 1987 and 1990, embarked upon a 
programme of housing, education and health reform; areas that had avoided major 
restructuring in the first terms. Coined ‘Social Thatcherism’, a term the Prime 
Minister disliked (presumably as it sounded too similar to socialism), the key changes 






Alain Enthoven, an American economist from Stanford University, published two 
articles: Health Plan: The Only Practical Solution to the Soaring Cost of Medical Care 
in 1980 and Reflections on Improving Efficiency in the National Health Service: An 
American Looks at Health Services Organization and Management in the U.K., the 
latter commissioned by the Nuffield group in 1985. Enthoven tabled a plan for the 
NHS that was taken up by the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and later by the IEA, 
that of an internal market. Enthoven also concluded that the NHS was inherently a 
system that created ‘perverse incentives’ that meant the more funding the state 
allocated, the more problems it received for its trouble.561 David Willetts, head of the 
CPS at this time, became interested in the idea and conducted an inquiry into the 
proposal. The think-tank produced a pamphlet in 1986, NHS. The road to recovery, 
that made several controversial suggestions. These included, along with tax incentives 
for private healthcare, that ‘fees at point of service should be levied on patients except 
those on family credit when they use GP or in-patient services. This would help instil 
some awareness of cost and an incentive to participate in the service.’562 This was, 
however, never likely to be implemented. Although not popular with the New Right 
one of Thatcherism’s mantras on health was that it would remain free at the point of 
use.  
 
Other ideas, however, such as the proposed internal market, were assimilated into 
Secretary of State for Health Ken Clarke’s 1989 White Paper ‘Working For Patients’. 
The internal market reforms were to offer GPs the opportunity to become 
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‘fundholders’, giving them control over their budgets and the ability to purchase 
services from other providers. This principle went across the service as hospitals were 
offered the chance to become self-governing ‘trusts’.563 The idea was that purchasers 
and providers would be separated so that there would be competition to gain contracts 
by health authorities, GPs and even private insurers. This competition, in keeping 
with economic liberal ideology, would increase efficiency and standards while patient 
treatment would ‘follow the money’ - a term the IEA later poured scorn upon. The 
paper also introduced charges for eye and dental tests. The medical establishment 
again resisted the proposed changes, with a poster campaign stating the NHS was 
‘under threat’.564 The IEA identified the medical profession as a vested interest 
resistant to change, criticising their monopoly position and market entry barriers.565 
Nevertheless Ken Clarke launched a robust defence of the reforms, apparently keener 
on them than the Prime Minister, and the proposals were introduced after opposition 
to them was dampened.566  
 
The result of the ‘Working for Patients’ agenda was to focus the health service much 
more on value for money. It was widely accepted that the NHS needed reform by the 
late 1980s and not to have done so would have further impacted on the quality of 
treatment available.567 The changes worked in a similar way to that of the Education 
Reform Act of 1988. Some improvements were made using market style disciplines 
but the main, presumably inadvertent, problem was that it caused a centralisation of 
power, and more intrusive bureaucracy. Despite certain aspects of the reforms being 
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compatible with the New Right, these effects would have been problematic to Public 
Choice proponents. This paradox stemmed from an innate distrust of local authorities 
by the Thatcher government. The result was an administration committed to 
liberalism restricting autonomy, and increasing control as much as yielding it.  
 
In other respects, the health reforms satisfied aspects of liberal economic thinking. 
Competition for funding and greater choice could increase productivity and 
efficiency. Increased entry into the market for providers had the potential to drive up 
standards while GPs and hospitals would become both consumers and producers. 
Reform of the NHS during the Thatcher years was difficult and proved to be one of 
the most intractable problems of the era. Falling well short of what economic liberals 
would favour, the changes made at the end of the 1980s did go some way to instilling 
market disciplines. The IEA, however, soon turned on the reforms by reinforcing its 
criticism that the NHS was a ‘rationing device’ and a monopoly that denied the 
consumer choice.568 It has also called the health service an example of ‘state failure’ 
and called for complete privatization. 569  Nevertheless, the model had been 
established. In health policy, all subsequent governments have followed similar 




The social policy examined here took inspiration from long-term Conservative 
thinking, the political realities of the time and to a limited extent, liberal thinkers and 
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think-tanks. The sale of council houses has been seen as one of the most successful 
reforms of Thatcherism. It was a populist measure that was backed by moderate 
Tories from Anthony Eden to Peter Walker as well as more Thatcherite ones like 
Geoffrey Howe. The scheme did expand home ownership and satisfied the broad 
themes of the New Right. The implementation (large discounts as well as other 
housing subsidies like MIRAS), however, proved to be problematic. In effect the 
government offered different types of subsidy from social housing, which favoured 
different interest groups (homeowners) for political reasons (making traditional 
Labour supporters into Conservative voters) and distorted market forces. This was to 
have some negative long-term consequences: increased homelessness, soaring 
property prices and shortage of supply. For these reasons the policy of council house 
sales, as well as the wider housing policy of the Thatcher government, can be viewed 
as a popular success but with caveats for economic liberals, particularly the focus on 
price of the Austrian School. Another long-term liberal project was the reform of the 
rental market as a means of increasing labour mobility. This was not attempted during 
the Thatcher years. 
 
Education and health policy showed the limits of liberal economic ideas in the 1980s. 
They were both seen as politically sensitive and possibly as inert markets, which had 
to be provided for by government. After the frustration of unsuccessfully proposing 
education vouchers and increased private provision of healthcare, neo-liberals adapted 
to the obstructive climate that reform entailed. Recommendations by the CPS and ASI 
for internal market orientated policies were reflected in the 1988 Education Reform 
Act and 1989 Working For Patients white paper. This legislation attempted to 




ethos of this period has provided the platform for the changes introduced in the 
subsequent 20 years and feeds into the thesis that there exists a ‘Thatcherite 
consensus’.  
 
The influence of liberal economic ideas on the case studies examined in this chapter 
was less apparent compared to economic policy. There was a broad strand of 
Hayekian thinking in evidence in promoting ownership and attempting to make the 
state more accountable and leaner. Other classic liberal recommendations, such as 
private provision of education and healthcare, were never options or seriously 
entertained by the Thatcher government. Even more typically neo-liberal ideas such 
as Friedman’s education vouchers were deemed politically impossible. Education and 
health reform met with fierce resistance from vested interests, and in the case of the 
NHS by suspicion from the public. The wider implications of this institutional 
opposition will be looked at in the next chapter. Council house sales had as much to 
do with long-term Conservative thinking, which from the 1920s had prescribed a 
‘property-owning democracy’. Nevertheless the results of right to buy, and to a lesser 
extent the NHS and education internal market reforms, did have some semblance with 
the general aims of neo-liberalism. That is to say the state encouraged private 
provision for political purposes (housing) or created markets where they barely 
existed (health and education), while focusing on broader liberal themes as opposed to 









Chapter Four: Vested Interests, Monopolies and Thatcherism. Trade 
Union Reform, Privatization, Big Bang and Broadcasting Policy.  
 
Neo-liberals perceived that by the 1970s the British economy was impeded by a 
number of entrenched interests, seen most clearly during the Winter of Discontent. To 
Austrians like Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises this was also a by-product of 
democracy, where organized groups managed to exert influence over politicians who 
then attempted to satisfy their demands.570 This was most obvious in the Labour 
Party’s relationship with the trade unions as well as other producer groups. Influence 
of this kind would, according to the New Right, trigger government action that would 
distort markets and prices, and drive up inflation and potentially unemployment. A 
leading member of the Treasury for most of the Thatcher years, Lord Burns, has said 
the Prime Minister and Nigel Lawson were naturally hostile to organised entities in 
general, whether this was the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) or the trade 
unions.571 In addition, one of the broad aims of Thatcherism was reasserting order and 
government autonomy. This included reducing the kind of disorder seen during 
picketing in strikes and allowing government to make decisions without 
overwhelming pressure from various interest groups. It is this dual purpose identified 
by Andrew Gamble in his critique of Thatcherism: ‘The Free Market and the Strong 
State’. This made a link between the Thatcher government and Freiburg neo-liberals 
of the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, Thatcherites characterised the British state in the 
1970s as both too big and too weak.572 Crucially though, ordoliberals generally 
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advocated measures that they considered ‘market compatible’.573 It may be, however, 
that by restructuring the British economy the Thatcher government reduced the power 
of some vested interests but created others. As noted in the last chapter the Thatcher 
government’s success in achieving liberal economic goals varied considerably. This 
chapter aims to show that it ranged from effectively nullifying a previously powerful 
group’s influence (trade union reform) to eliminating one but allowing another to 
appear (the City, privatization) and lastly, failing in its attempt to tackle one interest 
(the BBC) yet permitting another to form (BSkyB). 
 
Neo-liberalism, vested interests and monopolies 
 
Economic liberals dislike the impact of vested interests on markets. Groups influence 
policy makers, sometimes as a quid pro quo in the democratic process. They can 
behave as ‘rent-seekers’, elevate prices and raise barriers to market entry. Some 
liberals wanted to reduce formation of monopolies, whether publically or privately 
owned. Although theories of monopolies and competition in markets are complex, it 
is worth setting out some of the broad principles here.  
 
Where the Hayekian and Friedmanite strands of thought converged was on the 
deleterious implications on markets of bureaucratic intervention. Although developing 
his own brand of economics, Friedman became an ardent proponent of the political 
principles found in The Road to Serfdom.574 He explained one of the ways in which 
he thought government was ‘the problem’ through the influence of special interest 
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groups: ‘Government actions often provide substantial benefits to a few while 
imposing small costs on many.’575 Austrians like Hayek thought that government 
acted as a civil association, when ideally it should simply protect civil association.576 
Likewise Hayek believed, and in this respect he agreed with Chicagoans, that 
monopolies were often created by governments, either directly or indirectly.577 Once 
monopoly status was achieved, which the associated vested interest lobbying 
preserved, it could only worsen when an industry was state owned. Early neo-liberal 
thought, however, converged on the belief that monopolies should be prevented and 
competition promoted. Hayek, writing to Walter Lippman in the 1930s, did show 
some interest in using corporate law to limit the size of large corporations.578 Hayek’s 
contemporaries at the Freiburg School, the ordoliberals, took a more activist line on 
these issues. The ordoliberal model, used in part by post-war West German 
governments, had price and markets at its core, but believed the state should intervene 
to prevent monopoly formation. 579  Ordoliberals advocated competition rules 
embedded in law, rather than discretionary and often political decisions.580 Wilhelm 
Röpke, in particular, had a lifelong interest in wanting to curb cartels and 
monopolies. 581  He believed that capitalism had fallen into disrepute because 
competition had been corrupted by monopoly, and because sectional interests had 
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exploited state power.582 The ‘social market economy’ constructed by the ordoliberals 
had at its core a strong state, tasked with maintaining competition and monopoly, and 
constrained by law: the Rechtsstaat. 583 Daniel Stedman-Jones has identified the 
convergence between the ordoliberals and the ‘first’ Chicago School of the 1930s. For 
instance, Chicagoan Henry Simons envisaged a role for the state in preventing 
monopoly.584 Ben Jackson has also described how many of the early neo-liberals, 
generally including Hayek but exempting Mises, produced literature in the 1930s and 
1940s that advocated state regulation to break up large corporations.585 Indeed Simons 
wrote in 1934 that ‘the great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms’.586 
This was to conflict markedly with later neo-liberal thinking, that privileged the 
sovereignty of the individual over the wider community. 
 
The views of neo-liberals toward monopolies and competition diverged in the 1950s. 
If the early neo-liberal activist state became associated with German ordoliberals both 
Austrians and Chicagoans subsequently took a more laissez-faire position. Hayek had 
included some minimal interventionist inclinations in Road to Serfdom but he came to 
represent more utopian thinking. Although Hayek feared state power, he never 
confronted private power and saw no need for anti-trust and anti-monopoly policies. 
He believed that the power of large companies should be constrained by 
competition.587 Other Austrian School thinkers articulated their belief that a monopoly 
like a trade union is more dangerous than an enterprise monopoly due to the former’s 
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legal privileges and powers of coercion.588 Hayek thought the sort of models derived 
by ordoliberals like Eucken would only serve to increasingly undermine the freedom 
of the individual. 589  Rather than enforcing competition, which Hayek thought 
‘absurd’, Austrians believed the restraint of trade should be prevented. 590  For 
Austrians, it was not monopoly but only the prevention of competition which was 
harmful.591 Another neo-liberal in the Austrian tradition although by this time often 
deemed a ‘libertarian’, Murray Rothbard, attacked the concept of ‘natural monopoly’ 
in the 1960s. Many thought that the provision of some essential public goods, such as 
water, were natural monopolies and should be controlled and administered by central 
government. This was dismissed by Rothbard, as well as the idea of ‘collective 
goods’, as fictions perpetuated by those with a vested interest in maintaining 
privileged positions.592 Rothbard represented a newer generation of Austrian (in the 
tradition, not nationality) thinkers that took a more uncompromising line than his 
predecessors like Hayek. Rothbard believed the state an ‘anti-social instrument’ that 
should be whittled down to its prime function of upholding the rule of law.593 
 
The general stance of the Chicago School towards monopoly changed under the 




589 Artur  Woll,  ‘Freiheit  durch  Ordnung:  Die  gesellschaftspolitische  Leitidee  im  Denken  von 
Walter Eucken und Friedrich A. von Hayek’, (‘Freedom Through Order: The Guiding Principle of 
Economic Policy in Walter Eucken’s and Friedrich A. von Hayek’s Thought’), In: ORDO. Jahrbuch 





591 Alexander H. Shand, The Capitalist Alternative: An Introduction to Neo-Austrian Economics, 
(Frome: Wheatsheaf, 1984), pp. 130. 
592 Thomas J.Dilorenzo, ‘The Myth of Natural Monopoly’, In: The Review of Austrian Economics, (9:2, 
1996), p. 43, Shand, Neo-Austrian Economics, pp. 101-103. 




Group’ and ‘Anti-Trust Project’.594 Guided by George Stigler, Chicagoans came to 
believe that monopolies were sustained by government but that large companies could 
replicate the competition function.595 As a result Friedman also became more relaxed 
about the appearance of monopolies, writing in 1962 that it is normal in most markets 
to observe ‘giants and pygmies side by side.’596 Chicagoans also advocated the best 
action to counter vested interests and monopoly was to reduce market entry barriers. 
According to Mark Skousen, however, the Austrian and Chicagoan positions were 
different because of their broader philosophical positions. Chicagoans generally 
believed in the possibilities of equilibrating ‘perfect competition’ while Austrians saw 
markets as dynamic, spontaneous and non-equilibrating.597 Austrians saw attempts to 
restrict predatory practices by regulation or oversight as flawed, as ‘inappropriate 
equilibrium theorizing’ and serving only to impede information and efficiency in a 
particular market.598 So while the Austrians came to embody a position that advocated 
competition by reducing both entry barriers and regulation, the Chicagoans moved 
someway, but never fully to that ideal.599 This was, according to Skousen, because 
Chicagoans sometimes supported policies prohibiting price fixing and mergers, and 
even worked directly with (the US) government in making ‘anti-trust’ laws.600  
 
The various strands of neo-liberalism, then, would agree that monopoly and vested 
interests had injurious effects on markets. They could also converge on the 
desirability of private rather than state ownership, as well as many producers 
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operating in a market as possible. Lastly, information flows via the price mechanism 
would operate more efficiently if monopoly formation and special interest group 
influence were reduced. How this may be achieved, however, was different for each 
school. Ordoliberals believed action should be taken to break up monopolies while 
Friedman and Stigler thought reducing entry barriers was sufficient and moved away 
from regulation from the 1950s. Austrians shared these liberalising, rather than 
legislating, instincts, but often took a more utopian or ‘hardline’ point of view.601 
 
A government committed to the tenets of economic liberalism may have been 
expected to confront vested interests and monopolies. There is, however, little 
evidence to suggest that the Thatcher government broadly set out to do this.602 There 
was no master-plan to tame vested interests. Nevertheless, economic liberals in the 
Conservative Party, not least the Prime Minister, did have a predisposition to this end. 
The thinking of the Party had long been influenced by the work of Edmund Burke, 
who stressed the importance of multiple sources of power and influence as well as of 
a pluralistic society.603 The Conservatives were usually considered less beholden to 
special interests – at least beyond big business - in comparison with their counterparts 
in the Labour Party.604 With this combination of long-term Conservative thinking, the 
pressure exerted by trade unions in the 1970s, as well as the renewed interest in 
liberal economics by the time the Thatcher government came to power, it may have 
been anticipated that they would attempt to attenuate the influence of vested interests. 
This will be looked at by examining several such groups: trade unions, the 
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nationalised industries, the BBC and the City of London. Margaret Thatcher had a 
long-standing antipathy to trade unions as well as the BBC.605 Documents show how 
privatization of nationalised industries was a political objective from the early years 
of the Thatcher government while the emphasis on trade made financial liberalization 
another implicit goal. Taken together these policies may have represented a cross-
section of a broad, but ill-defined, effort to reduce the power of entrenched interests. 
This chapter explores to what extent this assertion was true.  
 
Trade Union Reform 
 
The most urgent problem the new Conservative government had with overbearing 
special interest groups in 1979 was the trade union movement. The influence of trade 
unions had increased over the twentieth century to the point when one of the abiding 
memories of 1978 and 1979 in Britain is still the widespread strikes that crippled the 
country, from Ford workers to gravediggers to refuse collectors. Revisionists have 
questioned the commonly held assumption that the unions wielded as much power as 
has often been thought, or if there was even a series of crises in the 1970s.606 That 
assertion, however, is at odds with the statistics, and that both Labour and 
Conservative leaders were ‘governing against pressure’ from the unions.607 The 
amount of days lost due to strikes over this period, for example, was thirty-one times 
greater in 1972, compared to what it was in 1991.608 In addition, successive incomes 
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policies and the high position in political life accorded to trade union leaders reflected 
their pre-Thatcher influence. ‘Beer and sandwiches’ at Downing Street to work 
through the issues of the day was a cliché of corporatist Britain, but a telling one 
nevertheless. What is clear, though, is that the problems of the 1970s and in particular 
the strikes of 1978 and 1979 gave the Conservative Party the chance to demonise the 
unions and play on the public’s widespread frustration with them. Robert Saunders 
has identified the importance of the ‘crisis’ narrative formulated by Margaret 
Thatcher in the 1970s and how her political programme was initially based on its 
diagnostic, rather than prescriptive nature.609 This crisis narrative was exploited 
remorselessly over the next decade, while the antipathy towards trade unions helped 
to discredit the Labour Party for a generation.610  
 
Development of the trade union movement 
 
The rise of the trade union movement from the mid-1800s was consolidated by 
legislation in granting it privileges in 1871 and 1875, and in particular the 1906 Trade 
Disputes Act as a result of the Taff Vale railway action of 1901.611  The impact of the 
then recently formed Labour Party can be seen in the latter.612 Therein lay the 
seemingly intractable problem Labour had when actually in power. It was backed by 
and represented the trade union movement and would be in a difficult position if the 
parliamentary party opposed the union leadership. George Dangerfield, in The 
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Strange Death of Liberal England (1935), was scathing about the breadth of the 1906 
law. He wrote, ‘The Liberal Government, crowned with the laurels of an unparalleled 
victory at the polls, seemed unaware that a new and uncompromising voice had been 
added to its deliberations.’ He went onto to say that ‘Labour was jubilant. The most 
powerful Government in history had been compelled, by scarcely more than a single 
show of power to yield to the just demands of organized workers.’613 Austrian 
economic liberal Joseph Schumpeter wrote in 1943 that the Act gave unions 
‘astonishing privileges’. He believed the law ‘practically amounted to enacting that 
trade unions could do no wrong – this measure in fact resigned to the trade unions 
part of the authority of the state and granted to them a position of privilege.’614 Yet 
industrial organization was crucial in both war efforts. Keith Middlemas, in his 
exhaustive study on the post-war British economy wrote that ‘organized labour 
remained on the margin of actual power until government needed it again in 1940, as 
it had in 1915-18.’615  
 
The influence of the trade unions became consolidated in Britain after the Second 
World War, in particular after the Attlee government’s programme of nationalisation. 
The Conservatives had put some corporations into state hands, such as the National 
Grid and the BBC under Stanley Baldwin in the 1920s, but it was a policy that was to 
become synonymous with Labour. During its period in government between 1951 and 
1964, Conservative leaders have been charged with showing a degree of 
accommodation and co-operation with trade union leaders not seen before or after. 
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The dominant One Nation strand of the Party wanted good relations with unions, 
between employers and management and refrained from legislating in this area.616 
One Nation Tories may have sought to limit the inequality that could threaten 
capitalism and parliamentary democracy and drive some towards Marxism. It was in 
keeping with ideas of enlightened self-interest to mollify the trade unions.617 In 
addition politicians such as Harold Macmillan’s and Anthony Eden’s experiences in 
World War I, as well as their having seen the effects of the Depression in the 1930s, 
gave them a certain sympathy and even respect for the working class.618 Former civil 
servant and author Alec Cairncross, however, believed the Conservatives relationship 
was not as harmonious during this era and that the Party ‘was never able to obtain the 
agreement of the trade unions…to a period of wage restraint.’619 Some in the 
Conservative Party were concerned at the growth in union influence in their thirteen 
years in government. In 1958 the Inns of Court Conservative Association produced A 
Giant’s Strength, which advocated taming growing trade union power.620 During the 
following decades, ‘wildcat’ strikes began to proliferate.621 Days lost through strikes 
rose from 2.277 million days in 1964 to 4.69 million in 1968 and to a peak of 23.909 
million during 1972 (as a comparison by 1991 the figure was down to 0.761 
million).622 From the legislation of the late nineteenth century until the 1970s, trade 
unions appeared to be exerting ever greater influence over political decisions. Hayek 
had identified the growth in power he believed organized labour increasingly enjoyed 
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were steps towards excessive state control, while warning of the effects of ‘unlimited 
democracy’ on individual freedom.623 
 
Harold Wilson, recognizing that industrial relations needed improvement, backed 
Barbara Castle’s 1969 White Paper, In Place Of Strife. It aimed to bring unofficial 
strikes to an end by proposing ballots before action, and also made provision for an 
Industrial Relations Court to settle disputes. There was vehement opposition to In 
Place Of Strife, from trade union leaders and within the Labour Party itself. Margaret 
Thatcher later wrote, outlining the neo-liberal linkage between vested interests and 
politics, that Callaghan ‘had built his career on giving the trade unions whatever they 
wanted. So I felt that he was to blame, in a uniquely personal way, for the scenes of 
the winter of 1978/79.’624 Wilson’s relatively moderate stance was not helped by 
growing left wing inclinations within his Party and the trade union movement as a 
whole during this period.625  
 
The 1970s: widespread strikes and the crises of state power 
 
The governments of the 1960s had attempted to restrain wage demands but had not 
been able to prevent strikes. Labour had blinked when they had the chance to alter 
their relationship with the unions in 1969. The underlying problem for the Party was 





624 Thatcher, Path, p. 444. 
625 Seamus Milne, The Enemy Within. The Secret War Against the Miners, (London: Verso, 2004), p. 
14, Richard Hyman, ‘Trade Unions, the Left and the Communist Party in Great Britain’, In: Comrades 
and Brothers: Communism and Trade Unions in Europe, W. Waller, S. Courtois and M. Lazar, eds., 




whole by the immunities granted in the 1906 Act. The Conservatives were elected in 
1970 and tried to deal with the issue in one piece of legislation, the 1971 Industrial 
Relations Act. Put together by then Solicitor General Geoffrey Howe and Secretary of 
State for Employment Robert Carr, the Act covered much the same ground as In Place 
Of Strife, while also limiting authorized strike action. The law was not widely 
enforced, however, undermining the credibility of the Heath government and added to 
the growing divide between it and the trade union movement. 
 
After changing course at the end of 1971 - one of several derided ‘U-turns’ - the 
Heath government struggled to control inflation through a prices and incomes policy. 
His government was fatally damaged by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 
strikes between 1972 and 1974, in conjunction with the 1973 oil crisis that caused a 
surge in inflation and increased the cost of energy. For a time in the late 1970s, James 
Callaghan’s Labour government had managed to reduce inflation with a nominal 5% 
wage limit, during the ‘social contract’ period. The policy unraveled in late 1978 as 
the Winter of Discontent took hold amid widespread strikes. This gave Margaret 
Thatcher the rhetorical space to appear to offer an alternative.626  
 
The New Right and the trade unions 
 
The Conservatives in the late 1970s were guarded about how they would tackle the 
problem of trade union militancy. While in other areas they would overtly profess 
interest in liberal economic recommendations, such as monetarist economics, when it 
came to industrial relations the Party had to tread carefully. Conservative politicians 
                                                        




were scarred by the events of the Heath government. They had attempted to deal with 
the issue in one law, the 1971 Act, but been humiliated by the non-compliance and the 
strikes that followed. Yet if there was one topic the New Right had produced reams of 
material on it was trade union reform. 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) concentrated 
primarily on two issues: monetarism to combat high inflation and trade union 
reform.627 In 1975, the IEA reprinted a pamphlet titled The Theory of Collective 
Bargaining by a neo-liberal contemporary of Hayek, W.H. Hutt. Originally written in 
1931, Hutt wrote that trade unions had operated as a ‘regressive and impoverishing 
influence’ and that the strike-threat had led to a diminishing of Britain’s power in the 
world. Hutt said that the main beneficiaries had been union hierarchies, that leaders 
were well paid in comparison with the rank and file, and the politicians who profited 
by supporting them.628 Targeting union leaders and not rank and file members was a 
consistent liberal device. Friedrich Hayek criticized unions as being organized 
minorities pursuing self-interest at the expense of the wider community, who pay in 
terms of both monopoly prices and disorder. Hayek also said that collective 
bargaining worsened conditions for highly skilled workers who had the same position 
as others in the union.629 
 
The Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), founded in 1974 by Keith Joseph, was initially 
charged with examining the West German Soziale Marktwirtshaft (social market 
economy). Interestingly in light of how the Thatcher government would treat 
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monopoly and competition, Joseph initially planned to name the CPS the ‘Erhard 
Foundation’, after the West German leader and political embodiment of 
ordoliberalism. 630   Joseph identified good industrial relations as key to West 
Germany’s success.631 Nigel Lawson also showed interest in the German model of 
‘work’s councils’, although the subsequent Thatcher government’s attitude to 
industrial relations looked very different from the more consensual German 
approach.632 Joseph addressed the Bow Group in 1979 by framing the issue in a long-
term and declinist context. ‘If the debate is to be productive and honest, setting the 
union problem in the context of our economic decline, rather than at the centre of 
today’s crisis [is crucial].’633 The Bow Group, particularly under the leadership of 
Peter Lilley, also identified the importance of reducing union influence. The Group 
formulated an ‘Alternative Manifesto’ ahead of the February 1974 election and later 
‘Lessons for Power’ that argued against incomes policies.634  
 
Neo-liberal themes and Trade Union Reform 
 
Pro-market economists and writers targeted trade union reform as an urgent priority in 
the 1960s and 1970s for a number of reasons. The most obvious one was that Britain 
suffered a series of debilitating strikes that hampered the economy and caused social 
unrest. The second was that excessive wage demands fuelled inflation. According to 
neo-liberals like Milton Friedman, intervention in the economy from government 
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would cause inflation.635 Neo-liberals thought vested interests affected markets in a 
number of ways. The collective power of trade unions restricted market entry to other 
producers through practices such as the closed shop, excessive wage demands and 
potentially by picketing. Unions collectively prevented competition and therefore 
choice for consumers.  Barriers to entry would hamper productivity and cause price 
distortions. Power rested with the producer. Liberals wanted to shift this emphasis 
towards the consumer. Trade unions also impacted on liberal themes of maintaining 
the sanctity of contracts and respecting the sovereignty of the individual.  Some on the 
New Right believed that unions priced out new labour and had an impoverishing 
effect, while impeding the growth of the economy as a whole. These last points were 
adopted by Margaret Thatcher in the 1970s.636  
 
Trade Union Reform: the Conservative Party in Opposition 
 
The strikes of the 1970s energized the Conservative Party as a whole, not simply its 
free market wing. Cecil Parkinson later wrote that the coal mining industry in 
particular ‘was given a privileged position and it abused the privilege.’637 When 
returned to opposition many in the Party were keen not to alienate voters with tough 
rhetoric towards the unions, but behind the scenes there was furious debate on how 
they should be tackled. The work done by the Conservatives in opposition between 
1974 and 1979 is documented in detail elsewhere in this thesis (see chapter one). The 
Right Approach (1976) and The Right Approach to the Economy (1977) were both 









as ‘We shall need to use every available means of making collective bargaining a 
more orderly and responsible process. Our purpose must be to exclude the need for 
any further resort to a formal incomes policy’ and ‘If, however, we should find some 
within the ranks of organised labour who are determined to mount a direct political 
challenge to a newly elected Conservative government, we say now quite plainly that 
they will be resisted firmly and decisively.’638 The unpublished Stepping Stones 
project was more combative and forthright towards industrial relations. 
 
John Hoskyns, in charge of Stepping Stones, believed the trade union issue had to be 
dealt with urgently and comprehensively. Richard Ryder, then political secretary to 
Margaret Thatcher, described Hoskyns’ approach (as well as that of Alfred Sherman 
at the CPS) as ‘hard at it’ and impatient for change compared to many in the Party.639 
Chris Patten, head of the Conservative Research Department (CRD) did not want to 
estrange voters and thought the emphasis should be on other policies.640 Hoskyns 
accused Patten, in a 1978 letter, of ignoring the union issue.641 Shadow Secretary for 
Employment, Jim Prior, also took a more moderate stance towards the unions.  
 
This was at odds with Conservatives who wanted to confront the unions, such as 
Geoffrey Howe, Nigel Lawson and Keith Joseph. Lawson wrote a letter to Joseph in 
1978 complaining that the unions should be higher up the agenda and that the 
Stepping Stones project was drifting.642 Geoffrey Howe set out a key component of 
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the Conservative trade union strategy as early as 1977. It echoed the thoughts of 
Hutt’s 1975 IEA pamphlet. Howe thought that a fruitful tactic could be to identify 
‘enemies’ in the battle with the unions. He said that both trade union leaders and the 
Labour government should be singled out as adversaries, whereas rank and file trade 
union members and Labour supporters should be framed separately.643 This became a 
key element in the policy of the Thatcher government. Although it was the Prime 
Minister herself who was often viewed as identifying enemies and relishing battles 
here it can be seen that the apparently more placid Howe was articulating this 
strategy.644 In addition, the insinuation itself, that trade union members were more 
moderate than their leaders, may have been false.645  
 
Although attempting to appear reasonable towards trade unions in opposition, 
Margaret Thatcher’s real thoughts on them were much tougher. A document from 
1978 demonstrated how the future Prime Minister underlined text from a speech from 
Friedrich Hayek that berated the unions, such as that ‘nobody ought to have the right 
to force others to strike’ and that unions were ‘abusing this power which the law has 
granted to them.’646 The 1979 Conservative Election Manifesto said trade unions were 
a ‘single powerful interest group’, led by ‘a minority of extremists’ that Labour had 
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allowed to ‘abuse individual liberties and to thwart Britain’s chances of success.’647 
The manifesto made three proposals. Firstly the limiting of picketing, secondly a 
review of the closed shop and thirdly a wider use of secret ballots, provided for by 
public funds. Coming soon after the Winter of Discontent, the issue of industrial 
relations was clearly a major one in 1979. 
 
The First Thatcher Government’s Trade Union Reforms 
 
James Prior continued in the role he had held in opposition and became Margaret 
Thatcher’s first Secretary for Employment in 1979. Prior was seen as more open to 
compromise with trade union leaders and less hostile than others in the Party, 
including the Prime Minister. He described his difficult task of introducing reform in 
his memoirs. ‘I was having to fight on two fronts – I was striving to impose some 
form of legislation on the unions while repelling the right wing demands for extreme 
measures. It was an uncomfortable stance, but made me look the reasonable man and 
therefore difficult for the TUC to attack.’648 While in opposition, Nicholas Ridley 
chaired a group on the nationalised industries. Ridley had written a report on the trade 
unions after the demise of the Heath government, which was leaked to the The 
Economist in 1978. The report concluded that a new Conservative government would 
face a union challenge within its initial two years in power, probably from coal, 
electricity or dock workers. The Government was advised to choose its opponents 








also outlined the need for mobile police tactics.649 Leonard Neal advised Margaret 
Thatcher on union reform early in the first term and did not see eye to eye with 
Prior.650 Lord Ryder, as we have seen, explained how free market liberals close to the 
Prime Minister like Alfred Sherman and John Hoskyns, urged a tough stance towards 
the trade unions.651 The pressure on Prior (as well as Margaret Thatcher) from the 
likes of Ridley, Neal, Sherman and Hoskyns as well as Nigel Lawson, was strong. Yet 
Prior used this to his advantage and the union leaders may have been more flexible as 
a result.  
 
After the fact there has been some suggestion that the Thatcher government had a pre-
planned strategy towards trade union reform. Prior wrote in his memoirs that he 
argued for ‘step-by-step’ reform.652 There is, however, little evidence that this was 
part of a pre-conceived grand plan.653 What we can say, however, is that the 
Conservatives proceeded with some caution and gradually eroded union privileges 
when the opportunity arose. The first step was the 1980 Employment Act.  
 
1980 Employment Act 
 
There was some evidence to show the public backed trade union reform. Polls sent by 
Party researcher Keith Britto to the Prime Minister in November 1979 suggested a 
majority of union members themselves backed the proposed government reforms.654 
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A 1980 CRD report carried out by Party Chairman Peter Thorneycroft, later 
commented on by The Times, showed many rank and file trade unionists supported 
change. It stated that 47% of union members (against 43% that disagreed) believed 
reform of trade union law to be in the best interests of the country. The paper also 
showed strong support to ban secondary picketing in both non trade unionists (70%) 
as well as union members (59%).655 This may have been less to do with market 
liberalization than the hope that a repeat of the Winter of Discontent might be avoided 
and frustration at the loss of income suffered when workers were forced out in 
supposed solidarity with fellow trade unionists with whom, in reality, they had little 
sympathy. 
 
Jim Prior himself mused on the opposition’s failure in government, alluding to the 
weight of the vested interest on its closest political representatives: ‘It may be that 
because of the Labour Party’s relationship with the unions it is not possible for a 
Labour Government ever to take the necessary steps, even though in their hearts many 
members of Labour Governments know that they should do so.’656 Prior, mindful of 
the failure of the 1971 Act, charted a more moderate course. The eventual legislation 
modified the law on the closed shop, made most secondary picketing illegal, removed 
immunity from trade union officials organizing certain secondary strikes and provided 
public money for secret ballots.657 Prior devised legislation that was politically 
possible at that point with the recent past in mind. In this sense, like so much else in 
Thatcherism, the policy was opportunistic.  
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The legislation introduced by the Thatcher government was part of a wider strategy 
that reduced trade union influence and would satisfy most strains of neo-liberalism. 
After two years of Conservative government, however, Hayek was unhappy at the 
progress being made on the issue. He commented on trade union reform on the BBC 
programme ‘Panorama’ in March 1981, criticising Prior. ‘The minister in charge of it 
is not in favour of radical alteration. I have no hope that so long as the matter is in his 
hands the necessary things will be done.’658 What was not appreciated by many at the 
time, however, was that Prior’s role and the incremental approach, intended or 
otherwise, was important in reducing the power of organised labour. There were 
several other components that reduced its power as a vested interest, but that this early 
legislation survived played one part. 
 
Prior was succeeded at the Department of Employment by the more Thatcherite 
Norman Tebbit, who later wrote that the 1982 Employment Act was the highlight of 
his political career, concentrating the legislation on union immunity from liability in 
tort. 659  Tebbit wrote, ‘I have no doubt that the (1982) Act was my greatest 
achievement in Government and I believe it has been one of the principal pillars on 
which the Thatcher economic reforms have been built.’660 The Act introduced stricter 
controls on the closed shop and narrowed the definition of a ‘trade dispute’ to reduce 
the legal protection available to union officials. It removed the immunity from trade 
unions in four cases: when action was outside the new definition of a dispute, 
unlawful picketing, unlawful secondary picketing and if it was taken to impose union 
membership. The 1982 law was significant because it removed privileges that had 
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existed since the 1906 Trades Disputes Act.661 The 1982 legislation saw a tightening 
of that which was introduced in 1980 and signified the next step in Conservative trade 
union reform. Despite the hostile protestations from Labour, the opposition was in 
disarray by 1982.  
 
The gradual erosion of the ability of organised labour to disrupt the economy through 
legislation may appear to be an example of the ‘free economy-strong state’ thesis. The 
importance of the changes in law, however, have not been considered crucial by some 
historians. Martin Holmes thought that the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts were not 
as significant on industrial relations as the abandonment of both corporatism and an 
incomes policy during the first Thatcher government.662 Certainly the ending of the 
arrangement between government and industry about setting prices and income levels 
was important in giving the market more credence. It was also notice that the 
influence of a vested interest like the trade unions was not going to be as close to 
central policy making, as well as setting the government on a more adversarial course 
as communication ceased with union leaders. The 1980 and 1982 Acts, however, 
demonstrated that the government was going to take legal steps to reduce union power 
and the strike threat to the country and its economy. The legislation showed that 
agreement and voluntarism could not be trusted without the force of law. They rolled 
back the privileges of 1906 that had been the core component of union militancy 
throughout the century and partially curbed the restrictive practices of the closed 
shop, strikes without secret ballots and secondary picketing. In addition, like the 
ending of exchange controls in 1979 economic policy, the legislation acted as a signal 
that the government was going to reduce the power of trade unions and privilege 
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market forces. The 1980 and 1982 Acts were reinforced by subsequent legislation. A 
rules-based system of reducing political interference in the economy is an ordoliberal 
theme, despite the actual arrangement between business and unions in post-war 
Germany being less formal. 
 
The 1984 Trade Union Act set out that industrial action could only be taken after a 
majority in a secret ballot, made every voting member of a union’s governing body be 
re-elected after five years and insisted unions keep a register of all members’ names 
and addresses.663 The erosion of union power was to culminate in the miners’ strikes. 
It took longer than the Ridley Report envisaged, five years as opposed to two, but the 
NUM took on the Government in 1984. In the popular consciousness, this was the 
focal point of the confrontation between the Thatcher government and the trade union 
movement.  
 
The National Coal Board (NCB)’s announcement of accelerated pit closures 
prompted strikes, incited by NUM leader Arthur Scargill, across the country in March 
1984. The action lasted for a year and violent picketing reached a peak at Orgreave in 
Yorkshire in June 1984. The violence was robustly fought by ‘mobile policing’, as 
had also been recommended in the Ridley Report. The schism in the union between 
the UDM (Union of Democratic Mineworkers) and NUM in Nottinghamshire and 
South Derbyshire, the lack of a ballot for action and Scargill’s belligerent stance gave 
credence to the long-standing Conservative assertion that union leaders were extreme 
and did not represent the views of rank and file members.664 Trade union legislation 
itself was not necessarily crucial in the strike as secondary picketing laws were 
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flagrantly ignored.665 Secretary of State for Energy Peter Walker vetoed using the 
recent laws as he thought this could increase sympathy for the striking miners from 
other workers.666 Also important was that after 1979 courts were more inclined to 
interpret the previous legislation (for instance the police had the same powers in 1984 
and 1985 as they did before 1979) in a way that restricted the privileges that unions 
enjoyed.667 The determination of the Government to support the police during the 
strike does give more credence to the ‘strong state’ principle. The new laws were to 
be more important subsequently. The resolve of the government, the police methods 
used and the flawed strategy of the NUM were all central. The identification of the 
union leadership as ‘enemies’ and the tactics of Scargill himself (calling a strike in the 
Spring, without a ballot and encouraging violent picketing) all played their part in the 
eventual outcome. Defeating the miners’ was of huge significance to the overall 
programme of Thatcherism. David Owen identified the Prime Minister’s role in this 
in April 1989. 
 
But the legislation would, of itself, have been insufficient. A successful 
confrontation with mindless militancy was the essential buttress. Until Arthur 
Scargill was soundly and humiliatingly defeated, the spectre of 1979’s winter of 
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The Wider Strategy to Curb Union Influence 
 
In addition to legislation and the defeat of the miners’ strike there were other efforts 
to reduce the power of the trade unions. The privatization of several industries moved 
employees out of the state sector, although many retained union membership. The 
amount of workers belonging to a union decreased during the 1980s, falling to less 
than 9 million members in 1990 from a high of over 12 million in 1979.669 This was 
also connected to the sharp rise in unemployment in the early 1980s. Often people 
that lost their jobs, for example in manufacturing industries, subsequently found work 
in the service sector where the norm was to be non-unionised.670 The realignment of 
the British economy had the effect of reducing union power. Another strategy the 
Thatcher government pursued was that of ‘contracting-out’, which meant that services 
nominally provided by the state (such as cleaning in hospitals or refuse collection) 
were put out to tender to private companies. This contract work also reduced the 
power of union members to wield influence in the state sector.671 Contracting out 
acted as a half way house to increase competition in public utilities.672 Again this had 
its liberal critics. The IEA, for instance, believed contracting out tended to cause rent-
seeking behaviour as once gained, there were no commercial pressures to improve 
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performance.673 Austrians also thought contracting-out did little to address liberal 
objectives such as greater efficiency or greater individual liberty.674  
 
It has also been argued that class-consciousness and class-based solidarities waned 
during the 1980s.675 There may have been splintering of the working class, helped by 
social and economic policy that led to a flexible and skilled ‘top end’ working class, 
leaving the worse off poorer by 1990.676 This was helped by policies such as Right to 
Buy, where council house sales may have helped to convert some traditional Labour 
supporters into property-owning Conservative voters. Other trends, such as an 
increasingly right-leaning media (from tabloids like The Sun and The Daily Mail to 
broadsheets like The Daily Telegraph) supported many of the policies of Thatcherism, 
became hostile to both the European Community and the ‘Loony Left’ characterized 
by Labour politicians like Derek Hatton and Ken Livingstone. In summary, the 1980s 
saw an erosion of the solidarity for trade union action through a combination of long-
term trends and the policies of the Thatcher government. 
 
Trade Union Policy after the Miners’ Strike 
 
The miners’ strike was not the end of industrial unrest in Britain. The teaching unions 
NUT (National Union of Teachers) and NASUWT (National Association of 
Schoolmasters/Union of Women’s Teachers) were on strike intermittently between 
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1985 and 1987. More significantly, strikes broke out when News International moved 
its printing operation from Fleet Street to Wapping in the London Docklands in 1986. 
Rupert Murdoch had built up a large multinational media empire that included British 
newspapers like The Sun, The News of the World and The Times. In 1986 the group 
moved its offices to Wapping and as a result, 6000 of its workers went on strike in 
protest. The national union called action amid redundancies but despite the strikes 
lasting for over a year, production of the newspapers continued. Industrial relations 
had been notoriously bad in newspaper printing and this dispute, not the miners’ 
strike, was where the laws enacted by the Thatcher government were initially put to 
use.677  
 
The Conservatives introduced two more pieces of trade union legislation under 
Margaret Thatcher, the 1988 Employment Act (when Norman Fowler was Secretary 
for Employment) and its 1990 counterpart, by Michael Howard. The 1988 Act 
removed all statutory support for the closed shop, tightened balloting procedures and 
removed sanctions that unions could levy on members for breaking strikes.678 It was 
not until the 1990 law, however, that the government attempted to eliminate the 
closed shop altogether.679 It also made all secondary action unlawful and unions 
responsible for unofficial strikes liable for acts of all of their officials.680  
 
Lastly, the Dock Labour Scheme was abolished by Nigel Lawson as Chancellor and 
Norman Fowler as Secretary for Employment in 1989. The NDLS (New Dock Labour 
Scheme) had been established after the Second World War in recognition of the 
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importance of the docks.681 The scheme, however, allowed the docker’s union to 
exercise a grip on what occurred at Britain’s docks. It was described as ‘slowly 
strangling’ the British dock industry while losing out to non-scheme and foreign 
ports.682 Lawson called the scheme a ‘vested interest’ and a ‘statutory racket’.683 The 
scheme ended in 1989 and evidence showed the productivity of the docks improved 
as well as the performance and skills base of dock workers.684 Union influence as a 
vested interest was drastically reduced by 1990, in effect becoming an ‘outsider’ 
group excluded from the policy-making process. 685  The Thatcher government 
achieved this through a combination of policies, laws, confrontation with the NUM 
and other long-term trends. Although as already noted this was not all by pre-planned 
design, some writers have said the trade union strategy of Thatcherism bore some 
semblance to tactics outlined in Stepping Stones.686 
 
Within the Labour Party, Neil Kinnock had managed to reduce union influence there 
too, reasserting the primacy of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) over party 
policy.687 From a liberal economic point of view markets received less pressure from 
unions as a vested interest. The rise of non-unionised jobs in the service sector 
allowed for the more flexible labour market favoured by liberals. In 2013 The 
Economist described Britain’s labour market as ‘Europe’s most flexible’.688 The 




682 McNamara and Tarver, ‘strengths’, p. 14. 
683 Nigel Lawson, The View From No.11. Memoirs of a Tory Radical, (London: Corgi Books, 1993), 
pp. 444‐446 
684 McNamara and Tarver, ‘strengths’, p. 12. 
685 Thomsen, British, p. 233. 
686 Matthijs, Ideas and Economic Crises, p. 132. 
687 Marsh, New, p. 162. 
688 The Economist, ‘British immigration. You’re welcome’, 21 December 2013, 
[http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21591865-open-letter-citizens-bulgaria-and-romania-youre-




Conservative trade union legislation, whilst attempting to appear business-friendly.689 
In this respect Thatcherism achieved one of its, and neo-liberalism’s, long-term goals 
of reducing trade union’s influence on political and economic processes. Both Hayek 
and Friedman had long desired turning back the privileges of organised labour. Trade 
union reform was the clearest example of how the Thatcher government tamed a 




Privatization was one of the flagship policies of Thatcherism. The largest utilities 
were privatized during the second and third terms and have not been re-nationalised 
by subsequent governments. In fact, the policy has been extended. Privatization was 
also one of the most prominent Thatcherite policy exports. The Know How Fund to 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s specifically offered the advice of 
British experts in how to sell state assets. The scheme was incremental during the 
1980s and grew after early sales of smaller companies. With little opposition to these, 
renewed political capital after the Falklands War and 1983 election as well as the 
success of Right to Buy, the Thatcher government privatized large utilities like British 
Gas and British Telecom. The British Electricity Authority (BEA) was privatized at 
the end of the Thatcher years, and was completed after the Prime Minister herself had 
stepped down. The results may not have satisfied some economic liberal thinking but 
privatization was an ideological policy. This was because it went to one of the core 
themes of liberalism: ownership and private property rights. Even when answering 
criticism of the project, that electricity was rushed through for political expediency 
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and that competition was not created, Nigel Lawson saw the primary goal of the 
policy as changing the terms of ownership.690 What happened to these bodies when 
they became privately owned has been the subject of much debate. Ordoliberals 
advocated the breaking up of monopolies and promotion of competition, Austrians as 
little government intervention as possible and entry barriers reduced. Chicagoans 
were closer to the latter, tolerating monopolies but accepting some state action to 
create market conditions if necessary. The Thatcher government will be shown to be 
closest to Friedman and Stigler’s position although showing some inclinations, 
presumably without design, towards ordoliberal-esque competition enforcement 
during electricity privatization.691 
 
Electricity privatization built on the experience of previous sales and as such is a 
convenient lens through which to view the strategy as a whole. The promise of putting 
the industry into the private sector came in the 1987 election manifesto and was 
finally implemented during 1990 and 1991. One of the challenges of electricity 
privatization was that it existed in the state sector as a series of regional monopolies. 
How would shares be sold in 12 different (regionally based) companies? How could 
competition be created in both supply and generation of electricity and what would 
happen to the politically sensitive issue of nuclear power? The eventual system, 
power supplied by the private sector and watched over by a regulator was to have its 
critics. Energy privatization, internationally as well as in Britain, was sometimes 
viewed as providing little benefit to consumers or worse allowing them to be prey to 
unscrupulous companies.692 In Britain windfall taxes on power companies were levied 
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during the first Labour government of Tony Blair, while pensioners were subsidised 
by the government with a ‘winter fuel allowance’ from 1997. A more recent furore 
over the cost of energy erupted in 2013 when Labour leader Ed Miliband claimed he 
would freeze energy prices. Clearly energy privatization and deregulation have not 
been universally popular and this may be due to the way the schemes were 
implemented.  
 
Nationalisation after 1945 
 
The BEA was formed in 1948 when it amalgamated over 600 small companies into 
14 regional bodies and one central authority, the Central Electricity Generation Board 
(CEGB), responsible for generation. It formed part of the wider programme of 
nationalisation by the Attlee government. Many of these utilities were considered 
natural monopolies by policy makers, such as water, although the concept was 
opposed by some neo-liberals.693 Alfred Sherman, director of the CPS in the 1970s, 
wrote that nationalisation was counterproductive, that it became a parasitic burden on 
the economy that awarded privileged conditions of employment to selected, highly 
unionised groups.694  
 
The Attlee government succeeded in nationalising all the major industries, except 
steel, which was moved late in the government’s tenure and reversed by the Churchill 
government. It was later re-nationalised by Harold Wilson in 1967. Edward Heath 
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vowed to prevent further movement of industry into the state sector, the 1970 election 
manifesto saying ‘We are totally opposed to further nationalisation of British 
industry.’695 Heath reneged on this when his Government felt forced to nationalise the 
ailing Rolls-Royce company in 1973. The Labour governments of Harold Wilson and 
James Callaghan between 1974 and 1979 were themselves committed to more 
nationalisation, under pressure from an increasingly vociferous left in the party. It was 
one area where Keith Joseph pursued his ‘ratchet effect’ thesis as more companies 
moved into the public sector. Despite this, there is little evidence to show the British 
public were in favour of reversing this process in 1979.696 
 
The New Right Critique of State Ownership 
 
A key debate in the 1970s (and subsequently) was that of ownership. Those on the left 
and in both main political parties accepted the orthodoxy that large state utilities and 
industry were more effectively owned in the public sector, in part because of 
economies of scale. Neo-liberals, however, refuted this principle and produced 
literature in the 1970s and 1980s that called for a decoupling of government and 
industry of all kinds. Economic liberals generally accepted the state should provide 
security and enforce the law, but should intervene only in cases of market failure and 
market asymmetries. The ‘market fundamentalist’ brand of liberalism - which would 
include some Austrian thinkers like Rothbard - would reject the latter, seeking 
market-based solutions to most issues. The majority of British industry, according to 
neo-liberals, therefore did not require government control. Pro-market thinkers 
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regularly wrote about the ‘sanctity’ of private property rights. The editorial stance of 
publications such as The Economist changed in the 1970s and this reflected a shift in 
emphasis over ownership.697  The work of John Locke and Adam Smith often 
provided the intellectual justification. Only if privately owned, it was argued, can 
business and industry operate efficiently, productively and with accountability. A 
poorly run and unprofitable firm will collapse if privately owned. There was never 
this threat with state-owned industry. A study at Liverpool University by Richard 
Pryke examined public and private productivity between 1958-68 and 1968-78. The 
second period was found less productive for both but particularly the public sector.698 
Pryke commented that ‘public ownership provides a comfortable life and destroys the 
commercial ethic.’699  
 
The primacy of property rights tied in with other New Right themes: Public Choice 
theory and theories of monopoly. Public choice theory, the ‘economics of politics’, 
examined the workings of government and bureaucracy. Thinkers such as Gordon 
Tullock and James Buchanan identified waste, inefficiency and low productivity as 
endemic in the public sector. They also characterised how they believed bureaucrats 
had a natural tendency to expand their field of influence and also towards rent-seeking 
behaviour (see chapter one). This fitted with Keith Joseph’s ‘ratchet effect’, that 
government will grow if left unchecked. The problems posed by Public Choice 
theorists amounted to what think-tanks such as the IEA, CPS and ASI, as well as 
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other neo-liberals, deemed ‘government failure’.700 This was deliberately put in 
economic terms to compare it with that of market failure. The New Right and 
politicians associated with it such as Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher came to 
believe that government failure was just as likely as market failure. The acceptance of 
this ideological tenet was one that could justify privatization.701 As a result even a 
monopoly in the private sector, according to Conservatives like Nigel Lawson, had 
more incentive to make a profit than its state-owned counterpart.702 Some on the pro-
market right believed that even so-called natural monopolies were better in the private 
sector where there was the threat of bankruptcy.703 Those at the Chicago School, such 
as George Stigler, went further to suggest private monopolies could replicate the 
competition function within a large organisation.704 
 
Economic liberal Jack Wiseman evoked the principles of Road to Serfdom when he 
wrote about nationalised industries: ‘the case is weak. First, their arguments of 
principle against private property per se are implausible and unconvincing. Second, 
the destruction of private property must imply the concentration of political and 
economic power in the same hands. This must be expected to result, and has in the 
past resulted, in a severe curtailment of individual freedom.’705 Both Austrians and 
Chicagoans believed that monopolies should not be legislated against, only that 
government should reduce barriers to market entry.706 Not all liberals, though, were so 
relaxed about privately-owned monopolies. Adam Smith wrote that monopolies 
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maintained high prices and kept markets under stocked.707 Nevertheless, the prime 
goal for neo-liberals was the withdrawal of the state from owning utilities and 
industry. 
 
There was a growing sympathy for these thoughts in the Conservative Party in the 
1970s. Even in the 1950s Margaret Thatcher had said that consumers should be given 
priority over producers while party policy had consistently spoken out against 
nationalisation.708 By the late 1970s Geoffrey Howe believed that the Morrisonian 
Corporation was ‘constitutionally irresponsible’. 709  There was some, if limited, 
mention of (what was to become) privatization in the 1979 election manifesto: ‘More 
nationalisation would further impoverish us and further undermine our freedom. We 
will offer to sell back to private ownership the recently nationalised aerospace and 
shipbuilding concerns, giving their employees the opportunity to purchase shares. We 
aim to sell shares in the National Freight Corporation to the general public in order to 
achieve substantial private investment in it.’710 This amounted to a pledge to overturn 
recent Labour nationalisations and not to commit any further industry into the public 
sector. It was not, however, a programme of broad ranging privatization and echoed 
the similar sentiments in other post-war Conservative election manifestos. 
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Privatization and the First Thatcher Government 
 
The Thatcher Government was not the first to move a state owned industry into the 
private sector. The Churchill government had denationalised steel in 1953, although 
this was reversed in 1967.711 During this process Conservatives had been concerned at 
the lack of response from investors and the subsequent performance of the industry in 
private hands.712 Under Margaret Thatcher it was only when more economic liberals 
moved into the top government positions and into a cabinet majority after 1981 that 
privatization gained momentum. In addition, the political opportunity existed after the 
Falklands War and with the economy growing after 1982. Nigel Lawson’s claim, 
however, that ‘denationalisation’ was a ‘central plank of our policy right from the 
start’ was also exaggerated.713 Andrew Gamble believed the process was improvised, 
while Lord Burns said it was opportunistic.714 It was true that the 1977 Ridley Report, 
concerning state owned industry, did mention denationalisation. It did not, however, 
recommend ‘a frontal attack on this situation’ rather ‘a policy of preparing the 
industries for partial return to the private sector, more or less by stealth.’715 One 
pertinent example of this was British Leyland.  The company was broken up, saw a 
rise in productivity and was sold into the private sector in 1986.716 Privatization was 
initially incremental. Politically, the successful sale of an industry would be of 
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Several smaller state-owned assets were moved into the private sector during the first 
term. These included the National Freight Company, Britoil and Amersham 
International. What was notable about these sales was the lack of opposition to them 
from the public.717 This, along with the unexpected amount of interest in buying 
shares from small investors (the sale of Amersham International was often the 
example cited) gave ministers confidence to extend the programme. In stark contrast 
to denationalisation in the 1950s, the Amersham share offer was oversubscribed by 24 
to 1 and raised £65 million for the Treasury.718 Employees were offered free shares 
and were told they would see their shares matched by the government up to certain 
levels (the first 350 shares purchased by each employee in the case of Amersham).719 
This strategy was a template for later schemes.  
 
Nigel Lawson, in particular, was emboldened by the privatizations between 1980 and 
1982.720 The Conservatives did not include wide ranging privatization in their 1979 
election manifesto or make it a centrepiece of their initial strategy when in 
government but it does appear they were not expecting the private ownership 
approach to be as successful as it proved. If the smaller privatization sales during the 
first term were an unpredicted success then the major policy in promoting private 
ownership was the Right to Buy scheme, selling council houses to tenants. These 
early policies appeared to illustrate the aspiration to own capital could be utilized 
further. To reflect this, the Number 10 Policy Unit (the Prime Minister’s ‘think-tank’) 
under John Redwood claimed to have coined the term ‘popular capitalism’ in 1983.721 
In more practical terms the CPRS (Central Policy Review Staff) produced a paper in 
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October 1982 that set out how monopolies might be privatized as regulated 
businesses. 722  The role of regulation would prove important. In addition, the 
Nationalised Industries Study Group article ‘Switching Direction’ in 1982 influenced 
the eventual privatization of British Telecom.723 This study group, the Policy Unit and 
the CPRS all had a bearing on the development of privatization.  
 
By 1983 the opportunity presented itself to privatize a large utility. Lord Burns, then 
Chief Economic Advisor to the Treasury said that privatization ‘took advantage of the 
moment’ while the ‘Official History of Privatization’ stated that only by 1983 were 
there sufficient investors to launch large asset sales.724 Others believed that the 
overwhelming desire to reduce the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) 
was the prime motivation behind privatization, by both a windfall for the Treasury 
and removing continuing state subsidisation.725 Andrew Gamble wrote that among the 
key aims of privatization, along with choice, competition and efficiency; was the 
control of public sector pay, reducing the PSBR; to weaken the trade unions and 
remove decisions from the political process.726 The last point demonstrated how 
privatization could lessen the influence of a vested interest on government, a key neo-
liberal aim.727 Privatization was one of several liberalization measures, or supply-side 
reforms, that furthered the political goals of Thatcherism.728 David Owen, then leader 
of the SDP and at the vanguard of the eventual ideological shift from old to New 
Labour, wrote in Economic Affairs in 1983 that there was some merit to privatization, 
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but little where a state monopoly becomes a private one.729 The latter point was a 
recurring argument from across the political spectrum and could be applied to the 
larger privatizations of the second term.  
 
British Telecom (BT) was privatized in 1984, British Gas in 1986. They made 
sizeable profits for the Treasury (£5 billion for BT, £9 billion for British Gas) and 
appeared to capture the public imagination. Furthermore, privatization acted as an 
influential Thatcherite export. Lord Burns said privatization ‘led the world’ while 
Lord Ryder (Conservative MP and Margaret Thatcher’s political secretary in the first 
term) called it one of Thatcherism’s ‘greatest achievements’.730 In liberal economic 
terms however, how pro-market were these privatizations? 
 
Criticisms of Privatization 1984-86 
 
A repeated criticism of privatization was that it simply shifted a monopoly from the 
public to private sector. As we have seen many neo-liberals still thought this was 
preferable to public ownership. Others considered a monopoly worse in the private 
sector because dividends paid to shareholders could have been used for investment. 
The level of profit paid out has been described as ‘economic rent’.731 There were also 
questions surrounding the regulators put in place during the privatization process. By 
the end of the 1980s some neo-liberals feared that in a monopolistic situation these 
regulators would be ‘captured’ by industry, while the scheme for British Gas had been 
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‘hastily’ put together.732 The speed of privatization was attributed to the electoral 
cycle.733 These points, in keeping with neo-liberalism as a whole, still put the 
emphasis on the nature of state intervention, rather than private ownership itself. The 
regulatory framework was to blame, according to neo-liberals, rather than the 
dynamics of monopolies in the private sector.734 Lastly, privatization from one 
monopoly to another was criticized in terms of information flows. This was an 
argument from the left that utilized neo-liberal microeconomic principles. 
Monopolies, with no need to compete, were blamed for withholding information in 
order to maximize profits.735 Therefore, for some, the change in ownership and 
regulatory system in gas and telecoms did not do enough to promote competition and 
efficient markets. If the regulators of these private monopolies really were captured, 
with little competition, the process could hardly be labeled liberal.  
 
There were more positive opinions of privatization. Standards of service and labour 
productivity were considered to have improved after privatization.736 There was also a 
fall in prices. It was claimed that there was 35% reduction in BT’s main prices in real 
terms between 1984 and 1994. Prices of British Gas were also estimated to have 
fallen by 3%.737 All these issues were important when formulating the last major 
privatization of the Thatcher years, that of electricity. The Government wanted a 
successful sale as well as improvements in efficiency for consumers, but economic 
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liberals were also concerned about encouraging competition and setting up an 
independent and effective regulator. 
 
Electricity Privatization 1987-1991 
 
The Conservatives announced their intention to privatize electricity in the 1987 
election manifesto, ‘following the success of gas privatization’ and ‘the benefits it 
brought to employees and millions of consumers’.738 Nigel Lawson, as Secretary of 
State for Energy in 1983, had asked Coopers and Lybrand (a multinational 
accountancy firm) to produce a report on electricity privatization.739 The process then 
stalled when Peter Walker (a ‘wet’ who Thatcher consistently accommodated in her 
Cabinet) moved to Energy and was not to accelerate until Cecil Parkinson took over 
after the 1987 election. Parkinson was keenly aware of the criticism of previous 
privatizations: ‘I was determined that we would not follow the pattern set by British 
Telecom and British Gas and take it to the market as a highly regulated monopoly. I 
wanted to introduce competition where possible and regulation where it was not.’740 
Lawson’s last major undertaking as Secretary of State for Energy was the 1983 
Energy Act, that attempted to introduce some degree of competition into the industry. 
One IEA critic, however, wrote that this failed because the CEGB abused its 
dominant position.741 Lawson had helped diversify Britain’s supply of energy, for 
example initiating the ‘dash for gas’.742 He also helped stockpile coal in the strategy 
to resist a miners strike. Cecil Parkinson also wrote that expanding production of 
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nuclear energy was crucial during the subsequent strike.743 Electricity was described, 
however, as unsuitable for privatization due to its regional structure.744 What was to 
stop privatization simply becoming 14 regional (12 in England and Wales, 2 in 
Scotland) monopolies in the private sector? Once privatization of electricity was put 
into the 1987 manifesto through the 1989 Act up until implementation in 1990-91, the 
issue of competition dogged the scheme. In this respect, with liberal commentators as 
well as Cecil Parkinson aware of the issue, the Government’s thinking began to move 
towards ordoliberal ideas, that of the state ensuring competitive markets. Using 
legislation and a regulation framework to enforce competition and prevent 
monopolies forming echoed the sentiments of the 1930s and 1940s Freiburg neo-
liberals. 
 
One critic, Michael Parker, stated there was no pressure for privatization after the 
miners’ strike was defeated and oil prices plummeted in 1986.745 Despite efficiency 
gains when still under state control (possibly due to the Thatcher government’s more 
rigorous management style influenced by Sir Derek Rayner’s task force in the first 
term and later by that of Robin Ibbs), it was feared that these would be outweighed by 
the higher transaction costs in trading, metering and securing supply under smaller 
private companies.746 There was also the problem of how to treat nuclear power and 
this was initially included in the privatization plans. Asset sales were criticized as 
being short-termist and dominated by the financial markets in the City of London, 
                                                        
743 Parkinson, Right, p. 274. 
744 Browning, Winner, p. 22. 
745 Parker, ‘General’, p. 296. 
746 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, (London: Fontana, 1990), p. 593. Bale, Conservatives, p. 276, John 
Surrey, ‘Introduction’, In: The British Electricity Experiment. Privatization: the Record, the Issues, the 




which benefitted significantly from privatization.747 Lastly, there were concerns about 
effective regulation and that the process would be completed too hastily to fit in with 
the electoral cycle.748 Cecil Parkinson confirmed this latter point, stating that from the 
early meetings about the policy it was agreed privatization had to be completed by 
summer 1991, before the next probable election.749 
 
The 1989 Electricity Act and its implementation 
 
The British Electricity industry was finally privatized after the 1989 Electricity Act, 
following Cecil Parkinson’s 1988 White Paper. The supply of electricity was sold off 
as 12 regional companies, with the two Scottish companies following in 1991. There 
was some debate about whether to sell the CEGB, the power generator, off as several 
companies (Margaret Thatcher and Cecil Parkinson said in their respective memoirs 
that 4 or 5 companies were floated) but in the end it was just two, in a 70%-30% split 
as National Power and PowerGen.750 This crucial objective, of creating competition in 
generation, was strongly resisted by the head of CEGB, Lord Marshall.751 Nuclear 
power, because of the costs and the political implications, was excluded from the 
privatization process. There was also some disagreement over how to sell the shares. 
Other schemes had involved just one share, representing the giant company that was 
essentially a monopoly. The difficulty with electricity was that the supply companies 
would be numerous. Kleinwort Benson, the bank that advised the Government during 
this privatization, suggested the ‘exploding share’, where by an investor would buy 
one share that would then split into twelve components, representing the twelve 
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regional companies.752 The fear was that some of the new companies would be more 
subscribed than others and the Government was anxious that the privatization be a 
success. A similar question arose over selling shares in regional water boards, which 
took place around the same time. In his memoirs Nigel Lawson described being 
unimpressed by the ‘exploding share’ idea and felt it too complex for the public.753 
Lawson said that Kleinwort Benson went some way in persuading Cecil Parkinson 
and subsequently leaked the idea to the press.754 In the end though, the water sale 
went ahead first and sold shares in its ten different companies separately. Deemed 
effective in its implementation, electricity proceeded in a similar fashion and the 
exploding share scheme was forgotten. Electricity privatization took place in 1990 
and 1991 and the proceeds made £9 billion for the Treasury.755 
 
Electricity Privatization: analysis 
 
Privatizing the electricity industry in Britain had a number of benefits. Firstly, 
standards of service improved.756 Office hours were extended and appointments were 
kept within a specified waiting time.757 Secondly, prices went down. The figure 
claimed was a 3% decrease (over 5 years).758 There was also criticism, most notably 
that monopoly had been retained with a resulting lack of competition. Cecil 
Parkinson, on introducing the White Paper, said ‘competition is the best guarantee of 
customers’ interests’ and also wrote that Nigel Lawson in particular insisted on the 
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importance of competition.759 Liberals believed the lack of competition in generation 
hampered the process.760 Lawson, the most committed proponent of privatization in 
the Thatcher government, reserved a whole section of his autobiography to rebut the 
critics of privatization. 
 
Responding to criticism that privatization was a short-term strategy to deal with 
Government borrowing difficulties and bring funds into the Treasury (former Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan supposedly said the Government was ‘selling off the 
family silver’), Lawson denied that this was the prime motive.761 The Prime Minister, 
however, had written in a note in May 1979 that ‘the sale of assets could provide a 
significant contribution to getting the PSBR down.’762 The actual share prices during 
the privatization programme also proved contentious. Even in 1979 monetary 
economist Gordon Pepper wrote to Margaret Thatcher regarding the sale of BP saying 
that ‘publicly owned assets ought not to be sold at knock down prices.’763  
 
Lawson went on to write that the battle of ideas was of critical importance, in 
particular in widening share ownership.764 Lawson believed there was no evidence 
that investors were looking to make a quick gain and that electricity shareholders 
were in for the long-term.765 He also rebuked the suggestion that competition mattered 
more than ownership: ‘I believed that it was important to privatize as much as quickly 
as possible, and that this would itself set up pressures for more competition and other 
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structural changes’.766 Answering the charge that state-owned industry improved 
productivity in the 1980s regardless of ownership Lawson said that this was 
unsurprising because the prospect of privatization acted as a motivation. He 
concluded by saying, ‘neglect of the economic consequences of ownership is every bit 
as ideological as the neglect of competition.’767 Geoffrey Howe also described the 
political benefits of selling shares to the public during privatization: (The process) 
‘had the political advantage of increasing the numbers of those with a vested interest 
in our success.’768 It also decreased the likelihood of Labour reversing the policy 
when it returned to government.769 One critic wrote that the biggest losers of 
privatization were trade union members.770 
 
In a 1989 Hobart Paper by the IEA, there was a pertinent critique of the government’s 
privatization programme. George Yarrow, in his chapter ‘Does Ownership Matter?’, 
wrote that at a micro-economic level privatization had most notably promoted 
economic efficiency.771 Yarrow went on to say that the initial phase of privatization 
between 1979 and 1984 involved (for instance Cable and Wireless, National Freight, 
Amersham International, British Aerospace, Britoil and Enterprise Oil) ‘the transfer 
to the private sector of firms that operated in reasonably competitive product 
markets.’772 The same could not be said for the monopoly industries privatized in the 
second and third terms, where the government was, according to Yarrow, ‘distinctly 
less pro-competitive than would have been desirable.’773 Yarrow concluded that the 
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key to better performance in the large utilities was ‘to get competition and regulation 
working in tandem to provide improved information flows and better incentive 
structures’.774 In 2013 the IEA returned to the British energy market. Colin Robinson 
stated that electricity privatization had done little in the short-term to introduce 
competition of the market.775 By the turn of the millennium, however, the regulator’s 
effort to reduce entry barriers had managed to improve market conditions for 
consumers by allowing increased competition.776 This was then eroded, according to 
Robinson, due to increased government legislation and the collusion of the new 
energy companies with the regulator, essentially raising market entry barriers and 
price.777 Robinson intriguingly suggests that liberalization can only be temporary such 
is the ingrained process of special interest groups wanting to protect their privileged 
position, whether trade unions, large companies or others.778 The paper therefore 
insists that the debate in 2013 around energy prices is due to the leading companies 
acting in concert, effectively colluding to restrict competition.779 The IEA states that 
politicians are attempting to deal with the symptoms rather than the cause and this can 
be traced back to the privatization process that occurred during Thatcherism.780 The 
think-tank characteristically calls for ‘less government action and more competition’, 
presumably in a Hayekian rather than an ordoliberal fashion.781 
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Effective regulation as well as competition has been difficult to ensure in some 
industries. Yet the spirit of the times meant that less government was in vogue and 
that ‘light-touch’ regulation was desirable. Loose regulation, regulators captured by 
an industry or rules that created perverse incentives were the key components that 
prevented privatization satisfying more consumers, as well as more neo-liberals. 
Privatization again may have shifted the power of vested interests from one (state 
owned) monopoly to another (privately owned) that both had influence and in some 
cases subsidies, from the central government. In this way privatization, even of 
electricity, began to look like Friedmanite neo-liberalism. That is to say the state 
helped to create the conditions for a market, and then retreated from the ordoliberal 
goal of enforcing competition. Austrians in the Hayekian tradition still saw many 
barriers to more efficient markets.  Like other policies of the Thatcher government it 
satisfied the primary aims of the New Right (private property rights, wider capital 
ownership, some increased efficiency and productivity, less government) but not the 
specifically Austrian or micro-themes that allow a market to operate effectively. This 
included lack of competition, preventing information flow to consumers, monopoly, 
lack of producers entering the market, price distortions, continued government 
intervention due to a flawed system or ‘market failures’.  
 
The Broadcasting Policy of the Thatcher Government   
 
The strategy of the Thatcher government towards broadcasting likewise exposed 
some of the tension in their wider programme: liberalism curtailed by politics, liberal 
but not libertarian, tackling one vested interest but creating another. Two key points in 




examined funding of the BBC and the second paved the way for the boom in satellite 
television in the 1990s. If the Thatcher government wanted to reduce the power of a 
vested interest (the BBC) it did not succeed. In addition it helped create another, 
BSkyB.  
 
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was launched in 1927. It had a 
monopoly on television programming until 1955, when Independent Television (ITV) 
began screening, which had an 11% excise duty levied on its advertising by the 
government.782 BBC2 was then launched in 1964 and subsequently Channel 4 in 
1982. The latter was intended to satisfy fringe tastes and displeased some 
conservative opinion. Willie Whitelaw, unnerved by the inner-city violence of 1981, 
remarked that ‘he preferred to see and hear minority views on television than in riots 
and violence on the street.’783 Others felt that one of the roles of Channel 4 was to 
provide competition and to shake up the BBC, which had become a sizeable vested 
interest.784 
 
In 1981 the Government passed the Broadcasting Act, the first step towards satellite 
television. The IBA (Independent Broadcasting Authority) subsequently took bids to 
provide the new medium in Britain. The first cable supplier of satellite television 
began a trial service in mainland Europe in October 1981, which was officially 
created as the Sky Channel a year later. Rupert Murdoch’s News International group, 
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by and large supportive of the Prime Minister, gained control of Sky in 1983.785 Sky 
and BSB (British Satellite Broadcasting) won the franchise bids from the IBA in 
1986. Margaret Thatcher believed the BBC was not sympathetic to her government 
and represented much of what she wanted to sweep away from Britain. Reducing the 
influence of and providing alternatives to the Corporation became one of the aims of 
the broadcasting policy of Thatcherism. John Campbell wrote that the Prime Minister 
disliked state-owned television on principle and thought that the BBC coverage of 
Northern Ireland, in particular, was unhelpful to her administration.786 Furthermore, 
Thatcher believed the manner in which the 1981 riots were presented caused copycat 
incidents while the reporting of the Falklands War was lopsided, that it was the 
BBC’s role to be on ‘ourside’.787 Sir Alan Peacock (chair of the 1985 report) said in 
2010 that Margaret Thatcher had become annoyed with the BBC and wanted it to 
accept advertising and competition.788 The catalyst for setting up the Peacock Report 
was the BBC’s request for a 41% increase in the licence fee in 1984, causing uproar 
in the press. This triggered the Prime Minister’s move against the Corporation.789 
Home Secretary Leon Brittan asked a committee, to be chaired by Peacock, to look at 
the funding of the BBC in March 1985.790 
 
The Peacock Report 
 
The Peacock Report was published in May 1986. Including liberal economic writer 
Samuel Brittan, the committee was thought to be sympathetic to the general 
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philosophy of the Government and was expected to decide that the licence fee should 
be abolished. That it did not was as a surprise, infuriated the Prime Minister and was 
‘kicked into the long grass’ by her private secretary Bernard Ingham.791 Shadow 
Cabinet member Gerald Kaufman dryly said that Ingham’s subsequent ‘character 
assassination machine has so single-mindedly devoted its attention to Professor 
Peacock that one might have thought the poor man was a member of the Cabinet.”792 
 
The Report did make a number of recommendations: the licence fee should be used 
only to fund Public Sector Broadcasting (PSB) and items of national interest and that 
the BBC should have to compete for buying programmes. Peacock thought that 
combining roles as broadcaster and producer did not work.793 The Report, reflecting 
the liberal and libertarian instincts of its authors, stated that viewers and listeners were 
the best ultimate judges of their own interest; and that all censorship should end.794 
The Report also recommended indexation (to retail price inflation) of the BBC licence 
fee, direct subscription to the BBC to replace the main part of the fee and lastly to 
encourage a multiplicity of choice with pay-per-view and pay-per-channel.795 Home 
Secretary Douglas Hurd put a positive spin on the report, despite it rejecting 
abolishing the licence fee: ‘The report obviously does not conceal the view that the 
days of the BBC licence fee system are numbered.’796 Samuel Brittan believed the 
main reason the Prime Minister was irritated by the report was over censorship. 
Brittan said this ‘exposed many of the contradictions in the Thatcherite espousal of 
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market forces. They esposed the market system but disliked the libertarian value 
judgements.’797 Hurd said that censorship reflected the ‘peculiarly intrusive nature of 
broadcasting’ which ‘require special regulatory arrangements.’798 Here the small ‘c’ 
conservatism and more traditional Toryism were evident in Thatcherism, at least 
rhetorically. 
 
The response of the BBC to the Peacock Committee was also crucial to its outcome. 
Proving it was indeed a potent vested interest the Corporation commissioned and 
supervised research that demonstrated in impeccably ‘dry’ economic terms the 
impracticality of funding by advertising.799 The BBC team considered each member 
of the committee’s background and the best way to approach them. They were also 
effective campaigners behind the scenes.800 The key to the BBC strategy was to make 
its income look as indivisible as that from advertising for the ITV. It also stated that 
there would not be enough advertising to fund both channels.801 This was a shrewd 
plan to overcome the danger the committee posed and in fact turned the attention 
from the BBC to ITV. Margaret Thatcher was ‘greatly disappointed’ by the Peacock 
Report’s findings on the BBC, colleagues like Hurd thinking the Prime Minister was 
obsessed by the Corporation.802 Nevertheless, the BBC had proved itself a vested 
interest of some weight by diverting Thatcher’s fire toward ITV. 
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The Government was attracted by Peacock’s proposals for ITV, notably the idea of 
auctioning its franchises and requiring Channel 4 to sell its own advertising. The 
Conservatives disliked ITV’s monopoly on advertising and the channel also drew the 
Prime Minister’s ire with its 1988 programme ‘Death on the Rock’, about the 
shooting of three IRA members by the SAS in Gibraltar.803 The 1990 Broadcasting 
Act was to exert pressure on ITV, as did the growth of satellite television. This was 
one outcome of the Peacock Report. Former BBC producer Janet Jones believed the 
report ‘refashioned television firmly within the domain of the market’ and made 
direct payment for television a reality. 804  Peter Jay said that Alan Peacock’s 
recommendations opened the door to an ‘“ideologically free” philosophy celebrating 
consumer sovereignty.’805 The committee did force the BBC to change, if not as 
drastically as Thatcher had hoped. Janet Jones said that the report ‘created a far 
humbler, more innovative and democratic BBC, one that knew it must find a new 
rationale to survive as a public institution into the next century.’806 
 
The 1990 Broadcasting Act 
 
BBC funding survived the Peacock Report. It may have been forced into some 
changes but still retained its privileged position in British society. The aftermath of 
the Peacock Report, however, caused a revolution in commercial television. The 
committee paved the way for the expansion of satellite television and also exposed 
ITV to more pressure. Douglas Hurd introduced the 1988 White Paper by saying the 
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government had ‘been influenced at many points by the Peacock Report’.807 The 
Prime Minister favoured an increased number of channels and competition for 
programmes, in part because she thought that it would weaken the BBC. The 1988 
White Paper ‘Broadcasting in the 90s: Competition, Choice and Quality’ proposed 
that Channel 4 should be obliged to sell its own advertising and therefore provide 
rivalry with ITV.808 It also allowed the expansion of satellite and cable television 
providers. The White Paper eventually became the 1990 Broadcasting Act, which 
encapsulated several themes of liberalization: the free market, deregulation, 
withdrawal of the state and removing market entry barriers to producers.809 The Act 
looked at the theme of ownership. Douglas Hurd said in 1988, ‘The ownership of 
commercial television and radio should be widely spread, not concentrated in the 
hands of a few groups or individuals and to prevent excessive media cross-
ownership.’810 
 
Yet there were two criticisms of the Government’s policy. Firstly that instead of 
widening ownership it would actually lead to monopoly. Secondly, that increased 
choice would mean decreased quality. One company in particular has been a recurring 
target for the left, that of Rupert Murdoch’s News International group. Roy Hattersley 
said in 1988 of Hurd’s White Paper: ‘He asserts the need for ownership to be 
widespread. I make a prediction: they will not be regulations to which Mr. Rupert 
Murdoch takes exception.’811 Returning to the policy the following year the then 
Home Secretary David Waddington attempted to reassure the public that this would 
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not be the case. ‘There must be ownership rules. There is no chance whatsoever of 
British broadcasting falling into the hands of a bunch of tycoons or a cluster of 
conglomerates.’812 Again Hattersley poured scorn upon this suggestion. ‘Already the 
Government have allowed Mr. Murdoch to acquire two national newspapers without 
the scrutiny of a Monopolies and Mergers Commission inquiry. In part, the Bill might 
have been dictated during one of Mr. Murdoch’s cosy lunches with the Prime 
Minister.’813 
 
The Government had a problem, however, in restricting the growth of satellite 
television without drowning it at birth. It did not want to deter investors because the 
initial start-up costs were large. Satellites and the rockets to launch them do not come 
cheap, nor initially did distributing dishes and decoders. In addition, the very nature 
of satellite television meant it was essentially a transnational business that was more 
difficult to control than terrestrial broadcasting.814 Both British Satellite Broadcasting 
(BSB) and Murdoch’s Sky launched packages in 1989. One difference between the 
two was that Sky used mainly American programmes (on the Sky One channel) and 
Hollywood films (on the Sky Movies channel). BSB collapsed in November and was 
swallowed up as BSkyB, launched in April 1991.815 This outlined the difficulties with 
the Government’s insistence that competition would be ensured. David Waddington 
bent the Government’s own rules to allow the merger between BSB and Sky. 
Newspaper owners were only allowed to own 20% of television channels but by this 
point Murdoch controlled almost 50% of satellite broadcasting.816 John Campbell 
even wrote that Margaret Thatcher did everything she could to help Murdoch 
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dominate the new medium.817 By proclaiming to want to prevent monopoly formation 
and promote competition in satellite broadcasting, but encouraging market forces, the 
Conservatives invoked ordoliberal principles in the late 1980s. Essentially though, 
satellite television policy was again closer to Friedmanite neo-liberalism. It utilized 
the state to liberalise or create a market, then retreated from it whilst tolerating 
monopoly. It implicitly took the position, as did the Chicagoans, that ‘giants’ in a 
market were acceptable as long as there was some liberalization. 
 
Subscription-funded Sky mushroomed in popularity in the 1990s. The network 
attracted customers by buying the rights to repeats of old programmes (such as soaps 
like Coronation Street) and mainly by exclusively showing sporting events and 
films.818 The advance of Sky has been matched by criticism of the quality of the 
material shown. David Waddington said in 1990 ‘I do not believe for a moment that 
anyone will be able to argue…that we are creating a philistines’ charter or yob 
television.’819 Others, however, disagreed. Ian Gilmour, a regular critic of his own 
Party, said the Act was ‘sheer vandalism’ while John Campbell said the broadcasting 
policy of the Thatcher government accelerated the decline in moral values by a 
‘mixture of crude free-market dogma spiked with political malice.’820 This line of 
criticism exposed the contradictions outlined by Brittan: liberal but unable to accept 
libertarian value judgments. 
 
The nature of the satellite providers may have also led to homogenization. Murdoch’s 
was one of several big organisations operating partly as rivals and partly as a cartel 
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with shared strands of ownership. In the United States the media market came to be 
dominated by three American firms (Time-Warner, Disney and Viacom) and four 
foreign ones (Seagram of Canada, Bertelsmann of Germany, Sony of Japan and News 
International). Material originating from one part of Murdoch’s empire (in practice 
the United States) could be transmitted to audiences in all other parts of it.821 Hence 
the accusations of homogenisation, cartelisation and the problem countries had in 
restricting overseas programmes.822 Others saw the trend as a brand of calculating 
geopolitics or cultural imperialism. Des Freedman wrote in 2008 that ‘recent US and 
UK governments have embraced globalization as an opportunity to secure increased 
economic benefits and cultural influence through the activities of their media 
industries.’823 There is no evidence, however, to suggest the Thatcher government 
used media policy either as an extension of soft power in foreign affairs or to pursue a 
pro-market agenda. The broadcasting policy of the Thatcher government was 
designed for the domestic market but also a response to a rapidly changing world, 
much of which it could not control. It did try and tame the BBC but came up against a 
potent vested interest, again showing the limits of Thatcherism. By the twenty-first 
century the BBC was still an effective force – and not necessarily anti-Tory: Tony 
Blair’s administration was described as ‘at times, on a virtual war footing with the 
BBC.’824  
 
The second phase of the Thatcher government’s media strategy was to tackle 
commercial television. It was true that it managed to create a more competitive 
market in television and reduce the barriers to entry for producers. The growth of 
                                                        
821 Crisell, Introductory, pp. 259-260. 
822 Crisell, Introductory, p. 260. 
823 Des Freedman, The Politics of Media Policy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. 216. 




satellite and cable broadcasting has meant greater consumer choice. As with other 
policies of the Conservatives in the 1980s the broad aims of the New Right were met. 
Other market principles were not however, due to lack of competition. Legislation 
could not prevent, and may have encouraged, a near monopoly by Sky in satellite 
television. The Thatcher government provided some reforms that pro-market thinkers 
approved of but could not reduce the power of one vested interest, the BBC, and 
managed to create another, Sky. Although at times the government’s rhetoric had an 
ordoliberal approach to ownership, the reality was closer to Friedmanite neo-
liberalism. In addition, the Austrian and Chicagoan analysis that monopolies are 
vested interests often created and maintained by government, may also have been true 




Financial deregulation during the 1980s was a seemingly clear application of liberal 
economic ideas. The liberalization of the City of London (otherwise known as ‘Big 
Bang’) on 27 October 1986, was one of a series of measures, such as the removal of 
exchange controls, that moved the British economy in a more pro-market direction.825 
Big Bang itself was probably the furthest reaching liberalization measure of 
Thatcherism for its impact on the flow of international financial capital and 
globalization in general. Big Bang was one method to reduce the power of a vested 









Thatcher reforms, however, one vested interest was emasculated only for another to 
take its place.  
 
The City before Big Bang 
 
For much of the twentieth century the City was inhabited by ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’.826 The financial sector in London in the 1970s was considered a place of 
restrictive practices. As a former economic journalist Nigel Lawson talked of the ‘old, 
clubby, City’. 827  It was one restrictive practice, the system of fixed minimum 
commissions (essentially limiting access to markets), that prompted the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) to launch an investigation into the London Stock Exchange in 1979. 
Another, the ‘single capacity’ rule regarding jobs (permitting one to either act as a 
stockbroker or a market maker) as well as effectively excluding all foreigners from 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) membership left the City, according to Lawson, 
undercapitalized and in danger of becoming a backwater.828 Some felt the City a 
‘victim’ of government action. 829  Peter Middleton, Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury from 1983-1991, later noted the Bank of England too as a barrier to reform. 
He said ‘the Bank’s belief in orderly markets did get in the way of their belief in a 
liberal economic process.’830 
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The Chairman of the LSE, Nicholas Goodison, asked the OFT to call off its 
investigation if it promised to reform.831 It was then Cecil Parkinson in 1983, as 
Secretary of State at the DTI, who launched the initiative (in conjunction with 
Goodison) that led to liberalization of the City.832 A decision had to be made about 
whether to implement gradual or sudden change. Goodison believed it had to be the 
latter as the only way in obtaining his members’ agreement in full.833 Monetary 
economist Tim Congdon, however, believed Big Bang was part of a ‘Bigger Bang’, 
including an offshore revolution where companies and investors found that doing 
business in dollars in London increased returns. Congdon also saw financial 
deregulation as a natural step as levels of bank credit lent to the private sector grew in 
the early 1980s.834 
 
27 October 1986 
 
Restrictions on single capacity trading and fixed minimum commissions were lifted 
after Big Bang, and new hopefuls streamed into the City as trading in stocks and 
shares mushroomed. The Government saw its role as setting out a regulatory 
framework to oversee the new found financial freedom. The 1984 Gower Report set 
out the terms for investor protection but also stated that regulation could not ‘seek to 
achieve the impossible task of protecting fools from their own folly.’ 835  The 
regulatory bodies were outlined in the 1986 Financial Services Act, which formed 
self-regulatory organizations (SROs, made up of ‘providers and users of financial 
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services who will have the knowledge and expertise to ensure that investors’ interests 
are being properly looked after’) and a Securities and Investment Board (SIB).836 
Nigel Lawson wrote in 2006 that this system was more bureaucratic than the 
government intended.837 The IEA went much further. Despite Big Bang being an act 
of deregulation the think-tank, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, believed the 
1986 framework was overly complex and created perverse incentives.838 Neo-liberals 
saw Big Bang, as well as providing some financial liberalization, as simultaneously 
an act of regulation. 
 
Neo-liberal rationale for Big Bang 
 
Succeeding Cecil Parkinson at the DTI, Norman Tebbit argued for liberalization of 
financial services in 1984 in dry microeconomic terms: ‘I see market forces as the 
most potent weapon available, and I propose to rely on them to the maximum extent 
feasible. There can be no effective play of market forces without good market 
information.’839 Financial deregulation appeared to be a pure application of liberal 
economic ideas. It put faith in wealth creation, increased individual liberty and 
efficiency and lowered barriers to market entry. Alongside the growing revolution in 
communications and information technology, liberalization allowed quicker and more 
effective signaling and flow of information. Another example of deregulation was the 
ending of exchange controls in 1979. It was thought that controls had produced ‘sub-
optimal outcomes’ and the same principle can be applied to the City, in particular the 
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view that it was under-capitalized.840  Hong Kong was often cited as a liberal 
economic model, despite the lack of political freedom in the city-state. Milton 
Friedman, in his book Free to Choose, eulogised the Hong Kong system of low tax, 
minimal state and as a hub of global trade.841 These measures of exchange control 
removal and Big Bang, as well as enterprise zones, all tie in with the neo-liberal 
model of Hong Kong. One aspect of this strategy was that it exposed British firms to 
international competition, challenging in part the assertion that Margaret Thatcher’s 
government was primarily nationalistic. In fact some in the City saw Big Bang as an 
act of betrayal by Thatcher as it allowed British owned financial firms to be taken 
over by foreign banks.842 
 
Impact of Big Bang 
 
Big Bang had a number of consequences. One year after Big Bang trade with 
customers in UK shares had nearly doubled while share prices had risen 46% in the 
first seven months of 1987.843 It led to rapid wealth accumulation in the City and the 
South East of the country in general. The changes enhanced London’s status as a 
global financial hub and also caused social change in Britain itself. People from a 
variety of backgrounds could come to work in the City, allowing many to enjoy 
previously unheard of affluence. Financial liberalization eroded some traditional class 
distinctions and had some impact in shaking up the old status quo. This was, 
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perversely, at odds with the values of some Tories but precisely one of the goals of 
economic liberals.844  
 
Into the latter part of the 1980s and then 1990s financial liberalization and 
deregulation, which Big Bang encapsulated, accelerated globalization. The rapid 
movement of finance capital across borders as well as an acceleration of global trade 
has been the major economic trend of the last twenty-five years. At the same time it 
gave the City power. Andrew Gamble has written that the influence of the City has 
been exaggerated, that it is ‘not large enough, coherent enough, or politically 
organised enough, to determine government policy.’845 Lord Burns, however, said in 
2011 that the Prime Minister was hostile to vested interests and organized entities. He 
believed that Margaret Thatcher generally managed to reduce the power of vested 
interests, with the exception of Big Bang, which created one: the financial services 
sector.846 One example of this was the attitude of New Labour towards the City. 
Gordon Brown courted the financial sector in the knowledge that, without tax 
increases, receipts from the City were one of the only ways he could fund his 
domestic spending agenda. By the turn of the century the financial sector provided 
25% of the UK’s corporate tax receipts.847 Critics of financial deregulation believed 
the attitude and policies of Western governments from the 1980s, including ending 
the separation of investment and commercial banks, essentially allowed some to 
become ‘too big to fail’.848 The economic liberal viewpoint, however, was that the 
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regulatory framework itself sowed the seeds for this and that policies were not 
sufficiently pro-market.849 Hayekian thinking again viewed neo-liberal deregulation 
as overbearing state involvement that distorted markets. With respect to Big Bang in 
1986 the Thatcher government managed to end the restrictive practices of the old City 
system, only to replace it with a more powerful vested interest.  
 
Vested Interests and the Thatcher government: Conclusion 
 
As with all the areas in this study, how far the Thatcher government reduced the 
influence of vested interests can be gauged in gradations, and according to which 
strain of liberalism one is discussing. For economic liberals vested interests distort 
market forces and reduce their efficiency. Thatcherism may have been expected to 
have reduced the power of these groups as far as possible. The most effective example 
of how this pro-market aim was achieved was trade union reform. This vested interest 
had wielded particular influence over both the British economy and policy makers 
over the previous twenty years. Although for the most part improvised, the ‘step-by-
step’ and ‘divide and rule’ (separating union leaders from the rank and file) approach 
greatly reduced this influence and created a more flexible labour market. Trade union 
reform was both economic and political in its aim. The demoralisation of the trade 
unions had a severe impact on certain areas of the country and was one of the key 
reasons many in Britain took a visceral dislike to both the Prime Minister and her 
administration. For pro-market thinkers, however, trade union policy forced much-
needed liberalization and structural reform on the British economy.  
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Privatization also achieved some of the broad aims of the New Right. Several strands 
of liberal economic thinking made the case for the policy: Public Choice theory, 
government failure, monopoly theory, and the ‘ratchet effect’ of the state. 
Privatization shifted ownership of utilities and state owned industry into the private 
sector, creating millions of new shareholders with their own vested interest in its 
success. Efficiency was generally raised and in some cases prices went down, 
benefiting the consumer. The main liberal difficulty with privatization, however, was 
the lack of competition, effectively converting public monopolies into private ones. In 
privatizing the electricity industry, the new privately owned companies in some cases 
became regional monopolies. There was also the issue that regulators could be 
‘captured’ by the privately run companies. The problem of creating competition in 
power stemmed from the fact that only supply, not generation, was effectively vying 
for consumers. To sum up, privatization satisfied some New Right thinking and did 
allow markets to function more efficiently. It would have been preferable to economic 
liberals if more competition had been introduced. Ordoliberal principles would have 
been invoked by implementing a regulatory or law based framework that enforced 
competition and set out to impede monopoly formation. This appeared to be the 
direction Cecil Parkinson and Nigel Lawson were heading with electricity 
privatization. The end result, however, fell short of many liberals’ stated aim of a 
competitive industry and looked to be somewhere between the Austrians and 
ordoliberals, a potentially ‘captured’ regulator and a market that was not fully 
liberalised. A vested interest was reduced, that of state owned monopolies, but 
reappeared to a lesser degree in the private sector. This is indicative of all the areas 
examined here. The IEA’s Colin Robinson has suggested that liberalization is only 




rather than a series of one-off acts.850 This fits the pattern for much of these 
‘liberalising’ policies of Thatcherism, which appeared to reduce the impact of special 
interest groups. 
 
The policies towards broadcasting and the financial services tell a similar story. They 
both attempted to reduce the power of a vested interest (the BBC and restrictive 
practices in the City), only to create others (BSkyB and a reconstructed global 
financial hub). The BBC showed its potency as a power broker by effectively 
defeating the Government’s plans to force advertising or abolition of the licence fee. 
It turned the Prime Minister’s fire towards ITV and subsequent reforms allowed the 
growth of satellite television. BSkyB operated a near monopoly in this new medium 
and with a combined newspaper and broadcasting empire exerting influence over both 
the British consumer and consecutive governments. 
 
The 1986 Big Bang liberalised financial services in the City of London, sweeping 
away the old boys network of restrictive practices and bringing increased wealth to 
the South East of the country. Yet ‘light-touch’ regulation allowed huge financial 
institutions to form and created a new vested interest. The nature of the regulatory 
framework was one of the reasons this was allowed to happen. Nevertheless 










Chapter Five: Neo-liberalism and the Foreign Policy of the Thatcher 
Government 
 
This chapter will look at how Thatcherism was applied in foreign policy, specifically 
in the field of overseas development and aid. Why examine ideology in foreign 
policy? National governments generally pursue ‘realist’ strategies towards foreign 
affairs that owe much to self-interest, and little to economic theories. Thatcherism, 
however, has been closely linked with economic liberalism so it is pertinent to ask 
how far this extended to foreign policy. Moreover, framing Thatcherism 
internationally has often been very broadly linked with prevailing trends such as neo-
liberalism, globalization and the Washington Consensus. Some believe Thatcherism, 
in policies such as privatization and enterprise zones, was ‘exported’.851 How much of 
this was by design? Can we see any trends or patterns in the foreign policy of the 
Thatcher government and its apparent commitment to liberal economics? Finally, 
overseas development in particular is examined for two reasons. Firstly, it is one 
foreign policy area that has attracted less interest than say, the Falklands conflict or 
the Cold War. Secondly because aid and development policy appear to encapsulate a 
shift from the old redistributive capital transfer model to market and trade-led 
strategies. From the structural adjustment policies in Africa and Latin America in the 
1980s through to the austerity-tied bail-outs in the Eurozone after 2010: aid has been 
increasingly given in return for liberalization measures. This potentially follows a 
similar pattern as, and may have been influenced by the reforms of, Thatcherism. 
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The policies of the Thatcher government towards aid paint a complicated picture. The 
themes and principles espoused by Margaret Thatcher and her government, with a 
consistent antipathy towards subsidies, do not sit comfortably with aid. The Thatcher 
government may have been expected to provide aid on sufferance and even then to 
have tied it with economic liberalization measures. It could have been used to 
promote reform and increase the power of the individual at the expense of the state.  
This was not the case with bilateral aid. Selective subsidies and strategies that 
distorted prices and market forces were pursued, and were anathema to many neo-
liberals. The majority of bilateral aid given by the UK governments in the 1980s did 
not seriously pursue market-orientated strategies. The other side of aid policy, to 
multilateral organizations, was a different story. The percentage of UK aid donated 
multilaterally increased under the Thatcher government, with the majority going to 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), who did attempt to enforce 
market reforms on recipient countries. In other examples of British foreign policy the 
Prime Minister continually resisted sanctions towards apartheid, often citing the 
benefits of the market to produce change as a reason they should be avoided. Lastly, 
the Know How Fund to Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s offered countries 
making the transition from communism technical expertise in how to introduce a 
market economy. How far did liberal economic ideas influence the foreign policy of 
the Thatcher government? Considering the government as nationalist first, 
economically liberal second, may best summarise the conflicting features of UK 
foreign policy. As Cold War considerations ebbed, these principles began to align 





Neo-liberalism and foreign policy 
 
As we have seen, neo-liberal policies were generally implemented in a domestic 
context and in response to certain circumstances. Turner identified the rise of neo-
liberalism as Britain’s answer to trade union power in the 1970s, in the United States 
as a reaction to 1960s ‘Great Society’ programmes and the ordoliberals attempting to 
prevent a recurrence of the problems of interwar Germany.852 It appears problematic 
to tie in neo-liberal thinkers with particular foreign policy initiatives. Milton 
Friedman may have met with General Pinochet in 1975 and Margaret Thatcher may 
have wielded Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom at a similar time, but a ‘neo-liberal’ – as 
opposed to a nationalist – international strategy, is difficult to discern. In addition, 
many of the Thatcher government’s foreign policy issues - such as the Falklands, 
Rhodesia, Hong Kong and South Africa - were questions of Britain’s imperial past. 
Nevertheless, a closer look does reveal that neo-liberal thinkers did exert some 
influence on international affairs during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Firstly, Stedman-Jones has written that from the 1950s Chicagoans such as Milton 
Friedman saw themselves as ‘foot-soldiers in the fight against communism’.853 This 
meant aligning free market economics with political liberty, often making the former 
a prerequisite for the latter, and juxtaposing this with command economies and 
authoritarianism.854 Friedman’s thinking on this issue can be seen most clearly in his 
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visits to Pinochet’s Chile. The role Friedman had in advising a number of Republican 
Presidents, including Ronald Reagan, also demonstrates his influence. Secondly, the 
work done by Friedman regarding ‘shock therapy’ had an international dimension, 
and this was clearly set out in the Chicago thinker’s speeches. 855  Numerous 
liberalization programmes during the following decades, often overseen by the World 
Bank and IMF, bore some semblance to Friedman’s work on shock therapy. 
 
Thirdly, all the strains of neo-liberalism examined in this thesis desired a liberalised 
trading system. Ordoliberal Wilhelm Röpke, for example, favoured unilateral trade 
liberalization.856 Hayek too wrote at length of the benefits of freer trade and the 
negative impact on attempts to restrict the movement of goods, labour and capital.857 
Much has been written about the acceleration of globalization and international trade 
since the 1970s and this is due to events such as the end of the Bretton Woods system 
in 1971 and subsequently the winding down of the Cold War. A more general climate 
of pro-market sentiment, as well as multilateral trade agreements such as the Uruguay 
GATT round of the late 1980s, were also important. Finally, and more difficult to 
measure, is the belief by some writers that ordoliberal principles are embedded in 
some of the laws of the European project. Although ordoliberals accepted that their 
ideas had lost influence by the mid-1960s, some also thought that ordoliberalism saw 
a resurgence in the 1980s and still casts its ‘long-shadow’ over German-speaking 
countries.858 Others believe that ordoliberal principles of competition enforcement 
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have been established in the post-war European Community treaties, while 
ordoliberals also urged Britain to adopt an independent central bank as well as legal 
enforcement of monetary targets in the 1980s.859 Therefore ordoliberal thinking 
exerted an indirect effect on British politics due to its influence on the European 
Community and some of its member states. It is also worth pointing out that Röpke 
disliked European integration ‘from above’. To summarise then, neo-liberal thought 
had some influence on policy towards the Cold War, trade liberalization and to a 
lesser extent, the European Community. The main focus of much of this chapter, 
however, is how neo-liberalism altered attitudes and strategies towards the 
development of poorer countries. 
 
Development aid pre-1970  
The aid orthodoxy inherited by the Thatcher government in 1979 had a protracted 
history of different philosophical and economic ideas. Some of these would be 
challenged and altered. British governments realised in the 1920s, at the height of 
their imperial power, that using financial aid to encourage overseas development 
could be a better tool than overt domination to further national interests abroad. This 
was to increase as formal empire went into decline. Delivery of aid and the transition 
to a Commonwealth of independent states allowed the UK to maintain influence in its 
former colonies. There was no collectively coherent policy by the West towards 
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development of poorer countries until after the Second World War.860 The advent of 
superpower status of the United States, which was rhetorically anti-colonialist, and 
the decline of the European empires hastened the independence movements of 
countries that came to be known as the ‘third world’. The West gave developmental 
aid to the new nations of Africa and Asia as well as Latin America. The justification 
and motives for this are explored later. A consensus existed amongst most donor 
counties on why and how aid should be provided until the 1970s when several strands 
of criticism emerged.  
 
The success that was often cited as the rationale for aid was the post-war Marshall 
Plan. The Truman administration in the United States was concerned about the state 
of Western Europe in the late 1940s. It believed a further descent into chaos and 
poverty in the region would provide fertile ground for communist parties as well as 
declining markets for American goods. Geopolitics and the prosperity of American 
business and therefore its people were the motives for providing large sums in aid on 
favourable terms to Western Europe. In return for political allegiance countries like 
France, West Germany, Italy and Great Britain began to recover from the decimation 
of the war and became or maintained stable social democracies. The model for aid 
had been established: capital transfer would increase investment and growth. This 
stimulus would allow a country to escape or avoid poverty then grow more or less 
independently.861 Although this method worked well in post-war Europe, it was to 
prove much less successful in the developing world over the following years. Despite 
the War, in much of Europe, the basic infrastructure was in place to allow money to 
be used in a way that could promote development in the region, often not the case in 
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the rest of the world. Aid ‘successes’ included South Korea, Botswana and Honduras 
but the number of failures was marked.862 Nevertheless the post-war orthodoxy that 
richer countries gave aid to poorer countries was another that had taken root by 1979. 
 
Justification for aid 
 
There were a number of reasons the West provided cash transfers to the developing 
world. In his 1987 book, Foreign Aid Reconsidered, Roger Riddell identified three 
broad moral cases for giving development aid: the prevailing Christian faith in the 
West, utilitarianism and colonial guilt.863 Riddell said that Christian values in Europe 
and the United States meant that there was an acceptance to give to those in need 
while the notion that richer Europeans exploited poorer regions during colonialism 
justified ‘reparations’. The principle of utilitarianism argued money transferred from a 
rich country to a poor one would add more utility than it detracted.864 It was justified 
as morally ‘right’ if it produced a greater amount of happiness than any alternative.865  
 
Permanent Secretary to the ODA between 1989 and 1994 Tim Lankester believed the 
intellectual climate coalesced around aid in the 1960s, with acceptance of ideas such 
as ‘take-off’.866 This was introduced by Walt Rostow in the previous decade, one of 
the first influential advocates of development aid in the form of government-to-
government grants. Rostow was a ‘liberal missionary’ and a fervent anti-communist 
who categorized development in five stages: traditional society, preconditions for 
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take-off, take-off, drive to self sustained growth and finally the stage of mass 
consumption.867 He believed that most of the countries in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa were in the second phase and were potentially on the brink of ‘take-off.’ What 
they needed, according to Rostow, was modernization, to promote the use of science 
and technology and a sharp increase in savings and investment. Rostow, who based 
his analysis on the industrial revolution, thought that if a country did not reach take-
off it would be susceptible to communism, contrary to the interests of the United 
States. Therefore Rostow’s evaluation was closely linked with Cold War imperatives. 
In A Proposal, Rostow (and Max Millikan) admitted the price of the economic aid 
required for take-off would be large but the cost of salvaging areas that were allowed 
to fall to communism, such as Indo-China, would be far greater.868 They went on to 
identify the aims of aid programmes as the development of local leadership, a 
constructive outlet for nationalism (which often meant the military), to provide a 
social solvent and increase confidence in democratic and international solidarity.869 
Austrian School thinker Murray Rothbard poured scorn upon Rostow’s ideas, 
describing them as a ‘futile search for non-existent “laws of history.”’ 870 
Nevertheless, it was thinking that came to dominate Western countries’ aid policies: 
cash transfers in return for political orientation away from the Soviet bloc. 
 
Rostow was a thinker on development also unique for his involvement in high-level 
policy making, as part of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. He thought the 
drive for development would be more committed by nationalists, which partially 
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justified American support for numerous autocrats and military dictators during the 
Cold War.871 Rostow’s test case was Vietnam and his critics blamed him for the 
escalation of that war and other idealistic policies that backfired in their attempts to 
prevent the communist dominos falling. Rostow’s influence, however, can be seen in 
organizations such as USAID, Alliance For Progress and Peace Corps while his ideas 
of capital transfer in development as well as aid as a political tool were also important 
and widely practiced.872 Rostow’s thesis that aid could be used as a tool in the Cold 
War was to retain some influence on the Thatcher government in the 1980s. 
 
Walt Rostow briefly worked as a deputy at the UN Economic Commission to Europe 
to Gunnar Myrdal, another key thinker on aid policy in the 1950s and 1960s. Myrdal 
favoured rapid industrialization and capital accumulation in assisting development 
and redistribution.873 Myrdal also believed that imperialism meant institutions left 
behind in the developing world would continue to benefit the colonial power.874 This 
point was later a criticism of countries like Britain in their approach to the post-
colonial world. Nevertheless, both Rostow and Myrdal advocated capital transfer in 
development and were two of the most famous proponents of aid. 
 
Aid policy as well as its delivery began to be challenged in the 1960s and particularly 
the 1970s. Broadly speaking, this could be divided into those who believed more aid 
was required and those who thought it counterproductive and that other strategies 
should be pursued. The work of John Rawls gave philosophical weight to the former. 
His 1971 book A Theory of Justice was particularly influential and much debated in 
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the Western world. Rawls’ ideas of an ‘original position’ and a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
asserted individuals should be considered without knowledge of their status in society 
and without preconceptions. Rawls said that in these objective conditions, human 
beings would chose to assist those who were less advantaged than themselves.875 This 
reasoning appears to have prevailed in the official international reports into 
development. The 1969 Pearson Report (commissioned by the World Bank) and the 
independently funded Brandt Commission in the early 1980s both cited enlightened 
self-interest as the motivation for continuing aid to the developing world.876 The 
latter’s reports, North-South: A  Programme for Survival and Common Crisis: North-
South Co-operation for World Recovery were described by Tony Thirlwall as 
promoting ‘Global Keynesianism’.877 
 
Inevitably though, giving aid to the developing world went beyond ethical reasons. 
Former colonial powers like France and Britain gave disproportionately to their recent 
dependents. This was due both to a ‘special kind of community’ but also to retain 
privileged access to markets and resources.878 Aid in return for political allegiance 
(like the Marshall Plan) was commonplace during the Cold War and scarcely any part 
of the developing world was immune to the competing influence of the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Tim Lankester has written that there was a general acceptance 
that aid could be used for certain objectives – such as trade and promoting political 
relations – but that development should be the main concern.879 
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Apart from the moral case for aid, the established consensus in the West post-1945 
was that the ‘third world’ lacked the necessary resources for development. Capital 
donations, in the same way as the Marshall Plan, were intended to stimulate fledgling 
states and their economies. Several models for development have been in fashion 
since then and approximately mirror the Western trend from redistributive social 
democracy towards those that favour wealth creation through capitalism. Margaret 
Thatcher argued that advocates of aid wanted to see the ‘redistribution of world 
resources’ when trade and ‘the creation of wealth was the way to tackle poverty and 
hunger.’880 
 
The Harrod-Domar Growth Model, sometimes associated with Keynesianism, was 
initially the key influence on British aid policy. It justified the need for capital transfer 
in fragile economies to stimulate savings and investment and therefore growth.881 The 
Thatcher government’s well-known antagonism to Keynesianism could well have led 
it to oppose capital transfers for development and favour wealth creation. The 
growing evidence that aid was not working in the late 1960s and 1970s weakened the 
consensus and caused a reaction. The thinking that aid in the form of capital transfer 
led to economic growth began to falter, while the focus of development turned to 
poverty reduction.882  
 
Criticism of Aid 
 
As we have seen, one reason that justified developmental aid was Western ‘guilt’ over 
colonialism. Aid, though, has in turn been criticised for being neo-colonialist. Official 
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empire might have ended but influence, resources and markets were retained. The 
development aspect of aid took a back seat to the political and economic interests of 
the donor.  Aid has been blamed for causing psychological and economic dependence, 
preventing real development and autonomy.883 Michael Maren described the extreme 
case of this in Somalia, a pawn in the Cold War, in his book The Road to Hell. Aid is 
said to have funded corruption, induced dependency while international agencies 
unwittingly led the country towards anarchy. 884  An oft-repeated criticism of 
international aid was that it favoured richer countries in the developing world and as a 
result did not reach the poorest people.885 Another is that donors did not understand 
the diversity and differences of individual countries and as a result aid was not 
appropriately targeted.886 This has meant, subsequently, more emphasis has been put 
on NGOs. Contradictions within the development ‘industry’ have been identified as 
one reason that goals were not met while a general theme emerged that the problems 
of the developing world were too complex for aid to make much impact. These points 
were among those used by neo-liberal writers to propose a number of market-based 
reforms to aid policy and that of development in poorer countries.  
 
Neo-liberalism and aid policy  
 
The development consensus after the Second World War was broadly redistributive, 
an idea anathema to supporters of trade and wealth creation as means of relieving 
poverty. The most famous critic of aid on the New Right was Peter Bauer. He 
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continued in the intellectual heritage of Friedrich Hayek but specifically applied it to 
the field of development. Hayek, not a prolific writer on aid, looked at the broader 
areas of social justice and distribution. He said there was no justification for either 
and to attempt to impose these principles on a society would require coercion on a 
huge scale.887 Equality too, according to Hayek, was not something a society could or 
should strive for. The themes of encroaching state power and suppression of 
individual rights, however benevolent the initial motives are, permeated most of 
Hayek’s work.  
 
In a 1981 article in The Times, Hayek pointed to the development models of the 
Asian tiger economies as well as ‘most recently and impressively, Chile.’888 In the 
same article Hayek recalled his thoughts of ‘27 years earlier’ that the best intervention 
in development would be that of the US Government to assume ‘for a limited period 
of transition, the role of guarantor against political risks, of private loans to private 
foreign borrowers, and especially against the risk of the nontransferability of the 
proceeds of such investments.’889 In this respect Hayek echoes the leadership role of 
the United States cited by Walt Rostow, while making a case for development 
through trade and private enterprise. 
 
Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) was a libertarian response to 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Nozick believed individual rights and property were 
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sacrosanct and that the state should be ‘ultraminimal’.890 He believed equality, social 
justice and redistribution were never justified as they infringed upon individual 
rights. 891  Nozick questioned Rawls’ ideas of ‘original position’ and ‘veil of 
ignorance’, that they cannot achieve justice or fairness. Transferring his opinions to 
foreign aid, Nozick - whose thinking was close to the Austrian position on the issue - 
found no moral basis for donor governments to give aid and to redistribute wealth in 
this way encroached on the property rights of taxpayers in the developed world.892 
Milton Friedman did not write about the subject to a great extent but he did say that 
aid retarded development.893 More notably, he consistently cited Hong Kong and 
Singapore as development models due to their pro-trade and low tax systems. The 
principle that trade was the fastest route to development became accepted by many, 
included the ODA in Britain, in the 1980s.894 
 
Bauer, however, was the most potent neo-liberal voice that questioned the case for 
and delivery of developmental aid.895 He criticised aid when it was unfashionable to 
do so – from the late 1950s - and years before the World Bank and IMF introduced 
elements of his recommendations. Firstly, the reasons that rich countries gave money 
to the developing world were reappraised. There was a moral obligation to 
redistribute wealth, according to Bauer, only if it was acquired unfairly.896 Bauer 
believed this was not the case and colonial guilt and historical unfairness were 
redundant emotions. He said that economic differences were deserved and that former 
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colonies benefited greatly from the contact and trade with Western powers.897 He 
went on to say that countries that were not colonised, such as Ethiopia and 
Afghanistan, were poorer than those that were and therefore the West cannot be 
blamed for underdevelopment.898 The colonial guilt validation for aid, according to 
Bauer, was cultivated by the Soviet Union and its clients during the Cold War in an 
attempt to divide and undermine the capitalist world.899 Bauer claimed that the 
concept of a third world was a construct of the West after the War, that it was 
maintained by international aid and was a political, not an economic idea.900 He was 
one of the first critics to identify how aid was poorly delivered. Corrupt governments, 
unsuitable development models and the difficulty of allocating money to those most 
in need all recur in Bauer’s work. Governments in the developing world were said to 
favour Soviet planning methods while equating capitalism with colonialism.901 Many 
of Bauer’s ideas became more widely accepted during the 1980s and were reflected in 
some of the World Bank’s policies. Bauer called for soft loans to replace grants, aid to 
only go to administrations delivering good governance and that humanitarian work 
should be channeled through voluntary agencies.902 Bauer was to have some influence 
on the thinking of Margaret Thatcher. 
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UK Aid Policy in the 1970s 
 
The aid policies inherited by the Thatcher government were delivered by the ODM 
(Overseas Development Ministry), which was an independent department in 1979. 
The Callaghan government had been under great domestic and international pressures 
and it introduced the (subsequently) controversial Aid and Trade Provision (ATP) to 
help gain contracts for British companies abroad. ATP was set up in 1977 by Judith 
Hart as the Minister at the ODM. It was a means of providing subsidies to help British 
companies exploit opportunities in developing countries. ATP satisfied two strands of 
Labour ideology: industry by means of a subsidy and middle class concern over 
poverty in the post-colonial world.903  
 
The Labour government produced a 1975 White Paper, ‘The Changing Emphasis in 
Britain’s Aid Policies – More Help for the Poorest’ and reviewed its progress in ‘The 
Government Record – Ministry of Overseas Development’ in 1979. The latter 
document refuted the idea of ‘trickle down’ prosperity to the poorest, stating that 
bilateral aid was mostly ‘directed to the poorest countries of the Commonwealth’ and 
that since 1975, ‘all aid to the poorest countries has taken the form of grants, rather 
than loans’.904 These ideas would have been in confrontation with Bauer’s neo-liberal 
critique of aid at this time. Judith Hart said in a speech in 1976 that ‘Chicago School 
economics are not for any of us.’905 To illustrate the different priorities between the 
outgoing Labour government and the incoming Conservative one, the document goes 
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on to say that foreign aid was intended to be the fastest growing public expenditure 
programme between 1977 and 1982. Therefore the potential differences in the aid 
strategy of the Callaghan government and a more market-orientated administration 
were marked. In addition, compared to the rhetoric of Labour that linked aid with 
human rights in the 1970s, Margaret Thatcher herself was subsequently dismissive of 
the very concept of the latter.906 
 
There were other difficulties in the developing world in the 1970s for which Britain 
took unique responsibility. The UK was being urged to intervene and bring majority 
rule to Rhodesia, while its policy towards South Africa was beginning to come under 
fire. These issues, however, must be put into a Cold War context. Détente was falling 
out of favour in the West (particularly in the United States) as the Soviet Union began 
a period of adventurism in Africa. The USA was worried that communist influence on 
the continent was proliferating from the mid-1970s and military and economic 
assistance was supplied as tensions increased between the superpowers. There was 
little doubt that conflicts that arose in the developing world during the Cold War 
retarded development. To generalise, a narrative began to form that a number of 
corrupt regimes squandered their nation’s resources, while allying themselves with 
respective superpowers, and prevented aid reaching its intended recipients, namely 
the poor. Two notable examples were Mobuto Sese Seko in Zaire and Mengistu Haile 
Mariam in Ethiopa. Military clashes further devastated regions, their economies, 
institutions and their infrastructure. Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopa and Somalia were 
all cases in point.907 This was the backdrop of Margaret Thatcher’s ascent to power in 
1979 and she was to prove more belligerent and confrontational than her predecessors 
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towards the communist bloc.  Bulwarks against communism in Southern Africa were 
politically difficult to criticise or change. Cold War considerations were often 
paramount for Thatcher. Aid policy must be seen as a tool in this conflict and 
although relatively generous under Labour, was less important for the new 
government. 
 
Overseas Development Administration 
 
The Thatcher government’s first act in aid policy was to merge the ODM with the 
Foreign Office, creating a new Overseas Development Administration (ODA). This 
was a trend that had been consistent with changes in government in the 1960s and 
1970s. Aid policy was delivered by an autonomous ministry under Labour 
governments, reverting to control from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
under the Conservative Party. The first Thatcher government was desperate to reduce 
inflation and cut public spending. Incorporating the ODA into the FCO again made it 
ideally positioned for cuts. ODA staff numbers were reduced by 30% over the course 
of the Government. 908  Given the Prime Minister’s well-known antipathy to 
bureaucracy and the civil service this move was unsurprising and was another 
example of the potential influence of Public Choice theory, or at least Hayekian 
principles. The terms of aid allocation and delivery were also changed. The Minister 
of State at the ODA, Neil Marten, set out the new government’s position in 1980: 
 
We have had to make many painful decisions in our domestic programmes and 
overseas aid has to take its share. Our task now is to make the best use of the 
                                                        




funds available. The announced reductions are serious. They will be rightly seen 
as a firm indication of the determination of the present Government to continue 
to place overriding emphasis on the improvement of the British economy.909 
 
Despite broad public support for international aid (if at a low level of interest) and 
making up less than 0.5% of overall government spending, a change in policy was to 
lead to criticism.910 The Times stated that ‘since (last May) it (the ODA) has 
resembled nothing so much as a pre-operative patient being pored over by successive 
teams of surgeons.’911 The Thatcher government was to gain a reputation for being 
miserly on overseas aid and for repeatedly cutting its value. By 1985 The Economist 
remarked ‘between the charity of the British public (eg Oxfam) and Live Aid, they 
have raised more than the overseas aid budget.’912 The Government also felt the 
British taxpayer should have a tangible return for the money they were spending on 
overseas aid. This justified the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
business lobby bringing pressure to bear on the ODA when allocating aid. The 
Government believed the money should benefit British firms, help them win contracts 
and guarantee market share in the recipient country. This strategy owed little to the 
thinking of Rawls, Nozick or Bauer but was primarily nationalistic. The ODA was to 
repeatedly complain about the interference in its development agenda by the DTI and 
a small number of influential companies.913 
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An indication of how the Thatcher government viewed aid can be found in the 
Overseas Development (OD) report sent to the Prime Minister in December 1979. It 
stated that ‘Western aid programmes…have an important part to play in reducing 
communist penetration. (This) has not generally taken place in countries where the 
previous metropolitan power, together with other Western donors, has maintained a 
sizeable aid programme over a number of years.’914 It also used a historical example 
from the 1950s to back this up: ‘Dulles’ refusal to finance the Aswan Dam led to 
many years’ domination of Egypt by the USSR.’915 This document revealed several 
aspects of government thinking in 1979. Firstly, it seemed to accept Rostow’s idea 
that aid could provide a deterrent to communism in the developing world. Secondly, 
the motivation for aid was primarily political, not developmental. Thirdly, the aid 
programme was to be aimed mainly at former colonies so that as the ‘previous 
metropolitan power’, Britain could maintain links and influence. In the 1980s, the real 
value of aid fell while the majority of aid continued to go to Commonwealth 
countries.916  
 
The 1981 Cancun Conference in Mexico, concerned with the issues of a ‘Global 
North-South’ divide, was the notable visible moment in the aid policy of the early 
Thatcher years. World leaders were advocating an increased volume of aid and the 
ongoing Brandt Commission had been urging ‘global Keynesianism’ to promote third 
world development. The Times criticized the government. ‘Despite the Brandt 
Commission’s call for a big transfer of funds to the third world as part of a 
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programme for survival, Britain’s aid contribution faces further cuts.’ 917  In 
responding to criticism regarding the Brandt commission, Neil Marten wrote in 
November 1980, ‘the Government accepts the main message of the Brandt Report – 
that our own economic future is clearly linked with the future of the developing 
world. But in responding we must make sure that our energy is well directed.’918 In 
the House of Commons Marten used a recurring Conservative argument against 
criticism of reductions in the aid budget. ‘The cuts are due to the appalling economic 
state which the Government inherited,’ and when challenged that aid was a moral 
duty Marten responded, ‘that is absolute nonsense.’919 In 1981 Friedrich Hayek 
criticised the ‘notorious North-South report’ and urged those that were ‘moved by the 
specious plausibility of the Brandt Report’ to study the work of Peter Bauer to show 
how wealth transfers ‘produce effects opposite to those desired.’920 
 
Margaret Thatcher found herself in a minority at Cancun. She later wrote that ‘what 
the developing countries needed more than aid was trade’ and that ‘North-South 
dialogue also appealed to those socialists who wanted to play down the fundamental 
contrast between the free capitalist West and the unfree communist East.’921 At 
Cancun the British Prime Minister identified the key components of UK aid policy: 
trade, encouraging private enterprise and the broader fight against communism. 
Thatcher’s sentiments were less fashionable in 1981 but her opponents at Cancun 
were swimming against the historical tide. What was already under way in 1981 
continued throughout the decade. The World Bank and the IMF attempted to bypass 
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the bureaucracies of poorer state’s governments, foster capitalism while the volume of 
aid decreased. Redistribution was still talked about but the international consensus 
changed in the 1980s in favour of market-orientated policies. Tim Lankester said this 
reflected a ‘return to neoclassical tradition in developed countries.’ 922  The 
Conservative government’s 1980 Overseas Development Act, however, gave more 
consideration to business and commercial interests. In 1982 Neil Marten identified the 
‘background of political and commercial relations between the [recipient] country and 
the United Kingdom’ as a factor when allocating aid.923 
 
In the 1983 General Election Manifesto, the Government clearly thought tied aid was 
potentially popular with the British taxpayer. ‘Our generous but carefully controlled 
aid programme is both an investment in the freedom and prosperity of the poorer 
countries and in a stable and expanding world economy. That programme helps us as 
well as those who receive it, since most of it is spent on British goods and 
services.’924 Permanent Secretary to the ODA between 1984 and 1987, Sir Crispin 
Tickell, made a more concise judgment on the Government’s attitude to aid: ‘They 
(Conservative leaders) accepted there was a moral obligation for aid but that was 
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The recommendations that came from the New Right regarding aid policy, 
summarised in figure 4, made up much of the orthodoxy embraced by the World Bank 
and the IMF in the 1980s. Structural adjustment lending to the developing world (aid 
on condition of economic liberalization measures) grew during this period and later 
became much criticised. The principles advocated by writers and thinkers on the pro-
market right contained the same themes as towards domestic problems in the West 
itself. Private enterprise, free markets and competition should be encouraged while 
the size of the state reduced.926 Policy recommendations could be implemented with 
little opposition because thirty years of other strategies had not achieved significant 
development, few of the recipient states were democratic and the governments 
themselves were desperate for the money. The neo-liberal model for aid attempted, 
wherever possible, to bypass recipient governments and to minimise their autonomy 
to spend donor’s money. The argument that governments in less developed countries 
(LDCs) were manifestly corrupt and actually prevented the development of their 
people was a generalisation that became accepted by many writers and politicians, 
                                                        






















and has remained prominent. The basis of the model was not the quantity of aid but 
the delivery, while the policies of recipient government needed reforming.927 
 
Peter Bauer advocated replacing grants with soft loans and for emergency 
humanitarian aid to be carried out by voluntary organizations.928 Abolishing price 
controls, reducing public spending, reducing government deficits and selling public 
assets were all meant to liberate private enterprise and were urged by the New 
Right.929 Deregulation of capital flows and currency devaluation were intended to 
introduce competition, encourage exports and promote foreign investment. Lastly, the 
removal of import barriers to poor countries was seen as a way to help countries 
develop through trade.930 Protectionist measures, locally and also internationally such 
as the Common Agriculture Policy in the European Community excluded LDC 
producers. Neo-liberal thinkers believed development would occur through trade, not 
aid, which only served to crowd out employment in the developing world. Hayek and 
Friedman’s support for liberalization measures in poorer countries has already been 
mentioned. Ordoliberals too supported the principle of structural adjustment during 
this period. One article from the ORDO Journal set out how aid should be tied to 
market orientated policies.931 The World Bank embraced much of this in the 1980s. 
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The World Bank and IMF in the 1980s 
 
The World Bank, set up along with the IMF in the wake of the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference, was responsible for providing loans to stimulate development in poorer 
countries. The Bank concentrated on funds as capital transfers to LDC governments 
(along the lines of the Harrod-Domar model) to encourage growth and latterly (after 
the 1974 UN Conference) to specifically alleviate poverty. This changed, however, 
when A.W. Clausen became World Bank President in 1981. The crises in the West 
during the 1970s such as stagflation and oil price hikes as well as the growing debt 
problems of the global ‘south’ provided a opportunity to change approach. The 
intellectual environment had shifted. Neo-liberal thinkers had gained some credence 
in their recommendations to solve the problems in the West and similar ideas were to 
become in vogue in the developing world. Clausen was a firm believer in the power 
of the market and private enterprise to improve efficiency and productivity. He 
believed the path to development lay in market forces and not government 
bureaucracies.932 Tim Lankester identified the World Bank and IMF’s priorities in 
development as structural adjustment, provided by the former, and macroeconomic 
stabilisation, provided by the latter.933 
 
The Chicago School became the most prominent strain of neo-liberalism associated 
with structural adjustment because of Milton Friedman’s links with the Pinochet 
regime in Chile as well as his thinking on economic ‘shock therapy’. The strategy 
adopted in Chile after the Pinochet coup was subsequently praised by neo-liberals, 
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despite the backlash against the regime.934 The prevailing feeling was that aid had 
often failed because recipient governments needed reform.935 This gave rise to the 
conditioning of loans from the World Bank and effectively forced administrations in 
the developing world to adhere to a set of rules, known as structural adjustment 
lending. Aid which had previously been given as government-to-government grants 
was now often channeled through multilateral agencies like the World Bank and IMF 
and as a result, funded these structural adjustment policies.936 The UK fraction of aid 
allocated to multilateral agencies increased during the 1980s, most of which went to 
the World Bank and IMF.937 Western countries, particularly the USA and West 
Germany, were pushing for more aid to be provided to the private sector in the 
developing world and this pressure was borne out in the World Bank’s measures.938  
 
Both the World Bank and the IMF provided structural adjustment loans, the former 
usually linked to development projects such as infrastructure while the latter was 
usually for shorter-term macroeconomic assistance. Former Undersecretary at the 
ODA, Tony Faint, wrote in 2012 that ‘the UK generally supported the World Bank 
and the “Washington Consensus” during this period, though generally arguing for a 
more nuanced approach, recognizing human dimensions of development and calling 
for a more effective partnership with ldc (least developed countries) governments, as 
opposed to crude conditionality.’939 Tim Lankester said that structural adjustment was 
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‘both necessary and inevitable as a cornerstone of development strategy.’940 Tim 
Raison, Minister of State at the ODA endorsed structural adjustment, saying in 
Parliament in 1985 that currencies in African countries were characteristically 
overvalued and that ‘African Socialism, whatever the ideals associated with it may 
have been, has proved to be as bad a way of producing food as Socialism in the east 
of Europe.’941  
 
Comparing the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank with the hypothetical 
neo-liberal model for aid set out in figure 4, there are a number of similarities. In 
many cases public welfare spending was slashed, currencies devalued, price controls 
ended, capital flows deregulated while NGOs proliferated, providing emergency 
humanitarian assistance. An important measure that was more difficult to enforce was 
the lifting of tariff barriers in the West to goods from the developing world. Politics 
and sensitivity to domestic concerns made this hard to justify to Western leaders with 
national issues at the top of their agenda. Several rounds of talks had gradually 
reduced trade restrictions after World War Two but in the early 1980s a new series 
was at an impasse. It was not until the ‘Uruguay Round’ was launched at Punta Del 
Este in 1986 that progress began to be made.942 Government deficits were also 
difficult to reduce without this trade, as the hoped for activity of the private sector and 
increase in foreign investment did not materialise. One key issue here was the 
recurring instability in many developing countries during this period. Without 
confidence in the protection of the law and lacking the necessary infrastructure, 
private companies did not invest and take risks. 
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In much of the literature on developmental aid, structural adjustment lending is 
vilified. An exchange between ODA Minister Tim Raison and Labour MP Stuart 
Holland in 1986 demonstrated the resentment that was to occur around the policies of 
the World Bank and the IMF: 
 
The Minister will be aware that, in practice, the IMF’s structural adjustment 
terms have proved a formula for deflation, devaluation and the denial of the 
public sector and social spending. Is he not worried that countries such as 
Tanzania have very little prospect of development if those IMF conditions are 
applied? Has the ODA simply become an agent of IMF policy?943 
 
We are absolutely right to support those countries which are prepared to take 
the steps of policy reform, which are widely accepted as desirable. If we do not 
have policy reform there will not be any progress but a continuation of the 
rather depressing record of aid going in without commensurate results coming 
out.944 
 
The economic rationale of structural adjustment was criticised. In an exhaustive study 
in the 1990s, Cassen et al. wrote that there was an exaggerated faith in the immediate 
potential of the private sector and that aid had the ability to provide conditions for 
private enterprise to flourish if invested in infrastructure. Cassen went on to conclude 
that the key purpose of aid should be to provide things that the private sector cannot, 
essentially where the market fails or was missing.945 The World Bank’s strategy also 
disappointed because of the absence or weakness of legal, financial and information 
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services, as well as political infrastructure, which made the risk of investment high.946 
Lastly, some believed structural adjustment was based too much in economic theory 
and not in empirical evidence.947 If the historical model was post-war Europe and the 
Marshall Plan then the contemporary one was South East Asia and the ‘Tiger’ 
economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. They developed 
rapidly largely without aid but by liberalization and the embrace of capitalism. Neil 
Marten alluded to these countries as a model for development in 1980. ‘Newly 
industrialized countries – like Hong Kong, South Korea, Brazil, Singapore and 
Mexico – have thrived largely because they encourage private investment and so 
develop their own industries.’948 Margaret Thatcher said in Parliament the following 
year that Hong Kong had received ‘practically not a penny piece of subsidy from 
Britain and yet everyone there has jobs.’949 Yet a closer look at these cases revealed a 
less straightforward story. At various points in their progress the Tiger economies 
would have broken the rules of structural adjustment. Methods such as an active state, 
strategic protectionism and policies of promoting human resources allowed rapid 
development to take place and to a comparatively high level of social equality.950 
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NGO’s in the 1980s 
 
A reform to aid policy in the 1980s, advocated by neo-liberals like Peter Bauer and 
widely seen in practice was the increased use of NGOs to administer emergency 
humanitarian relief. The Conservatives had identified a greater emphasis on NGOs 
and voluntary agencies delivering aid even in 1979.951  Tim Raison claimed in 1983 
that there had been an 81% increase in provision to the voluntary sector in the period 
after 1978-79.952 The case for greater NGO involvement was due to several reasons. 
NGOs were thought to have more awareness of the diversity of different regions than 
larger national and supranational bodies.953 A common criticism of aid was a one-size 
fits all model was applied indiscriminately to countries of huge diversity. NGOs 
nominally had humanitarian motives and should be less affected by the politics that 
effect government decisions regarding aid.954 The trend away from government to 
government grants and towards NGOs was an example of the shift towards neo-
liberal policies and the type of conditions applied to loans by the World Bank. NGOs 
were considered more flexible, open to innovation and quicker to respond to local 
needs. They could also bypass the large bureaucracies so distrusted by economic 
liberals. It has even been suggested that NGO proliferation was a method of 
privatization of developmental aid.955 As well as providing humanitarian relief NGOs 
have been described as helping to liberate market forces in local communities.956 
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Interviewed in 2011, Sir Crispin Tickell said of his time as Permanent Secretary to the 
ODA that he ‘brought in NGOs a lot more. I had regular meetings with the main 
NGOs.’957 The Economist, in an article from 1989 praising Chris Patten’s work as 
Minister of State for Overseas Development, wrote: ‘Mr Patten has transformed the 
ODA’s relations with non-governmental organizations. He always consults them, and 
has greatly extended the joint financing of projects, matching their cash with aid 
money.’958 In October of that year, Patten’s successor Lynda Chalker gave a speech 
advocating an extension of the role of NGOs.959 
 
As with every other aspect of aid policy, however, one strategy has led to further 
problems and unforeseen criticism. NGOs differ in where they receive funding. Some 
are private organisations while others are partly or fully funded by governments. 
NGOs have been criticised for attempting to impose cultural hegemony on poorer 
countries while government-funded ones have been accused of being at the bidding of 
national interests. 960  Faith-based NGOs have played an important role in the 
developing world in relieving poverty but have been likened to colonial missions.961 
Erica Bornstein, in The Spirit of Development, wrote about the similarities in modern 
Zimbabwe and colonial Rhodesia. NGOs can be the human face to what is essentially 
a new variety of Western intervention. NGOs have become part of an aid ‘industry’ 
that is by definition interested in its own expansion. Governments such as the UK 
have encouraged this because it has decoupled aid from its sphere of responsibility 
and essentially outsourced development. The proliferation of voluntary organizations 
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interested in their own expansion follows a similar pattern to the Hayekian critique of 
the state, going beyond Bauer’s vision of short-term relief. Despite these methods 
neo-liberals have continued to put the emphasis in development on trade. 
 
UK Aid and Nationalism 
 
Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson described liberalism in 
conjunction with nationalism as a force for good.962 In development, however, they 
can prove contradictory. Aid had always had an element of self-interest associated in 
its donation. Sir Crispin Tickell said in 2011, ‘there is something to be said for tied 
aid. Aid policy was not an entirely charitable exercise. By being in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office you were promoting British interests overseas.’963 The end of 
empire had seen Britain give the majority of its aid to Commonwealth countries in an 
attempt to retain influence while, as we have seen, Rostow had pioneered the policy 
of using aid to repel communism. It has been alleged that the end of colonialism did 
not diminish the number of Europeans ‘assisting’ former colonies.964  
 
When Margaret Thatcher took office in 1979 Britain’s political influence was seen by 
many as in decline.965 A late entry into the European Community, decolonisation and 
a humiliating IMF loan in 1976 reduced the UK’s international clout. Although 
Thatcher hoped to reassert British authority abroad, her priorities were domestic 
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economic problems. Unemployment, inflation and the poor performance of British 
industries were issues that the government wanted to reverse. The 1980 Overseas 
Development Act put the emphasis on promoting British business and trade abroad 
and this can be seen as the main concern for the government’s development strategy. 
Aid could be used as a means of creating British jobs and securing companies 
contracts overseas. Tied aid and ATP encapsulated this shift. Neil Marten said that 
ATP was ‘to help British firms match subsidized credit terms offered by their 
competitors. We must have a means of matching this competition, and we have, 
therefore, increased the size of this provision.’966 
 
If the Conservative government had market economics at the forefront of their aid 
policy then ATP would have been dropped. The subsidy distorted prices and was 
instigated at the behest of the business lobby in the UK.967 In development terms it 
removed influence from the ODA, was unlikely to consider local needs and meant 
Britain helped ‘richer’ poor countries, inhibiting the primary aim of aid as poverty 
alleviation. ATP helped only a small number of British firms and was criticised for 
lowering the quality of UK aid.968  
 
Aid as a continuous subsidy was anathema to the New Right. The World Bank’s 
structural adjustment showed some convergence with neo-liberal policy suggestions 
and the UK did support these. It has been suggested, however, that the World Bank 
pressurised the FCO to come into line with structural adjustment and that the flow of 
ideas was firmly from the World Bank to the ODA.969 Multilateral organisations like 
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the World Bank provided some political cover if the Thatcher government was trying 
to promote neo-liberalism internationally but the suggestion casts doubt on whether 
Britain really was exporting pro-market policies in development. The Thatcher 
government did not pioneer liberal economics in aid because it was not in its narrower 
national interests. It continued to favour aid to Commonwealth countries. Figure 5 
shows how in 1989 the five leading recipients of British aid were in the 
Commonwealth. Crispin Tickell believed this was at odds with the realities of 
development, saying in 2011, ‘I thought more aid should go to Africa and less should 
go to India. I always thought that if they could make their own nuclear weapon they 
could look after their own.’970 Nevertheless, figures at the end of the decade show that 








As Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher extolled the values of liberty and the market. 
These principles featured heavily in speeches made during trips to Eastern Europe and 
also as justification to oppose sanctions against South Africa. The potential of trade, 
rather than aid, was at the forefront of the rhetoric of Thatcher’s development 
strategy. The 1987 Conservative Party Election Manifesto stated ‘there is little point 
                                                        










in demanding more aid for these countries and then refusing them the opportunity to 
trade.’971 Indeed, lowering tariffs and trade barriers in the Uruguay GATT round 
would have been expected to have been paramount in the Government’s thinking 
regarding overseas development. Minister at the ODA between 1989 and 1997, Lynda 
Chalker, strongly supported the GATT talks.972 An ongoing concern, trade restrictions 
were lowered after the Uruguay round was concluded. In her memoirs Thatcher made 
the case for trade in developing countries as a means ‘not only for poorer countries to 
earn foreign currency and increase their peoples’ standards of living. It was also a 
force for peace, freedom and political decentralization.’973 Characteristically Thatcher 
blamed the European Community for hampering Britain’s trade policy in its lack of 
progress in reducing barriers. ‘Britain’s own trade policy was now in the hands of the 
Community, which contained a majority of countries with a tradition of cartels and 
corporatism and a politically influential agricultural sector.’ 974  It was true that 
Thatcher was ideologically disposed to free trade and that some of her Government’s 
domestic reforms (privatization, monetary control, reduced public spending) were 
adopted in structural adjustment. For the most part British overseas development 
policy was conducted on a case-by-case basis, however, with liberal economics used 
as a justification or eschewed when necessary to suit national priorities. Market 
principles were used as a tool in foreign policy, ignored or embraced, to further 
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An example of the problematic nature of ATP was the controversy that arose over the 
Pergau Dam project in Malaysia. A 1994 Select Committee Inquiry revealed there had 
been a misuse of aid in order to win the contract for a British firm, starting a project 
that was not necessarily needed locally and revealed collusion between the British and 
Malaysian governments. The fact that an arms deal was involved only made the affair 
more opaque. ATP was responsible for a relatively small amount of UK aid yet the 
Pergau Dam scandal damaged the reputation of the Thatcher government’s foreign 
policy, brought about accusations of corporatism and questioned the primacy of the 
market in its programme.  
 
The subsequent inquiry uncovered a train of events that owed little to either poverty 
alleviation or liberal economics. The Malaysian government had identified Pergau 
Dam as a possible site for a hydro-electric dam in the 1960s. In the early 1980s 
Malaysia adopted a ‘Buy British Last’ policy in protest at increased student fees and 
the FCO and DTI were eager to build better relations with the South East Asian 
country. George Younger, then Secretary of State for Defence, visited Malaysia in 
March 1988 and signed a protocol that included a £1 billion arms package.975 The 
protocol appeared to accept a conditional link of ‘aid for arms’, which according to 
Tim Lankester ‘horrified’ the ODA.976 The British later tried to back track on this but 
the then Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe admitted it implied a ‘moral obligation’.977 
Younger himself said in 1994 that ‘each side had its own perception of whether there 
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was linkage, and each was happy to keep its own perception.’978 Meanwhile, a 
consortium of British companies led by Balfour Beatty and Cementation International 
submitted an application for ATP support to build the Pergau Dam in November 
1988. When Margaret Thatcher met with the Malaysian Prime Minister in March 
1989 she made a verbal offer of ATP to build the dam, based on a value of over £200 
million. It subsequently emerged that Charles Powell, the Prime Minister’s foreign 
policy advisor, had pressurised the ODA into an answer regarding the feasibility of 
building the dam prior to the visit.979  
 
The ODA, in 1990, concluded that ATP should not be used to support the project. It 
was deemed uneconomic and believed would result in Malaysian consumers paying 
an estimated £100 million extra for electricity over its 35-year life compared with if 
the money was invested in an alternative source, gas-fired turbines. 980  Yet a 
government supposedly committed to liberal economics overruled this 
recommendation and approved the project (by this time John Major and Douglas 
Hurd were Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary respectively) in February 1991.981 
Tim Lankester said during the Parliamentary inquiry in 1994 that Pergau was ‘an 
abuse of aid programme’ and that ‘it was not…a sound development project.’982 If the 
project was uneconomic and failed to meet the whole purpose of donating aid why 
was it approved? Charles Powell, who stayed on briefly to advise Major, said ‘the 
Government could not back out now. The Prime Minister (Major) felt that we must 
honour Mrs Thatcher’s word’.983 Douglas Hurd, Foreign Secretary between 1989 and 
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1995, explained his reasoning. ‘The shock would have been felt in every office and 
shop floor of British companies trying to do business in Malaysia.’984 
 
Hurd later wrote:  
I was defending a wasteful project on grounds of good faith and friendship. 
Lynda Chalker, though loyal throughout, was deeply unhappy, not least because 
of her own high reputation in that office was also at stake. Looking back, I can 
see that it was a mistake to act so quickly in 1991. If I had called an office 
meeting and summoned papers, no doubt the temporary link with arms sales in 
1988 would have been revealed.985 
 
It is hard not to conclude that the British government used its influence to negotiate a 
sizeable arms deal with Malaysia, securing a large amount of business for the UK, in 
return for supplying aid for a prestigious project that worked against the principles of 
the ODA, and could hardly be labeled ethically liberal. There was also evidence of 
‘aid for arms’ from the UK to ‘relatively rich third world countries’ Jordan, Oman, 
Indonesia and Thailand.986 In 2013, Lankester published a book on the affair. He 
reappraised the project, writing that the economic case against Pergau Dam became 
less clear-cut with the hindsight of fuel prices.987 Nevertheless, Lankester paints a 
picture of the ODA as coming under commercial pressures that paid scant attention to 
development concerns. Despite the cuts in aid volume, Lankester thought Britain had 
a good reputation on aid delivery under the Thatcher government.988 This was 
undermined by the Pergau Dam project. The Foreign Affairs Committee also found 
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that the existence of ATP discouraged UK companies in this export field from 
becoming more price competitive or from diversifying into markets where they might 
sell British exports without government assistance.989 This appeared distinctly un-
Thatcherite or pro-market and showed how liberal economic ideas were usurped by 
political and nationalist imperatives.   
 
1980s South Africa and sanctions 
 
An area where pro-market ideas were invoked to justify another controversial policy 
was the UK’s posture towards apartheid South Africa. Increasing Soviet influence in 
the developing world in the mid-1970s, after the relative calm of détente, alarmed 
Western leaders. The demise of the Portuguese junta led to independence for Angola 
and Mozambique, civil war, and the installation of regimes sympathetic to Moscow. 
The end of white minority rule in Rhodesia allowed a nominal Marxist, Robert 
Mugabe, to become the first President of Zimbabwe. Lastly, South Africa occupied 
Namibia, where the leftist SWAPO were recognized (from 1972 by the United 
Nations General Assembly) as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of the Namibian 
population. In summary, South Africa in the early 1980s was surrounded on all sides 
by left leaning governments, trying to prevent one taking control of Namibia and 
attempting to put down an insurgency led by the ‘communist’ ANC at home. The 
P.W. Botha government had launched ‘Total Strategy’ in 1977. Reforms domestically 
were intended to consolidate power there while raids into bordering countries (the 
‘Frontline States’) were designed to destabilise socialist regimes and disrupt ANC 
bases. As the Cold War entered a tense phase during the first Thatcher government, 
                                                        




allies in this area of the world were deemed important. Britain’s historical role as 
regional hegemon was to bring the matter of apartheid to a controversial head only a 
few years later. In the early 1980s though, the Cold War power struggle outweighed 
more ‘ethical’ foreign policy considerations. It was also difficult to see any link with 
Friedman’s ideas of market economies leading to political liberty in apartheid South 
Africa. Despite this, however, the Thatcher government partly justified their tacit 
support of apartheid South Africa with the rhetoric of economic liberalism. 
 
A state of emergency was declared in the country in 1985. Margaret Thatcher then 
came under pressure for her intransigence over the issue of economic coercion. Her 
political opponents vilified her for an unwillingness to impose sanctions on the 
apartheid regime, which they hoped would bring an end to the institutionalised racism 
in the country. The archives released by the post-apartheid government in South 
Africa, however, do reveal how Margaret Thatcher attempted to use her influence 
over Botha to accelerate reform. In a series of letters in the mid-1980s Thatcher tried 
several times to persuade the South African leader, writing that ‘the issue of sanctions 
will not go away’, that ‘many countries remain deeply sceptical that fundamental 
change in South Africa is truly under way,’ and more critically that Botha’s behavior 
left her ‘very disappointed, indeed dismayed.’990 Most surprisingly, and at odds with 
her public rhetoric, Thatcher urged Botha to release Nelson Mandela, writing that it 
‘would have more impact than almost any single action you could undertake.’991 
Nevertheless, to the outside world Thatcher appeared a friend of the apartheid regime. 
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The leaders of Western countries, in particular fervent Cold Warriors like Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, were left in a difficult situation. They were anxious to 
stand up to the USSR, curb its influence and aggressively win a battle of hearts and 
minds as well as military might. Yet the rhetoric of ‘freedom’ from the West was 
hypocritical and compromised by its support for South Africa, which crudely 
suppressed the majority of its people. Yet the role played in reaching a settlement in 
Rhodesia in 1980 showed Britain had the potential influence to force change in the 
region. The British stance towards South Africa, however, was contradictory. A 
significant strand of both public opinion and the Conservative Party was sympathetic 
to the white settler colonies and apparently did not object to apartheid.992 Margaret 
Thatcher repeatedly said that thousands of British jobs depended on business with 
South Africa and this proved a potent argument in a period of high domestic 
unemployment. A repository of raw materials in short supply elsewhere, such as 
platinum, gold, chrome, aluminium and diamonds, also made South Africa an 
important trading partner for the UK.993 
 
There was nevertheless significant protest against apartheid in Britain, which 
increased during the 1980s. This was often combined with a more general anti-
Thatcherism and was embraced by the opposition parties, trade unions and church 
groups.994 The Labour Research Department published a booklet in 1986 explaining 
why it thought sanctions would work. South Africa needed trade with the UK more 
than vice versa, according to the study.995 The SDP, meanwhile, published two 
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pamphlets abhorring the ‘abyss of apartheid’ and the Thatcher government’s response 
to the crisis in South Africa. It said that Britain had a historic responsibility to the 
region (SDP leader David Owen, as Foreign Secretary 1977-79 had paved the way for 
the Rhodesia settlement) and that South Africa should be branded a terrorist state, 
similarly to Libya and North Korea at that time.996 The SDP also recommended aid to 
the frontline states to repair the damage caused by South African sabotage raids.997 
Indeed, Chris Patten (ODA Minister between 1986 and 1989) believed aid to the 
countries bordering South Africa was important. ‘Our aim is to strengthen the 
economies of the countries in the region so as to reduce their dependence on South 
Africa. That is why we have invested so much in transport and infrastructure 
projects.’998 Justifying aid to nominally leftist regimes in the region, alluding to 
structural adjustment and to counter the hypocrisy of previously criticising Labour for 
the same policy, Patten said to the House of Commons in 1987: ‘We have committed 
nearly £14 million in emergency aid for Mozambique so far this year. The economic 
policies now being pursued by Mozambique, after its agreement with the IMF and the 
World Bank, certainly do not seem terribly Marxist to much of the outside world.’999 
 
The United Nations declared 1985 as the year that punitive measures should be 
enforced against the Botha regime. Margaret Thatcher (and Ronald Reagan to a lesser 
extent) stood out in their resistance to sanctions. Britain’s policy was fiercely 
criticised by some leaders and many protestors as, by implication, condoning 
apartheid. Thatcher’s argument against sanctions, at least rhetorically, could be 
attributed to her belief in economic liberalism. It was not dissimilar to Friedman’s 
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support of Pinochet. Thatcher reasoned, time and again, that sanctions would 
impoverish South Africa, that the only way to emancipate the black majority was by 
trade and to allow the ‘trickle down’ effects of capitalism to allow development, a 
middle class and eventually democracy. Sanctions, according to Thatcher, would have 
the opposite effect and in the process damage Britain’s economy: 
 
What I wanted to achieve was step-by-step reform – with more democracy, 
secure human rights, and a flourishing free enterprise economy able to generate 
the wealth to improve black living standards. It was also true that Britain had 
important trading interests in the continent.1000 
 
Lord Owen indeed argued ‘her basic position of not trying to harm the South African 
economy was perfectly rational.’1001 He believed, however that the Prime Minister 
tended to ‘polarise the argument’ and became ‘cut off from reality’ on the issue.1002 
Many were suspicious though that Thatcher’s real motivation was the preservation of 
British business links and jobs with the pariah state. Sanctions against South Africa 
were an example of the conflict between Margaret Thatcher’s ideological belief in the 
market and her inherent nationalism. There were clearly divisions within the cabinet 
on the subject of apartheid. Geoffrey Howe outlined what he saw as the contradictions 
in Thatcher’s policy, describing ‘the suspicion that she was making much of black 
economic hardship only as a means of safeguarding our own British interests.’1003  
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There are several lines of reasoning on why apartheid collapsed in South Africa and if 
sanctions accelerated its demise. The black majority tried to make apartheid 
ungovernable in the 1980s and the ensuing disorder had a part to play in the eventual 
repealing of discriminatory laws.1004 Trade, and not sanctions, was fomented by 
Botha’s regime in an attempt to retain power.1005 According to SDP research there 
was no evidence of the ‘trickle down’ effect emancipating black South Africans. 
Their figures showed the South African economy grew on average by 6% in the 
1960s and 3-4% in the 1970s with no increase in political power for non-whites.1006 
The situation in South Africa showed the difficulty in bringing about internal regime 
change, although there was evidence to suggest sanctions worked. A turning point 
occurred in August 1985 when P.W. Botha rejected any notion of majority rule. This 
led to foreign banks calling in loans, causing the value of the rand to plummet.1007 The 
US Congress passed an act the following year (against President Reagan’s veto) that 
discouraged investment in South Africa and caused several American companies to 
then leave the country.1008 David Owen, who visited the region on several occasions, 
wrote that ‘the harshest economic sanction was in 1985 when foreign bank loans dried 
up following the refusal of the Chase Manhattan Bank to roll over short term loans’ 
and that a myth was propagated by Margaret Thatcher that sanctions never had any 
effect on the changes that came in 1990 with Botha’s successor, President F.W. de 
Klerk. ‘That was never the view of the South African business community.’1009 
Sanctions impacted on the South African economy and forced businesses operating in 
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the state to seek dialogue with the ANC.1010 David Owen thought that sanctions did 
make an impact. ‘It is very difficult to calculate whether the ban on new investment 
hurt the South African economy but a reasonable assessment is that it depressed 
attainable GDP growth by 1-1.5% per annum by 1988-89.’1011 
 
The release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and the end of apartheid was a combination of 
political pressure, economics and also personality. F.W. de Klerk, who became 
President in 1989, had no reforming pedigree but introduced far-reaching changes 
within the space of months. De Klerk, succeeding the intransigent Botha, was forced 
into concessions because he may have expected the ANC to weaken in the aftermath 
of the fall of the Berlin Wall (or his country to lose Western support with the Cold 
War ending), because the economic situation was deteriorating and the country was 
becoming ungovernable. De Klerk was described as essentially a ‘practical and 
religious’ man.1012 The argument against sanctions was difficult to separate from the 
apartheid regime’s desire to hang on to power and Thatcher’s wish to retain British 
jobs and trade with the country. The Thatcher government invoked liberal economics 
as a justification against sanctions. It appeared, however, that this was a rhetorical 
device that masked more rudimentary self-interest.  
 
The Know How Fund to Eastern Europe 
 
Towards the end of Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister sweeping changes 
took place in Eastern Europe as the Soviet Union withdrew its influence from the 
region and communist rule crumbled in one country after another. This presented the 
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British government with an opportunity to assist and consolidate a peaceful transition 
to democracy whilst encouraging pro-market reforms. The fall of the Berlin Wall at 
the end of 1989 was the focal point of the collapse of communism in East Europe and 
anticipated the 1991 demise of state socialism in its figurehead, the Soviet Union. 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were both popular in Eastern Europe. Kenneth 
Baker, a regular member of the Thatcher cabinet, later said of the Prime Minister that 
the Poles ‘almost worshipped the ground she walked upon’.1013 Reagan and Thatcher, 
similarly to Milton Friedman, used the language of freedom and liberty and aligned 
this with the principle of the market, ownership and private property.  
 
If the Cold War was ultimately a victory for hard power there were still some that 
thought the soft power of capitalism and Western prosperity may have played some 
part in hastening the end of the conflict. The work of neo-liberals saw a broad shift in 
Western opinion towards the market and this started to be extended abroad. The 
stifled peoples of the communist bloc and their deteriorating economic situation saw 
the liberty of the West attractive. This was manifest in the show of people power in 
Eastern Europe at the end of the decade, seemingly the ‘end of history’ and the 
moment when capitalism and democracy triumphed as the dominant ideas of the age. 
The changes that occurred across Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, however, left a 
power vacuum. As socialist autocracies were toppled new leaders emerged from 
previously underground dissident groups, such as Lech Walesa in Poland and Vaclav 
Havel in Czechoslovakia. Years of stagnation and command economies meant that 
the transition to capitalism would not be straightforward. After the fatal delay in 
responding to the communist takeover of Eastern Europe in the 1940s the Foreign 
                                                        




Office sought to respond rapidly to realign the region towards the West.1014 Part of its 
strategy was the Know How Fund to Eastern Europe (KHF), set up in 1989.  
 
While visiting Poland in November 1988 Margaret Thatcher declared that if the Poles 
provided the commitment and resolve, practical guidance (and some funding) would 
be offered in transforming the country. 1015  This was attractive to the Polish 
government for the simple reason its economy was in the doldrums. The pace of 
change over the following months, however, surprised the British. The trade union 
movement Solidarity was legalised and elections were held, going against the ruling 
communists. Britain wanted to be seen as promoting reform and rewarding the Poles 
for the changes they were introducing and as a result encourage the rest of the region.  
 
Instead of traditional financial aid, the UK went about providing technical assistance. 
This did represent a cash injection but in a more pragmatic way to much 
developmental aid. It was hoped that the KHF would help set up a legal and 
institutional framework in which capitalism could operate and soon expanded from 
Poland to Hungary and then the rest of Eastern Europe.1016 The key areas for 
assistance included banking, finance, accountancy, privatization, retraining the 
jobless, stimulating small businesses and ‘political’ projects such as journalist 
training.1017 This programme was specific in its promotion of the market and was 
presided over by both the FCO diplomatic and ODA departments. Conservative 
Central Office also received requests for assistance from new political parties in 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Some Conservatives attempted to build links 
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with centre-right parties and leaders, such as Vachlav Klaus in Czechoslovakia, and 
the Party also sent some ‘training teams’ to provide advice on campaigning and other 
democratic processes.1018 
 
The KHF concentrated on flagship projects though, that reflected some of the 
domestic reforms of Thatcherism, such as the Katowice Banking School, Budapest 
Stock Exchange and Czechoslovak privatization scheme.1019 Other examples included 
a conference on privatization in Prague and co-operation between the Open 
University and the Hungarian Open Business School in 1990.1020 Unlike much 
structural adjustment lending, where markets were either failing or missing and 
infrastructure to support them did not exist, the Know How Fund was more effective. 
Although the economies of Eastern and Central Europe were moribund and stagnant 
by the late 1980s, the industrial building blocks that could act as the foundation for 
capitalism nevertheless still existed. Undersecretary at the ODA and in charge of 
supervising the Fund, Tony Faint, wrote that the ‘KHF (Know How Fund) was always 
envisaged to deliver advisory support, not for resource transfer (which might well 
have led them to postpone reform).’1021 This is both an insight into the Know How 
strategy and an appropriately free market sceptical take on the ability of capital 
transfers to stimulate development.  
 
The Fund was not without its critics. The Economist wrote in 1990 that despite 
Thatcherites liking the KHF because ‘it didn’t involve dishing out huge sums of aid to 
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crumbling governments’ that ‘critics complain the fund is miserly.’ 1022  Others 
regretted the lack of political institution building to complement economic 
reforms.1023 Clare Short, Secretary of State at the ODA’s successor DfID between 
1997-2003, regarded the Fund as an example of ‘extreme “marketolatry”’.1024 The 
KHF was criticised for being underfinanced, understaffed and focused on short-term 
issues.1025 In the same period the KHF spent £10 million in the Soviet Union, 
Germany donated $12 billion, although this represented the unique challenges of 
unification. The project, however, was about making a small amount of money go a 
long way.1026 The KHF was also an attempt to stabilise the region and reduce the 
potential for political unrest. A national government must be expected to act in a 
degree of self-interest and in this instance it was to encourage evolutionary as 
opposed to revolutionary change in Eastern Europe. The interests of the UK were best 
served by a transition to market economies and political pluralism in the region. The 
FCO account of the KHF states, ‘the Know How Fund has been about supporting 
reform whilst attempting to attenuate the potentially destabilising effects of radical 
change.’1027 Tony Faint wrote that although other countries were providing assistance 
to Eastern Europe there was a ‘need for [a] specifically British facility.’1028 The Know 
How Fund was different from other British aid programmes in that it gave the 
countries of Eastern Europe only the capacity to implement market reforms. In some 
ways this was more sophisticated than structural adjustment and certainly more rooted 
in liberal economics than ATP, bilateral aid or the policy towards South Africa. 
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Whereas structural adjustment enforced liberalization on developing countries in 
return for aid, the Know How Fund offered help, not direct grants, to set up the 
institutions to allow a market economy to function. Lynda Chalker told Parliament in 
1990 that the ‘know how strategy has been to make sure that the fund provides British 
advice, skills and training. We concentrate on the sectors in which we have particular 
expertise and take account of the specific Governments’ expressed priorities. The 
know how fund has some priorities – the banking and financial services; advice on 
setting up small businesses and entrepreneurial activity.’1029 
 
The Balcerowicz Plan 
 
The Know How Fund predominantly helped facilitate supply-side reforms. The Fund 
was initially designed for Poland and economist Jeffrey Sachs has said that British 
influence in the country was most significantly found in areas like privatization.1030 
Sachs helped formulate the most far-reaching element in the country’s shift towards a 
market based economy - the ‘Balcerowicz Plan’ of macro-economic ‘shock therapy’ - 
at the end of 1989. Nigel Lawson captured the pro-market feeling of the period in the 
Commons that October. ‘I find it very striking…country after country was determined 
to turn its economy from a Socialist economy to a market economy…no one put this 
more clearly than the new Polish finance Minister Mr. Balcerowicz’.1031 It was not 
long before Balcerowicz launched an anti-inflationary package that led to a fall in real 
incomes by as much as a third.1032 Margaret Thatcher strongly approved of the 1989 
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plan: ‘Balcerowicz, deliberately chose a radical course – the simultaneous 
introduction of measures to eliminate price controls, tighten monetary policy, cut the 
budget deficit and remove almost all restrictions on international trade.’1033 She also 
countered its critics: ‘the alleged drop in living standards was a statistical fiction, 
since previously Poles had faced crippling shortages.’ 1034  One IMF report 
subsequently noted that Poland ‘implemented market liberalization at a more rapid 
pace than most of the other transition economies’ but that from the early 1990s ‘of the 
transition countries, Poland has achieved the highest rate of GDP growth along with 
the smallest increase in inequality.’1035  
 
The Balcerowicz Plan could have been lifted from a number of Milton Friedman 
speeches or letters from the 1970s. The Chicago economist was well-known for his 
links to the Pinochet regime in Chile and wrote to the dictator in 1975 arguing for 
economic ‘shock treatment’ by reducing government spending by 25% within six 
months and for ‘the removal of as many obstacles as possible that now hinder the 
private market’.1036 In a speech from 1977 Friedman, using both Chile and post-war 
West Germany as examples, argued that high inflation should be tackled by the shock 
treatment of radically reducing government spending, tax rates (and eliminating tax 
loop-holes), ‘denationalization’ of public assets and incentivising residual government 
functions such as through vouchers.1037 These principles, and sometimes their direct 
implementation, were present in both the IMF’s structural adjustment lending and the 
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Balcerowicz Plan. The merits of this kind of strategy have been vigorously debated 
since the end of the Cold War and have met with resistance from the anti-
globalization movement and a variety of other groups. What is apparent from the 
Polish example, however, was that there was a shift over the 1980s that encouraged 
market-orientated policies internationally and that in this the Thatcher government 
played a part. Polish Foreign Minister from 2007, Radosław Sikorski later wrote, ‘if 
you look at the shock therapy prescribed by our first finance minister, Leszek 
Balcerowicz, it is clear that it was inspired by Mrs Thatcher’s radicalism’.1038 
 
The progress of the former communist bloc has been criticised. Corruption, oligarchy 
and organised crime proliferated in the region in the 1990s. The West has been 
blamed for rushing through elections and market reforms without putting enough 
emphasis on building political institutions that could have reduced corruption.1039 
State monopolies became private ones, inequality amplified with wealth concentrated 
in the hands of the few, seemingly in league with corrupt governments. Tony Faint 
said that the KHF was ‘noticeably more successful in CEE (Central and Eastern 
Europe) than in the FSU (Former Soviet Union), where the communist system was far 
more entrenched. Reformers like (Russian) Yegor Gaidar tried to push a reform 
agenda against great resistance.’1040 
 
In relative terms, comparing the area’s response to liberalization measures with that of 
other regions (Africa in particular but also Latin America) the Know How Fund can 
be deemed to have been successful in its aims. In the years since 1989 most of Eastern 
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Europe has been admitted into the European Union, has remained peaceful and 
retained liberal democracies. The short-term assistance offered by the British 
government appears to have been one of the most successful aid strategies of the 
Thatcher period, and the one most effective in promoting and consolidating market 
principles. The Economist wrote in 1990, ‘why not extend a good idea, several have 
asked, and apply the same conditions to debt-ridden and dirigiste countries in the third 
world?’1041   
 
The Know How Fund assisted radical reform in Central and Eastern Europe. In his 
recent account of the Fund however, Keith Hamilton said that to view Margaret 
Thatcher as wanting to translate free market economics into foreign policy would be 
too ‘facile’ an interpretation. This was due to the complex network of agencies 
providing assistance to the region after 1989 and because the Foreign Office was one 
of the least ‘Thatcherite’ departments in Whitehall.1042 Nevertheless, the Fund does 
represent an underlying trend. By the late 1980s Tony Faint deemed pro-market 
policies uncontroversial and that ‘state control of the economy’ had been ’discredited 
as an economic model’.1043 This could scarcely have been said ten years previously 
and alludes to another shift: that the climate of ideas had moved towards economic 
liberalism. This fits with the prevailing or ‘supporting’ wind idea mentioned 
elsewhere in this thesis. In UK domestic politics this had occurred earlier due to the 
rigorous ideological debate of the 1970s, the substantial work done by neo-liberal 
writers and the apparently discredited policies of the post-war period. By 1979 there 
was enough space for a pro-market strategy in Britain. Internationally this occurred 
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ten years later, with the clear and growing economic gap between the West and 
communist world. As the strictures of the Cold War began to ease, neo-liberal policies 
gained more prominence. Some of these, such as privatization, had been at the 
vanguard of domestic reforms of Thatcherism. For aspects of the foreign policy of the 
Thatcher Government, even relatively minor ones like the Know How Fund, the 
promotion of liberal economics fitted more easily with more traditional self-interest. 
The Know How Fund, then, was a policy that combined free market economics with 
national interest and consolidated the Prime Minister’s rhetoric of freedom that had 
been previously given throughout the region. Faint summarised the approach: ‘The 
KHF was a very effective facility for reformers to use, and most effective where 
national objectives meshed well with its strategic outlook.’1044 
 
Liberal Economics and the Thatcher Government’s Aid Policy 
 
There have been a number of criticisms of the overseas development strategy of the 
Thatcher government by neo-liberals. The Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), the think-
tank originally set up by Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph in 1974, published a 
paper in 1988 looking at UK aid policy. It took a similar tone to other New Right 
critiques of the decade. It called for an increased role for voluntary organisations, 
trade rather than aid and to counter the bias in favour of the public sector in 
developing countries. 1045  The paper advocated market solutions to debt, 
encouragement of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and equity finance.1046 This may 
indicate that structural adjustment had not begun to bite or that aid policy was so 
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varied and confused that neo-liberal writers stuck to the same mantras. Where the 
1988 CPS paper did differ from previous economic liberal analysis of development 
was its emphasis on reducing international trade restrictions, particularly on 
agricultural products. This represented the length of time the Uruguay GATT round 
lasted, although this was relatively short compared to the subsequent Doha round. The 
West was urged to give fullest possible access to the exports of the developing 
world.1047 Some neo-liberals, similarly to Röpke years earlier, encouraged unilateral 
free trade, as opposed to the reciprocal variety.1048 A market fundamentalist of the 
Hayekian line of thinking could argue, as some at the IEA have done, that if Britain 
was truly committed to trade rather than aid it could have abolished the ODA entirely 
(and its budget) and declared unilateral free trade with developing countries.  
 
Subsequently neo-liberals have looked at why liberalization in the 1980s did not lead 
to more development. Similarly to East Europe, but to a far greater extent, governance 
has been identified as a problem. Economic liberalization without credible and stable 
institutions has led to corruption and retarded development. A focus on rules-bound 
institutions preventing concentration of power is an ordoliberal principle. The 
emphasis on tying aid to good governance was to be an issue pursued by the Major 
administration, in the aftermath of the Cold War. Chris Patten talked about the 
difference between Asia and Africa when he said the most important issue in 
development was good governance.1049 The last Foreign Secretary in the Thatcher 
government, Douglas Hurd, also echoed this. ‘It had been thought impracticable or in 
bad taste to say too much about the governance of the countries which received our 
aid. In 1990 we introduced a concept of good governance and respect for freedom as a 
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condition for future aid.’1050 Lynda Chalker rebuffed the criticism of structural 
adjustment programmes in 1990 but added that ‘we must send a clear message of 
support to those committed to better government.’1051 
 
B.J. Ndulu, writing in Economic Affairs more recently, said that failure in Africa has 
been due to endemic rent-seeking, over regulation of markets, an unstable investment 
climate, weak infrastructure, unprotected property rights, a low rate of capital 
accumulation and low productivity.1052 This picked up on two important points when 
considering development in LDCs: political instability and property rights. 
Liberalization in the 1980s was intended to stimulate private enterprise and lead to 
growth. Yet the private sector will not invest (nor individuals save) if the conditions 
in an area are unstable. Political violence and turmoil was widespread across Africa 
and Latin America during this period. Secondly, if property rights cannot be secured, 
investment and therefore business are risky propositions. Misunyi Kimenyi, also 
writing in Economic Affairs considered better governance as just as effective as 
capital transfer in encouraging development.1053 Kimenyi went on to say political 
instability, corruption and poor democratisation has affected the chances of 
development in LDCs.1054 The principles of a stable investment climate, secure 
property rights as well as good governance were not made priorities in the 1980s by 
the Thatcher government. Yet this later neo-liberal analysis did expand upon some of 
the trends set during Thatcherism: reduced amounts of cash transfers and tying aid 
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and technical assistance with internal reform. The general theme in development, 




Unsurprisingly the Thatcher government was primarily realist or nationalist in its 
foreign policy. For most of the Thatcher years the main focus of this was the Cold 
War, particularly during the escalation of the early 1980s. As tensions thawed during 
Gorbachev’s leadership of the Soviet Union liberal ideas began to take more 
precedence in some UK foreign policy. This coincided with a broader global shift 
away from state-led command economies towards more market-based liberalization. 
A pertinent example of how self-interest sat more comfortably with economic 
liberalism was the Know How Fund to Eastern Europe after 1989. 
 
To generalise, although it purported to have developmental aims, overseas aid under 
the Thatcher government was used as a tool of foreign policy. The ODA was 
incorporated into the Foreign Office in 1980 and bilateral aid was allocated to further 
Cold War imperatives and national interests. Development aid had always been used 
in this way by British governments but the goal had previously been enlightened self 
interest. It was more difficult to see this feature in much of the Thatcher (bilateral) aid 
strategy. ATP was used as a subsidy to gain contracts for British companies which 
disrupted prices and was even shown to have questionable utility for the UK. ATP 
became associated with corruption in the Pergau Dam fiasco, which appeared to show 
aid given to the Malaysian government in return for a lucrative weapons deal and a 




government had a reputation as ideologically dogmatic and at the vanguard of the 
global shift to market orientated policies in the 1980s. The bilateral aid programme of 
the UK over this time brings that perspective into doubt. 
 
Multilateral aid, however, was a different story. Despite the work done by the Brandt 
Commission in urging an increase in the volume of aid and the general consensus at 
the 1981 Cancun Conference, the international strategy towards development changed 
during the Thatcher years. The neo-liberal critique of aid percolated into the IMF and 
World Bank’s structural adjustment lending which tied aid to economic liberalization 
measures, which were intended to stimulate private enterprise and trade-led growth. 
Margaret Thatcher was vocal in her opposition to redistribution at Cancun and 
consistently argued the case for the market: trade not aid. Yet she was not a leader on 
the aid issue. Her emphasis in foreign policy was the Cold War and British interests 
while her zealousness for market reforms was mainly concentrated in the domestic 
sphere.  
 
Liberal economic thought was expendable as a tool of foreign policy. In relation to 
ATP and bilateral aid it was disposable - towards South Africa it was a justification. 
The apartheid regime was reviled around the world but Margaret Thatcher invoked 
trade as a means of development and resisted intense international pressure to apply 
sanctions. They were, however, subsequently one factor (along with political unrest, 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and a change in leadership) that forced South Africa to 
reform. The Prime Minister’s reasons for supporting aid as a subsidy for British firms 
while resisting sanctions against South Africa were the same: UK jobs and national 




economics as a rhetorical device. In aspects of overseas development it was discarded 
due to self-interest and over South Africa it was invoked for the same purpose.  
 
The Know How Fund to Eastern Europe showed a more sophisticated application of 
liberal ideas in aid policy. It pursued national interest in promoting peaceful pro-
Western change in the former communist bloc and by encouraging the transition to 
market-based liberal democracies. A combination of the FCO and the ODA provided 
technical assistance to the fledgling administrations of Eastern Europe and helped 
them develop the capacity for a market economy. It was not the blunt instrument 
imposed by structural adjustment, which yielded some disappointing results in the 
developing world and, although flawed in certain areas, was ultimately more 
successful as a result. The Thatcher government was more compromised in foreign 
and aid policy towards liberal economics than was the case domestically. 
Nevertheless and despite the overarching realism, foreign policy initiatives like the 
Know How Fund and support for the World Bank and IMF represent a wider trend. It 
was indicative of the international shift toward globalised trade and market orientated 
economics. Although the Thatcher government only did a limited amount to actively 
pursue this, the example set by its domestic agenda as well as elements of its foreign 
















This thesis has examined the extent of influence of liberal economic thought on the 
Thatcher government in a number of ways. Firstly, by utilizing the growing literature 
on the subject, it has charted the rise of neo-liberalism over the twentieth century. The 
main positions of the most significant neo-liberal strands - the Freiburg, Austrian and 
Chicago Schools - have been differentiated. Secondly, the influence of neo-liberalism 
on a cross section of the policies of Thatcherism has been framed. Thirdly, the 
opinion of neo-liberals toward the Thatcher government regarding these case studies 
has been outlined. Lastly, the extent to which some of these policies were neo-liberal, 
and which strain of neo-liberalism they best or least represented, has also been 
examined.  
 
This study has not questioned whether or not Thatcherism was influenced by liberal 
economics but how and how far. There are a number of generalisations found in the 
literature during and since the Thatcher era. These include that Conservative 
governments revived laissez-faire capitalism, returned to ‘Victorian values’ and 
dogmatically applied the theories of in particular, Friedrich Hayek and Milton 
Friedman.1055 The left has lambasted the Thatcher government as destroying both the 
working class and the post-war settlement. It has closely attached the forces of neo-
liberalism, globalization and market fundamentalism (often interchangeably) with 
these administrations, frequently in a conspiratorial tone. 1056  The left has also 
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criticised New Labour as being neo-liberal, and a luke-warm version of 
Thatcherism.1057 The pro-market right, however, has often stated that the Thatcher 
government was too timid in its application of liberal economic ideas. One overriding 
factor in the work done on this topic is the polarising effect of both Margaret Thatcher 
and her government. With over thirty years now elapsed since the Conservatives came 
to power in 1979, and in particular since the 2007-08 financial crisis (and its implied 
link to the reforms of the 1980s) there is now sufficient space to reappraise the 




There are several key points this study has tried to make. 
• The majority of the policies of the Thatcher government probably satisfied the 
ideas of neo-liberalism, broadly conceived; examples would include 
ownership, monetary control, some faith in market forces, less intrusive state 
bureaucracy and the importance of private property rights. 
• Many of the reforms associated with Thatcherism did not, however, satisfy the 
more demanding principles of Austrian microeconomics and allow markets to 
function at their most efficient. This was because Thatcherism was as much a 
political project tied to Tory ‘statecraft’ as an ideological crusade. Subsidies, 
misplaced regulation, tolerance of monopoly and neglect of competition 
created price and market distortions. These failed to meet the social aims of 
ordoliberals and were insufficiently liberalising for Hayekians. 
• Individual liberal economic policy recommendations, such as enterprise zones, 
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were in some cases implemented in a reasonably similar fashion to their 
original design. Monetary control followed some of the theoretical 
recommendations of Friedmanite neo-liberalism and its offshoots such as the 
London Business School.  
• The Thatcher government made a general, if ill-defined, attempt to reduce the 
power of vested interests. Its most notable success here was the taming of 
trade union influence through a combination of ‘step-by-step’ legislation, 
political guile and a raft of other measures and trends, such as declining union 
membership and ending price and incomes policies. However, in other cases, 
such as privatization, financial deregulation and broadcasting policy, it 
reduced the influence of one set of interests but allowed another to emerge. 
The IEA has suggested this may be an integral feature of liberalization in 
democracies. 
• The foreign policy of the Thatcher government privileged national interests 
over liberal economic ideas. In some areas, such as the Know How Fund to 
Eastern Europe and multilateral aid particularly as the Cold War thawed, 
national interest and economic liberalism converged. For the most part, 
though, the rhetoric of the market and liberty in foreign policy was not 
matched empirically. 
• Many of the reforms of the Thatcher government constitute a new orthodoxy. 
A number of economic liberals, however, believe several Thatcherite policies 
did not go far enough (for instance in education and health) and have shifted 
the debate in terms of misdirected state regulation. Their critique still invokes 
‘government failure’, utilizing Hayekian and Public Choice tradition. This 




towards its objectives without ever being able to reach them fully. 
 
Limits of this study 
 
Although the Thatcher government came to power over thirty years ago, the 
proximity of the period has posed some challenges with respect to sources for this 
study. The thirty-year rule regarding disclosure of government documents has meant 
the emphasis on primary archive material is skewed towards the first Thatcher 
government. For instance, the papers concerning exchange control removal and early 
economic policy offer an intriguing insight into how close both individual economic 
liberals and New Right ideas penetrated the formulation of policy. The later case 
studies that look at, for instance, the ‘internal market’ reforms or Big Bang suffer as a 
result. On the other hand, the relatively short space of time since the Thatcher 
government was in power has meant several relevant politicians, civil servants and 
commentators have been interviewed. The wealth of material on these topics from 
economic liberals during this period has meant the study very much looks through this 
lens. The New Right was not shy about releasing material; policy makers obviously 
were.  
 
The Rise of Neo-liberalism 
 
The Fabian Society and its influence acted as the model for the New Right. Its long-
term impact on policy makers was the inspiration for a number of groups. It was one 
of the reasons that Friedrich Hayek established the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 and 




Affairs (IEA) and Bow Group.1058 Hayek recognised that change and influence 
occurred over the long-term and away from the political arena. This meant writers and 
think-tanks operated, by and large, outside the mainstream during the 1950s and 
1960s. The opportunity for their opinions to be taken more seriously arose during the 
crises of the 1970s. Hayek was of the Austrian School of economics that formed in 
the late nineteenth century in Vienna. Along with his mentor Ludwig von Mises, 
Hayek has come to embody a market fundamentalist strain of neo-liberalism. 
Although true that Hayek, and in particular Mises, articulated a minimal state liberal 
‘utopia’ (to use Milton Friedman’s description), this ignores the historical 
development of neo-liberalism. 1059  Writers such as Daniel Stedman-Jones, Ben 
Jackson, Werner Bodefeld, Rachel Turner, Taylor Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse as 
well as the collection by Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe have shed light on the 
forgotten first incarnation of neo-liberalism in 1930s Germany. This group, the 
ordoliberals, reinforced the liberal faith in market forces and the importance of price 
while accepting some role for the state in maintaining competition and attenuating 
what they thought were the deleterious social effects of laissez-faire. With the 
contextual backdrop of authoritarianism and growing collectivism of the period, both 
Stedman-Jones and Jackson have identified the convergence of neo-liberals in the 
1930s and 1940s, including the ordoliberals, the ‘first’ Chicago School and to a lesser 
extent, Hayek. Andrew Gamble also made a link between Thatcherism and the 
ordoliberals during the 1970s by invoking the latter’s idea, the ‘free economy – strong 
state.’1060 
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Hayek formed the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 and embarked upon forming a wave 
of liberal opinion that would turn back the fashion for central planning. He later 
admitted that by wanting to keep his group united he resisted criticising other Mont 
Pelerin members, in particular Milton Friedman, as well as the ‘constraining 
liberalism’ of the Freiburg School.1061 Although clearly agreeing on a great deal, this 
strategy may have helped disguise important distinctions and given rise to the 
grouping together of the various schools of thought as a homogeneous collective. 
1930s and 1940s neo-liberalism exerted some influence on the post-war West German 
state, which the ordoliberals either worked close to or even with in government. This 
strain became forgotten in the English-speaking world, however, as Friedman’s 
‘second’ Chicago School became the most famous proponents of economic liberalism 
in the 1950s. Stedman-Jones has suggested that the Chicagoans represented a more 
radical turn for neo-liberalism. 1062  Its economic if not philosophical positions, 
however, sat somewhere between the Austrians and ordoliberals. Hayek and Mises, 
and later Murray Rothbard, were anti-state ‘libertarians’ whose focus on 
microeconomics and price was closest to classical liberalism. Ordoliberals saw the 
primacy of markets but wanted to use them for social outcomes and to prevent 
‘proletarianization’ politicising the working class.1063 Ordoliberals were comfortable 
with a legally-based state that would constrain monopoly and make ‘market 
compatible’ interventions in the economy.1064 Although uneasy about government 
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activism the Chicago School under Milton Friedman and George Stigler nevertheless 
were willing to utilize it to further their goals. Ideas such as monetary control and 
education vouchers attempted to promote conditions suitable for more efficient 
markets or to create a market if it did not exist. This principle has been identified by 
writers such as Jamie Peck - that of ‘retasking’ the state in favour of business or pro-
market interests - and has some resonance with the policies of Thatcherism.1065 The 
change in role of the state has been identified by Peter A. Hall as representing a link 
between ideas, power politics and a shift in institutional ‘policy paradigms’.1066 The 
distinctions between the strains of neo-liberalism, as well as their historical 
development, have not been sufficiently well documented in much of the work on 
Thatcherism, hence this study.     
 
Monetary control was the first major New Right policy to gain a level of acceptance 
with politicians, and some of the public, in Britain. This was due to the work of 
Milton Friedman (and Anna Schwartz) from the 1960s identifying inflation as a 
monetary phenomenon. The message was also conveyed by politicians like Keith 
Joseph and journalists such as Peter Jay and Samuel Brittan, in newspapers like The 
Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Economist and The Financial Times.1067 The fault 
line for the establishment in this debate was 1976, when Britain had to accept an IMF 
loan. James Callaghan’s famous Labour Party Conference speech (written by Peter 
Jay) created some space for the Thatcher government to subsequently pursue the 
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policy more dogmatically between 1979 and 1983.1068 The other area that the New 
Right had some impact on in the 1970s was trade union reform. The Winter of 
Discontent, in particular, created an opportunity in which politicians and the public 
questioned the role of the unions in British society.  
 
Monetary control and industrial relations were direct responses to the public’s 
concerns of the times. Wider acceptance of a pro-market programme, supply-side or 
micro-economic reforms made less of an impact. The work in the 1960s and 1970s of 
Public Choice theorists may have also had a small, if limited, effect. Rooted in the 
thesis of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, writers like James Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock launched a critique of the state. Government and its bureaucracy, according 
to Public Choice, was wasteful, inefficient, prone to ‘rent-seeking behaviour’ and 
inclined to inexorably expand. Politicians, accordingly, should aim to reduce the size, 
power and scope on the state while applying increased discipline to what remained. 
Public Choice theorists invoked the idea of ‘government failure’. These principles 
may have influenced Keith Joseph (who spoke of the ‘ratchet effect’ of socialism and 
the state) and Margaret Thatcher, who recommended her civil servants read Virginia 
School literature.1069 Public Choice ideas appeared to infuse several Thatcherite 
policies, from privatization (the state should not run industry) to financial 
deregulation, to the internal market reforms in public services (market disciplines can 
constrain unproductive public sector workers and bureaucrats). Nevertheless this also 
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aligned with longer term Conservative thinking on bringing a more managerial or 
business approach to bureaucracy.1070 
 
In rhetorical and presentation terms, Keith Joseph was the British politician who most 
publicly challenged the post-war settlement with the ideas of the New Right. His 
lecture tours, the work done by his think-tank the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and 
his input into other research groups (such as the Right Approach and Stepping 
Stones), were important in questioning long-held principles.1071 He was also the only 
Conservative to flirt with ordoliberalism, initially naming the CPS the ‘Erhard 
Foundation’ before its launch and showing interest in the work of Wilhelm Röpke.1072 
In practical terms, however, Geoffrey Howe had been committed to free market ideas 
since the 1950s (Joseph had alternated with the orthodoxy of the times up until 1974) 
and applied these principles with determination once in office. His commitment to 
policies like exchange control removal, enterprise zones and monetary control came 
under fire. Establishment critics, civil servants and other members of the Government 
challenged his course, while Margaret Thatcher was often unsure. Documents from 
the period show Howe’s policies were rooted in liberal economics and were pursued 
consistently despite his mild mannered public persona. At the same time, Joseph 
prevaricated over a bail-out for British Leyland while Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry and whether to implement a voucher scheme while at the Department of 
Education and Science. 
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Finally, New Right ideas can be seen to have been transmitted via a cascade. The 
most profound work was done by thinkers like Hayek and Friedman. Think-tanks like 
the IEA then condensed them and gave them contemporary context. Journalists like 
Samuel Brittan and Peter Jay helped influence popular opinion while ‘conduits’ like 
Gordon Pepper most directly influenced policy makers. Even in office these conduits 
can be seen to have retained some contact with key politicians. Two examples include 
the meetings between Pepper and the Prime Minister, as well as the latter consistently 




This thesis has attempted to show that a spectrum of liberal influence existed in the 
domestic policies of the Thatcher government. The monetarist phase of economic 
policy during the first term was one of the clearest examples of ideology in practice. 
Deviating from the previous orthodoxy of counter-cyclical Keynesian demand 
management, the Government targeted the control of inflation as its primary concern. 
Several writers, such as Stedman-Jones and those on the left such as Andre Gunner 
Frank, have identified this as building on the monetary restraint of the Callaghan 
government, which came under pressure from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).1073 The Thatcher government, however, appeared to be more committed to this 
approach and several Conservative politicians were aware of, if not advocates of, 
Milton Friedman’s monetarism, often through conduits such as Alan Walters, Gordon 
Pepper and Peter Jay. The policy had two distinct phases. From 1979 until the 1981 
Budget the emphasis was control of inflation by restricting monetary aggregates. 
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After this deficit reduction, under the influence of ‘rational expectations’ thinking of 
the kind proposed by the LBS, took a more central role. Although criticised for the 
severity of the recession it caused, inflation had been cut back at the end of the first 
term before Nigel Lawson embarked upon different monetary techniques as 
Chancellor. Even with economic policy, apparently rooted in theory, the Thatcher 
government used the defeat of inflation politically. As Bulpitt pointed out, one of 
monetarism’s key aims was to ‘disentangle’ the central state from ‘interests’.1074 It 
was this dogmatic approach to reducing inflation, at the cost of soaring 
unemployment, that most wedded Thatcherism to an austere ideology. 
 
The removal of exchange controls was a measure that promoted trade and therefore 
satisfied neo-liberals of all persuasions. Milton Friedman believed this was the key 
initial act of Thatcherism.1075 Both exchange control abolition and the enterprise zone 
policy acted as important signals for the Thatcher government. The policies 
represented an early faith in market forces (although documents reveal Thatcher came 
close to re-imposing inflow controls), particularly by Geoffrey Howe and the Prime 
Minister. They were stepping stones toward the set piece deregulatory reforms of 
privatization and Big Bang in the second term. Geoffrey Howe, Nigel Lawson and 
Margaret Thatcher met opposition to their economic policy from within both the 
Conservative Party and the establishment. The influence of the New Right here is 
particularly relevant because documents appear to show liberal economic outsiders 
exerted more influence on policy makers than those within the Government machine. 
A closer appraisal of enterprise zones, however, illustrates the wider programme of 
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Thatcherism and neo-liberalism. At face value, particularly with the growth of Canary 
Wharf, enterprise zones were a pro-market measure of deregulation and liberalization. 
Although this was true the use of the state in clearing land and providing 
infrastructure was also important in the London Docklands.1076 Enterprise zones were 
another example of how the state was ‘retasked’ under Thatcherism. In addition, 
outside the Docklands neo-liberals were less supportive of the policy. 1077 
 
If economic policy saw a more faithful application of liberalism, social policy was 
more compromised. One popular success was council house sales. Although the 
policy had long-standing roots in the Conservative Party, and had started several years 
before 1979, it aligned neatly with the liberal principles of ownership and 
individualism. Right to Buy, however, was a partial success for neo-liberals. It shifted 
the terms of ownership but the manner of implementation (subsidies, large discounts 
and other housing subsidies like MIRAS) caused market distortions. Housing policy 
was another that altered the groups that received favours from government. Whereas 
the post-war settlement privileged groups like trade unions, the policies of 
Thatcherism accelerated the trend that made homeowners ‘our people’. Successive 
Chancellors battled with the Prime Minister to lower the ceiling on mortgage interest 
relief as well as over interest rate rises. This encouraged price increases and what has 
been described as the British ‘fetish’ for home ownership.1078 In neo-liberal terms 
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Lastly, two favourite New Right subjects, education vouchers and private provision of 
healthcare of the NHS failed due to the opposition of both public opinion and vested 
interests. The adapted New Right models did find some influence in the internal 
market reforms of the third Thatcher government. The 1988 education legislation 
included some element of choice for parents and retained the voucher-based principle 
of per capita funding. The National Curriculum, however, centralised control in 
education. Local education authorities were a political target for the Conservatives but 
this approach clearly did not chime with the kind of dispersion of power favoured by 
neo-liberals such as Milton Friedman, who once said ‘If government is to exercise 
power, better in the county than in the state.’ 1079  Nevertheless subsequent 
governments have pursued the quasi-market reforms of Thatcherism as a means to 
improve choice and therefore standards. Reform of the NHS met significant resistance 
and saw the absolute limit of neo-liberal ideas in Thatcherism. Increased private 
provision may have been favoured by those on the New Right but the eventual 
internal market reforms instilled some financial discipline on the health service 
without altering its basic structure. 
 
Vested Interests  
 
Economic liberals believe that vested interests have a detrimental effect on a market 
economy. Although not a pre-conceived strategy, due to the influence of both long-
term Conservative thinking as well as neo-liberalism, we may have expected the 
Thatcher government to attempt to curtail the power of special interest groups. 
Several of the vested interests studied here (trade unions, the ‘old’ City, state 
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controlled industries) did see their influence reduced by the Thatcher government. 
Trade union reform was the most successful part of this strategy. Tackling industrial 
relations was both political and economic. After bringing down the Heath 
government, trade union power loomed large in the Party’s memory. Economically 
reducing its clout did create a more flexible labour market. To achieve trade union 
reform the Conservatives used a ‘divide and rule’ approach and when in government, 
an improvised ‘step-by-step’ approach. The slow attrition of the union movement, as 
well as the set piece confrontations with the NUM and printing unions, effectively 
reduced its influence as a vested interest and moved it to the fringes of the political 
process. 
 
Financial deregulation, however was a different story. The old clubby network of a 
hermetically sealed City was prised open by exchange control removal in 1979 and 
Big Bang in 1986. The resulting wealth accumulated in the new City as well as 
soaring trade secured London’s position as an international financial hub, and gave 
the financial service sector growing power. This allowed the City to develop into a 
more potent vested interest than it had been previously. For those at the Hayekian 
IEA, this was due to flawed or misdirected regulation.1080 The importance of the 
financial sector meant the British government either part-nationalised or bailed out 
collapsing banks during the 2007-08 financial crisis. ‘Too-big to fail’ financial 
institutions inevitably prevented new entry to the market and reduced competition. 
One account of the interplay between government, the Financial Services Authority 
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and representatives of the major British banks was set out in Alistair Darling’s Back 
From the Brink.1081 
 
The Thatcher government attempted to curb the influence of the BBC by setting up 
the 1985-86 Peacock Committee. Despite the presence of several economic liberals 
on the committee it did not recommend an end to funding by licence fee. The 
Corporation had to change, adapting to both the commission and its aftermath. In 
short though, the power of the BBC was not reduced to a great extent. The 1990 
Broadcasting Act attempted to bring more commercial pressures to bear on television 
but managed to create another vested interest, that of BSkyB and the Murdoch 
empire. The latter has managed to exert influence over policy-makers and this was in 
part because the Thatcher government ignored rules on monopoly and ownership in 
1981 and 1990. Again this was political as Murdoch’s newspapers and channels were 
generally more supportive of the Conservatives than the BBC. Although it is worth 
noting the large start-up costs of satellite broadcasting the results of the Thatcher 
government’s policies has been limited competition.1082  
 
Privatization satisfied broad New Right themes - withdrawal of the state, private 
ownership, reversal of the ‘ratchet effect’ - and did have benefits for the consumer. 
On the other hand, the years after each large privatization years saw continued 
monopoly (in the private sector) and regulation or legislation struggling to facilitate 
competition. Electricity privatization managed to remove a vested interest but the 
creation of giant monopolies in the private sector risked a new group exerting 
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influence on markets. During the electricity privatization process Cecil Parkinson and 
Nigel Lawson appeared to be moving to ordoliberal ideas of enforcing competition 
and preventing monopoly, as a result of the criticism of earlier gas and telecoms 
sales.1083 The eventual legislation however, hastened by the electoral cycle, saw less 
competition than many neo-liberals would have desired. Hayekians saw a ‘captured’ 
regulator, ordoliberals presumably a weak framework.1084 The result chimed with 





A government committed to liberal economics generally behaved in a traditionally 
self-interested way in foreign policy. A hierarchy of beliefs appeared to exist; of 
nationalism first, anti-communism second and market economics third. In several of 
the case studies examined here, such as bilateral aid, the Aid and Trade Provision 
(ATP) and the Pergau Dam project; national interest was the overriding consideration 
and not ideology. In others, such as the resistance to sanctions against apartheid South 
Africa, liberal economics were used as rhetorical device to mask (British) nationalism 
and anti-communism.1086 Lastly, the increase in multilateral aid (mainly to the World 
Bank and IMF, often for structural adjustment lending), support for NGOs and the 
Know How Fund to Eastern Europe all represented a convergence of liberal 
economics and national interests. The latter was also one of the most effective aid 
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policies of the Thatcher government. Therefore, as with domestic policy, there was a 
spectrum of influence from the New Right although ideas were generally less 
important in foreign policy. 
 
The decline in the value of aid over the 1980s would have satisfied New Right writers 
(and may have gained some inspiration from them) on the subject such as Peter Bauer 
and Robert Nozick. Other liberal economic ideas that the Thatcher government 
broadly supported regarding aid were lower tariff barriers to trade (after the Uruguay 
GATT Round in 1989), a rise in support for NGOs for humanitarian assistance as well 
the market disciplines (with varying degrees of success) exerted by structural 
adjustment policies. 
 
Thatcherism, Neo-liberalism and Market Fundamentalism 
 
Why is it important to further examine the links between Thatcherism and neo-
liberalism? Look at any number of texts concerning globalization and the modern 
world and the term neo-liberalism often looms large. The use is overwhelmingly 
negative and has to come to signify some malign force, either backed by sinister 
Western business interests or right-wing politicians, or even more worryingly as a 
power in its own right.1087 The implications of this have been shown in this thesis to 
be at odds with the original architects of neo-liberalism. Stedman-Jones has identified 
the historical development of neo-liberalism from 1930s Germany to 1980s Britain 
and America. Peck has also described the development of neo-liberalism, viewing the 
phenomenon as one that requires redefining, particularly in terms of how the state has 
                                                        




to ‘fix’ markets, in order to survive and maintain influence among ruling elites.1088 
Ben Jackson has singled out the similarities between early neo-liberals thinking in 
comparison with its more radical 1970s version.1089 Rachel Turner sees the movement 
towards neo-liberalism as rooted in the context of each specific country – in the US as 
a reaction to the Great Society of the 1960s, in Britain against union power in the 
1970s and West Germany in the 1940s against the Nazis.1090 While accepting these 
trends this thesis has attempted to set out the separate strains of thinking and core 
positions taken by neo-liberals from its inception, through Thatcherism and beyond. 
These differences have been made more opaque by the contemporary trend to read 
neo-liberalism as market fundamentalism with a twist of Western imperialism. The 
‘Washington Consensus’ and globalization are also terms closely associated with 
Thatcherism and neo-liberalism. This has been documented by Boas and Gans-Morse. 
What we can say from all these interpretations of economic liberalism in the twentieth 
century is that they are more complex than many have assumed. 
 
Although not in wide circulation, the term neo-liberalism had broadly positive 
connotations in the 1960s, linked with ordoliberal intellectuals like Röpke.1091 This 
changed in the 1970s when Augusto Pinochet’s coup in Chile and its resulting 
economic policies were dubbed neo-liberal. From this point the term took on a more 
sinister tone, aligned with Pinochet’s authoritarian regime. Milton Friedman’s support 
for it suggested that many neo-liberals believed markets create civil society and not 
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vice versa. One of the reasons it is still relevant to identify the different potential 
policies embedded within neo-liberalism is how far the modern reading has deviated 
from ordoliberalism. Several historians appear to show sympathy toward this 
moderate version of neo-liberalism, and dismay at the way it drifted in Britain and the 
US towards the Chicago School’s ideas. 1092  This is fundamentally because 
ordoliberals believed the market system was the most propitious way to organise an 
economy, but that it could be manipulated for social ends. The Austrian and 
Chicagoan interpretations see markets as able to deliver order and benefits with little 
or limited outside intervention. They also have an ill-defined ‘freedom’, sometimes 
articulated as ‘negative liberty’, as an objective.1093 It is in this respect that we see the 
Thatcher government more closely aligned with Friedmanite neo-liberalism – to enact 
broadly market friendly and often political measures – and then to step away from 
action that might mitigate their social implications or even that could allow the market 
to operate more efficiently. One example was monetary control during the first 
Thatcher government. For an Austrian this was too much government while for 
ordoliberals monetarism was too focused on economic and not social outcomes.  
 
In contemporary British politics these differences still matter. When the coalition 
government went about reducing the budget deficit through cuts in 2010 they invoked 
the policies of the Thatcher government between 1981 and 1983. When leaders 
suggest they can prevent energy price rises through government fiat they are 
inadvertently trying to amend the perceived flaws of the privatization policies of 
Thatcherism, albeit the symptoms rather than the root causes.1094 Closer examination 
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of the basic positions implicit in these policies could improve social outcomes if 




This study has attempted to describe the relationship between liberal economic ideas 
and the policies of the Thatcher government. It has studied neo-liberal literature, set 
out hypothetical policy models and explored where and why politicians may have 
implemented or deviated from these. It has examined what the New Right thought of 
Thatcherism and the ideological and political legacy of the period. The actual policies 
implemented by the Thatcher government have had far reaching effects. Taken as a 
whole they have helped create a new orthodoxy, both in Britain and internationally, in 
macro and microeconomics. This has taken selective ideas from the New Right, 
compromised by political reality. There are several ways in which this project has 
tried to add to the existing literature on Thatcherism and neo-liberalism. 
 
- Firstly, it adds to the growing work done on the development of neo-
liberalism, particularly by putting more emphasis on the work and lineage of 
the Freiburg School. 
- Secondly, it sets out neo-liberal positions and looks at how close the Thatcher 
government was to these. Although invoking the philosophy of Hayek at times 
and having some very loose association with ordoliberals ideas, Thatcherism 
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was most closely linked with the Chicago School of Milton Friedman. 
- Thirdly, it reinforces the impression that while few members of the Thatcher 
government were ideologues (indeed, the most fervent neo-liberal influence 
was exerted by advisors, or ‘conduits’ such as Alfred Sherman, Alan Walters, 
Gordon Pepper and journalists like Samuel Brittan), it did, however, align 
more closely to neo-liberalism due to the prevailing or ‘supporting’ wind of 
the period. 
- Fourthly, it shows that some in government, such as Terry Burns, helped move 
the Government’s economic policy in a more theoretically neo-liberal 
direction. By implication, the state action this entailed took on a broadly 
Friedmanite or Chicagoan hue. Burns, as well as others such as Walters, have 
acknowledged the direct influence Friedman exerted on them. 
- Fifthly, it shows that the Thatcher government, although nominally liberal, 
behaved in a similar way to Hayek’s reading of government, in so far it was 
beholden to certain interests. During Thatcherism these included home-
owners, privatized monopolies, as well as more traditional Conservative 
supporters in big business. 
- Finally, this thesis emphasises that the Thatcher government, although curbing 
its growth, ‘retasked’ the state as opposed to reducing its size. 
 
The contradictions neo-liberalism contains can be seen in these conclusions. 
Ordoliberals had clear objectives and rule-based mechanisms to reach them whilst 
utilizing the benefits markets can provide. Austrians tended to outline a utopia based 
on principle and deduction. The latter was too much even for a Prime Minister whose 




‘Utopia never comes, because we know we should not like it if it did.’1095 This is why 
Thatcherism, with its broad alignment to neo-liberal principles, was closer to 
Chicagoan thinking. Friedmanites believed they could move closer to a more liberal 
society by state-guided stepping stones. As Peck and Stedman-Jones have identified, 
this has meant neo-liberalism has needed to consistently redefine what government 
can actually do. Thatcherism implemented several reforms that satisfied some liberal 
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